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PART I
THE HISTORY OF CUSTOMER-DIRECTED GIVE-UPS
THE ABOLITION OF THE CUSTOMER-DIRECTED 
GIVE-UP: ITS IMPACT ON MUTUAL FUND
RETAILERS AND REGIONAL EXCHANGES
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Purpose of the Study 
Prior to December 5 i 1968, the use of give-ups— payments 
made by brokers executing orders for mutual funds to other broker- 
dealers v/ho were not involved in the transactions; these payments 
came from commissions received by the executing brokers, and were 
made at the direction of mutual fund managers to reward broker- 
dealers for selling their fund shares— and certain forms of recip­
rocal business arrangements were accepted practices in the 
securities industry. For many years, these practices were 
accepted without any public criticism from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission or the major national exchanges. As a result, 
the industry was to a large degree structured to and dependent on 
these practices. The main beneficiaries of these practices were: 
(1) brokerage firms that were not members of any stock exchange, 
but were involved in the sales of mutual fund shares; and (2) the 
regional exchanges, because of the dramatic increase in share 
volume generated by institutional orders, especially those from 
mutual funds. In a special membership bulletin dated October 10,
1968, the New York Stock Exchange informed its members that 
customer-directed give-ups would be prohibited, and that the 
effective date of the prohibition would be December 5» 1968, In 
addition, the Board of Governors approved a volume discount for 
the portion of large orders over 1,000 shares and an across-the- 
board reduction in intra-member rates. Although the mandate for 
abolishing customer-directed give-ups was issued by the New York 
Stock Exchange, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
Department of Justice played major roles in the events leading to 
the decree by the New York Stock Exchange. This aspect will be 
fully discussed in subsequent chapters.
The purpose of this dissertation is the determination of 
the impact abolishing give-ups has had on operations of mutual 
fund retailers and regional exchanges. Before the New York Stock 
Exchange’s prohibition, the National Association of Securities 
Dealers and other organizations had predicted that if customer- 
directed give-ups were abolished, a drastic shift in income from 
smaller to larger brokerage houses would result, so that numerous 
small firms would find operations unprofitable and would eventu­
ally be forced out of business. The regional exchanges also 
prophesied that if this form of fee-splitting arrangement was 
disallowed, the loss in trading volume, and consequently in 
revenues, would be so severe that eventually several of the 
exchanges would be forced to cease operations.
In investigating the abolition of give-ups and its impact
on mutual fund retailers and regional exchanges, attention will 
be focused not only on the quantitative impact that would relate 
to variations in trading volume revenues, mergers, admission to 
membership, and broker-dealer registrations, but also on the non- 
quantitative impact that would relate to the investing public.
This investigation will prove that the allegations of the National 
Association of Securities Dealers, other organizations, and the 
regional exchanges were unfounded. This study will also show the 
extent to which mutual fund retailers and the regional exchanges 
were affected by the abolition of give-ups.
Scope of the Study 
In addition to give-ups, complex reciprocal business 
practices have developed in connection with institutional trading. 
Institutional traders use a large part of commissions generated 
by their portfolio transactions for some form of reciprocity. In 
exchange for portfolio transactions, mutual fund managers want 
executing brokers to sell shares of their funds. Many banks 
insist on demand deposits in exchange for commissions. Insurance 
companies direct orders to brokers who buy insurance from them. 
Many pension funds of corporations will not direct orders to 
brokerage houses which do not recommend purchase of the corpora­
tion's stock. Even law firms that act as trustees and investment 
managers insist on brokers recommending new trust and estate 
clients in return for orders. The list is endless, and some of
the reciprocal practices are so complex that they defy descrip­
tion.
While the customer-directed give-up has been abolished, 
reciprocal practices continue to flourish. Undoubtedly there are 
ethical and legal implications with regard to these practices, 
which should be investigated. This study, however, will not con­
cern itself with reciprocal business practices. It will deal 
only with give-ups directed by mutual funds, and not give-ups 
which may have been directed or ordered by other institutional 
investors. In addition, this study will consider the impact of 
the prohibition of give-ups only on the major regional exchanges; 
these are the Midwest, Pacific Coast, and Philadelphia-Baltimore- 
Washington, and to a lesser degree the Boston, Detroit,
Pittsburgh and Cincinnati Stock Exchanges, Approximately 8o per 
cent of the volume handled by the regional exchanges takes place 
on the Midwest, Pacific Coast and PhiladeIphia-Baltimore- 
Washington Exchanges. The other four exchanges account for 
almost all of the remaining volume.
Definition of Terms
Customer-directed give-ups. The Securities and Exchange
Commission, in its Release No, 8239» defines a give-up as
, , . a payment by the executing broker to other broker- 
dealers of a part of the minimum commission he is required 
to charge his customers. The recipient of a give-up check 
may have had nothing whatsoever to do with the transaction 
for which the commission is charged and in fact may not
even know of the transaction or where or when it was 
executed,^
Mutual fund managers used give-ups to reward broker-dealers who 
sold their fund shares, and for research ideas furnished by the 
broker-dealers. The income derived from give-ups was income in 
addition to the regular commission or sales load received by the 
broker-dealers. It should be noted that managers of mutual funds 
were reluctant to reward broker-dealers who sold their fund 
shares with direct orders for execution, because in most cases 
they neither had the expertise nor the capital requirements to 
handle large block trades.
Regional exchanges. In I969 there were fourteen regional 
exchanges, all of which were located outside of New York City.
Ten of these were registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, while the remaining four were exempt because of their 
small volume of transactions. The three principal regional 
exchanges are the Midwest, the Pacific Coast and the Philadelphia- 
Ealtimore-Washington. The other registered exchanges are the 
Boston, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Salt Lake City, San 
Francisco Mining and Spokane exchanges. The last three are the 
mining exchanges and in many respects differ from the others 
since they deal in mining and oil shares selling at extremely 
cheap prices. At the beginning of 1970, the Pittsburgh Exchange
^Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Release No. 8239< 
January 26, 1968, p. 3»
merged with the PhiladeIphia-Baltimore-Washington Exchange.
Mutual fund. The expressions mutual fund and open-end 
investment company are used interchangeably. From a technical 
viewpoint a mutual fund is an open-end investment company because 
it must stand ready to redeem outstanding shares any time they 
are presented by investors. Thus the number of shares of a 
mutual fund or investment company is not fixed, but varies as new 
shares are sold to and redeemed by investors.
Others. In other sections of this dissertation, various 
organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, will be 
mentioned. Since most of these institutions are long named, 
abbreviations will be used for the sake of brevity. The follow­
ing is a list of these organizations and their abbreviated forms:
1. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
2. National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).
3. Investment Company Institute (ICI).
4. Independent Broker-Dealers’ Trade Association (IBDTA).
5. American Stock Exchange (AMEX).
6. New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
Because of the importance of most of these organizations 
to the study, a special section has been devoted to their 
descriptions and functions.
Organization of the Dissertation
Since give-ups are inextricably tied to institutional 
trading, especially mutual fund transactions, Part I of the dis­
sertation is partially devoted to a description of the growth in 
institutional portfolio activity, especially that of mutual 
funds. The background of the give-up and the events leading to 
its abolition is described. Finally, in Part I, the viewpoints 
and roles played by the SEC and the NYSE are described.
Part II concerns itself with the impact of the abolition 
of customer-directed give-ups on mutual fund retailers. This 
section reviews the studies of the National Association of 
Securities Dealers and the Independent Broker-Dealers’ Trade 
Association. These are the only two previous studies made to 
determine the effects of proposed legislation on the mutual fund 
industry. Parts of these studies relate to the give-up problem. 
The major section of Part II is devoted to the author’s question­
naire survey of a statistically selected group of mutual fund 
retailers designed to determine how the prohibition of give-ups 
has affected their business operations.
Part III describes the impact of the abolition of the 
give-up on the major regional exchanges. The reactions of the 
regional exchanges to the original proposals of the NYSE and SEC 
are discussed. Share and dollar volume growth for the period 
I96O-I969 are reviewed, together with the increase in block 
transactions over the same period. Especially noted here is the
fact that most of the exchanges, both regional and national, did 
not have complete records on block transactions. In some cases, 
estimates by the regional exchanges were made. Finally, the 
results of personal interviews with regional exchange members and 
questionnaires are examined to determine the effect of the ban. 
Steps taken by the regional exchanges to offset expected loss of 
revenues arising from the give-up prohibition are analysed to 
determine their success or failure.
Part IV, which is the final portion of the dissertation, 
critically analyses the legal implications of the prohibition. 
This analysis necessitates an examination of the commission rate 
structure of the New York Stock Exchange, for there is little 
doubt that the give-up and the minimum commission rate are inter­
related. Comments are made on the value of the volume discount 
that became effective at the same time the give-up was abolished. 
In addition, the author gives his own views on the propriety of 
prohibiting give-ups and the implications of the prohibition on 
the investing public.
Review of Previous Investigations
Although there have been numerous articles in the 
investment journals, periodicals, and newspapers relating to the 
prohibition of the customer-directed give-up and its effects on 
mutual fund retailers and the regional exchanges, it is doubtful 
that any of the findings were based on empirical research.
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Only two studies were actually undertaken, and these 
studies were not solely done to determine the effects of the 
abolition of give-ups, but rather to try to determine the effects 
of total proposed mutual-fund legislation on the mutual-fund 
industry. Parts of these investigations were concerned with the 
give-up problem. One study was instigated by the National 
Association of Securities Dealers, and the other by the 
Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Association, Clearly, neither 
of these associations are impartial observers. The NASD is a 
nonprofit organization which administers and regulates the over- 
the-counter market to which a great many broker-dealers retailing 
mutual funds belong. The IBDTA is also a nonprofit organization 
of approximately four hundred members. Any broker-dealer who is 
not a member of the New York Stock Exchange is eligible for 
membership in the IBDTA. In addition to the lack of impartiality, 
certain inadequacies were found in these studies which cast some 
doubts on the validity of the conclusions reached by the NASD and 
the IBDTA. In Part II, both studies are critically reviewed.
While some attempt has been made to determine the impact of the 
abolition of give-ups on mutual fund retailers, no investigation 
has been made to determine the impact on the regional exchanges.
To the author's knowledge, this attempt is the first.
11
Sources of Data 
Since the prohibition of the customer-directed give-up 
occurred less than two years ago, there has been very little 
empirical research undertaken in this area. As a result, most of 
the information in this study is of a primary nature. The follow­
ing schedule shows actual interviews with the regional exchanges 
and other organizations. In addition to those mentioned in the 
schedule, the author communicated with the New York, American, 
Boston and Pacific Coast Stock Exchanges, and other organizations 
by letter and telephone. Personal interviews were held in the 
following cities:
Cities Visited 
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Cincinnati
Detroit
Chicago
Regional Exchanges
PhiladeIphia-Baltimore- 
Washington Exchange
Pittsburgh Exchange
Cincinnati Stock Exchange
Detroit Stock Exchange
Midwest Stock Exchange
Washington
Springfield, Mass,
Organizations
The Securities and Exchange 
Commission
The National Association of 
Securities Dealers
The Investment Company Institute
The Independent Broker-Dealers' 
Trade Association
12
A questionnaire survey was also undertaken involving 5^0 
broker-dealers retailing mutual fund shares. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission permitted the author to use its computerized 
registration sheets on broker-dealers to select a sample for the 
questionnaire.
CHAPTER II
INSTITUTIONAL TRADING AND THE GROWTH 
OF THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY
Institutional and Mutual Fund Trading 
on the New York Stock Exchange
In the past twenty years, institutional participation in 
the stock market has been phenomenal. At the end of 19^9» the 
market value of all New York Stock Exchange listed stock was 
approximately 76.3 billion dollars. Of this amount, financial 
institutions held about 9.7 billion dollars or 12.7 per cent. By 
1969 the total market value of all NYSE listed stock was 629.5 
billion dollars, of which the holdings of financial institutions 
amounted to 24.1 per cent or 151.5 billion dollars. Table 1 
illustrates the approximate holdings of NYSE listed stocks by 
financial institutions for the period 1949-1969.
The most striking increases were shown by open-end 
investment companies and corporate non-insured pension funds. 
Additional evidence of the increased participation in the stock 
market by institutions is shown in Table 2.
While member trading has remained fairly steady as a per 
cent of total volume, the public's proportion of share volume has 
declined from approximately 53 per cent in 196O to about 35 per 
cent in I969. Institutional trading during this period increased 
from roughly 24 per cent to 4l per cent of total share volume.
TABLE 1
l4
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION HOLDINGS OF NEW YORK 
STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED STOCKS 
YEARS 1949, 1959, 1967-1969
Year Ending
Type of Institution
1949 1959 1967 1968
(Billions of Dollars)
1969
Insurance Companies 
— Life and Non-Life 2.8 8.6 18.7 22.1 21.5
Investment Companies 
Open-end 1.4 11.6 33.2 43.9 39.8
Closed-end 1.6 5.2 4.9 5.5 4.3
Non-Insured Pension 
Funds
Corporate 0.5 11.8 40.6 49.2 46.5
Others— Private, 
State and Local 
Government 0.0 1.1 5.0 6.2 6.3
Nonprofit Institutions 
College and University 
Endowments, Founda­
tions and others 3«2 12.8 25.9 30.9 28.4
Common Tpust Funds 0.0 1.4 3.5 4.3 4.1
Mutual Savings Banks 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.6
Total 9.7 52.8 132.4 162.8 151.5
Market Value of all 
NYSE Listed Stocks 76.3 307.7 605.8 692.3 629.5
Estimated Per Cent Held 
by Institutions 12.7 17.2 21.9 23.5 24.1
Source: New York Stock: Exchange Fact Book, 1970 » P» 47.
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TABLE 2
MAJOR SOURCES OF VOLUME ON THE NYSE 
FOR SELECTED YEARS
Per Cent of Total Share and :Dollar Volume
Public Individuals
Institutions and 
Intermediaries NYSE Members
Period Shares Value Shares Value Shares Value
i960 52.6 43.8 24.3 28.9 23.1 27.3
1961 51.4 46.1 26.2 29.2 22.4 24.7
1963 53.4 48.2 23.9 26.2 22.7 25.6
1965 48.5 41.3 31.4 36.5 20.1 22.2
1966 43.2 38.4 32.5 34.8 24.3 26.8
1969 34.5 30.0 41.1 45.6 24.4 24.4
Source ; New York Stock Exchange Fact Books, 1969 and 1970 »
If institutional trading on the NYSE is considered only 
in terms of public volume, that is, total volume less volume 
arising from member trading, the phenomenal growth of institu­
tional participation is even more apparent. A review of Table 3 
shows the dramatic comparison of the distribution of NYSE public 
volume for three selected years.
According to the NYSE Fact Book, the relationship between 
public individuals and institutional trading on all other markets 
showed that in 19^9, public individuals were responsible for
16
TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC VOLUME ON THE NYSE
FOR i960, 1966 AND 1969
Period
Per Cent of Total Share and Dollar Volume
Public Individuals Institutions and Intermediaries
Shares Value Shares Value
i960 68.6 60.7 31.4 59.5
1966 57.6 52.5 43.0 47.5
1969 45.6 59.7 54.5 60.3
Source: New York Stock Exchange Fact Book, 1970, p. 50.
79 per cent of the public share volume executed on these markets 
by NYSE member firms, and 67 per cent of the dollar value. This 
type of information was available for the first time in 1969, and 
is significant since it shows clearly how dominant institutional 
trading is on the NYSE.
The percentage distribution of share volume by institu­
tion and intermediaries on the NYSE and all other markets is 
shown in Table 4.
Between I96O and 1969» mutual funds increased their share 
volume by more than 50 per cent. Important even in I969 was a 
slight increase in mutual fund percentage of share volume which 
occurred despite the condition of the securities industry and the 
decline in total volume on the NYSE. While extremely complex
17
TABLE k
SHARE VOLUME DISTRIBUTION BY INSTITUTIONS AND 
INTERMEDIARIES FOR I96O, I966 AND I969
Institutions and 
Intermediaries
Per Cent of Total Share Volume
New York Stock Exchange All Other Markets
i960 1966 1969 1969
Commercial Banks or
Trust Companies 40.6 38.8 36.4 27.8
Mutual Funds 17.5 25.8 26.6 17.3
All Other 41.9 35.4 37.0 54.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: New York Stock Exchange Fact Book, 197c, p., 50.
reciprocal arrangements have been arising from all types of 
institutional business, the problem of give-ups has been 
associated mainly with mutual fund transactions. Since the pur­
pose of the dissertation is to investigate the impact of the 
abolition of customer-directed give-ups on mutual fund retailers 
and regional exchanges, emphasis will be placed on the growth of 
the mutual fund industry.
Table 5 shows mutual fund holdings as a per cent of the 
market value of all NYSE stocks for selected years.
18
TABLE 5
MUTUAL FUND HOLDING AS A PER CENT OF MARKET 
VALUE OF ALL NYSE LISTED STOCK 
YEARS 1949, 1959, 1967-1969*
Year Ending
1949 1959 1967 1968 1969
Market value of all 
NYSE listed stock 
(billions of dollars) 76.5 507.7 605.8 692.5 629.5
Market value of mutual 
fund holdings 
(billions of dollars) 1.4 11.6 55.2 45.9 59.8
Mutual fund holdings as 
a per cent of market 
value of all NYSE 
listed stock 1.8 5.8 5.5 6.5 6.5
Source: Calculations made from data obtained in the New York
Stock Exchange Fact Book, 1970.
*The figures shown by the ICI for mutual fund holdings as 
a per cent of the market value of all NYSE listed stock differ 
slightly from those shown in Table 5»
According to the 1970 Mutual Fund Fact Book of the 
Investment Company Institute, mutual fund holdings as a per cent 
of the market value of all NYSE listed stocks were as follows:
1949 1.8
1959 5.7
1967 5.2
1968 5.4
1969 5.5
19
The ICI figures are estimates, while those of the NYSE 
are actual. The figure for I969, however, is a preliminary 
estimate. The author was unable to determine the reasons for the 
differences in both sets of figures.
Institutional and Mutual Fund Trading 
on the American Stock Exchange
The only available information on institutional activity, 
including that of mutual funds, is contained in the Public 
Transaction Studies of I966 and I967 of the American Stock 
Exchange, Data on institutional trading for I968 and 1969 were 
not available. The following table shows the distribution of 
total volume for the three major categories: (l) public indivi­
duals; (2) public institutions; and (3) members for their own 
accounts,
TABLE 6
SOURCES OF VOLUME ON THE AMERICAN 
STOCK EXCHANGE FOR I966 AND I967
Category
Per Cent of
1966
Total Volume
1967
Public individuals 63.3 64.0
Public institutions 10,9 11.8
Members for their own accounts 25.8 24.2
Total 100,0 100.0
Source: American Stock Exchange Data Book, I969, p. 42.
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Substantially less institutional trading takes place on
the American Stock Exchange than on the New York Stock Exchange,
The AMEX Public Transaction Study of 196? reported that public
institutions accounted for 11.8 per cent of total volume on the
2
AMEX, as compared to 32.5 per cent on the NYSE,
The latest available information regarding mutual fund 
activity on the AMEX is for the years 1966 and 196? » as shown in 
Table 7.
TABLE 7
PUBLIC INSTITUTION VOLUME ON THE 
AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE 
FOR 1966 AND 1967
Type of Public Institution
Per Cent
1966
of Total Volume
1967
Nonmember broker-dealer 3.1 2.9
Commercial banks and trust companies 2.2 2.9
Mutual funds 0.7 1.1
Nonfinancial corporations - 1.2
Investment clubs — — 0.5
Other 4.9 3.2
Total 10.9 11.8
Source: AMEX Databook, 1969» p. 42.
^The AMEX in Brief, Revised Edition, p. 6,
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A comparison of mutual fund activity on both the NYSE and
AMEX by per cent of total volume and number of shares is given in
Table 8.
TABLE 8
MUTUAL FUND ACTIVITY ON THE NYSE 
FOR 1966 AND 1967
AND AMEX
NYSE
1966
AMEX
1966
NYSE
1967
AMEX
1967
Share volume
(millions of shares) 1,899.3 690.8 2,530.0 1,145.1
Mutual fund share of 
total volume 
(millions of shares) 72.2 4.8 139.2 12.6
Mutual fund trading as 
a per cent of share 
volume 3.8 0.7 5.5 1.1
Source: New York Stock Exchange Fact Book, 1970, p. 72.
AMEX Databook, 1969» p. 36.
Other calculation made from data in both sources 
mentioned.
The most important reasons for mutual fund preference to 
NYSE shares would be (l) the NYSE is a much older and established 
exchange than the AMEX; (2) a larger number of stocks are listed 
on the NYSE; (3) companies listed on the NYSE are generally 
larger and better known than those listed on the AMEX; and (4) 
companies listed on the AMEX normally move to the NYSE as soon as 
they can meet the listing requirements of the latter exchange.
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NYSE and AMEX Block Transactions 
Another measure of the increased participation of 
financial institutions in the stock market is derived from the 
statistics on block transactions for both major exchanges. For 
both exchanges, a block transaction is defined as one in which 
10,000 shares or more are traded on the floor of the exchange. 
Table 9 gives details of block transactions on the NYSE for the 
period 1965-I969» and on the AMEX for 1966-1969»
Block trading as a per cent of total volume on the NYSE 
went from 10.0 per cent in I968 to l4.1 per cent in I969, or an 
increase of approximately 40 per cent. On the AMEX the increase 
was almost 100 per cent during the same period. These increases 
took place despite a decline in total volume on both the 
exchanges. On the NYSE total volume in I969 was 2,890,789,000 
shares compared to 2,931,596,000 in 1968, a decline of 2.8 per 
cent. The percentage decline on the AMEX was 13.5 per cent, with 
volume falling to 1,240,?42,000 shares in 1969 from 1,435,766,000 
in 1968. The increase in block volume trading on the two major 
exchanges was apparently not offset by declining volume on the 
regional exchanges, but seemed to result solely from the increase 
in institutional trading.
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TABLE 9
NYSE BLOCK TRANSACTIONS, I965-I969 AND 
AMEX BLOCK TRANSACTIONS, I966-I969
Year
Block Volume
Number of 
Transactions
Millions
of
Shares
Per Cent of 
Reported 
Volume
Market Value 
(millions of 
dollars)
NYSE
1963* 2,171 48.3 3.1 1,837.4
1966* 3,642 83.3 4.5 3,303.2
1967* 6,685 169.4 6.7 6,810.9
1968* 11,234 292.7 10.0 12,971.6
1969* 15,132 402.1 14.1 13,609.3
AMEX
1966^ 387 6.8 1.0 119.1
1967° 1,063 18.8 1.6 338.4
1968° 1,682 36.1 2.3 1,108.8
1969° 2,463 60.4 4.9 1,367.8
^Source: New York Stock Exchange Fact Book, 1970, p. 12.
^Source: AMEX Databook, 1969» p. 36.
'Source: Letter from John C, Ford, Education Services
Manager, American Stock Exchange, March I8, 
1970.
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The Growth and Development of 
the Mutual Fund Industry
Mutual fund assets in 1940 amounted to approximately S500 
million, and the number of shareholder accounts totalled about 
296,000. At the end of I969 assets amounted to more than $48 
billion and shareholder accounts totalled about 10.4 million.
Two major reasons for the huge increase in assets are: (1) the
long-term upward trend of securities prices; and (2) the con­
tinued net purchases of fund shares by the investing public. The 
following tables show (l) the growth in assets and shareholders' 
accounts for the period I96O-I969, and (2) the net increase in 
capital for the same period.
TABLE 10
NET ASSETS AND SHAREHOLDER ACCOUNTS OF MUTUAL FUNDS 
FOR THE PERIOD I96O-I969
Year Ending
Assets 
(000,000's of Dollars)
Number of Accounts 
(OOO's)
i960 17,026 4,898
1961 22,789 5,319
1962 21,271 5,910
1963 25,214 6,152
1964 29,116 6,302
1965 35,220 6,709
1966 34,829 7,702
1967 44,701 7,904
1968 52,677 9,080
1969 48,291 10,392
Source: Investment Company Institute, Mutual Fund Fact Book,
1970, p. 16.
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TABLE 11
NET INCREASE IN CAPITAL OF MUTUAL FUNDS 
FOR THE PERIOD I96O-I969
Sales of Repurchases of
Own Shares Own Shares Net Increase
(000,000's (000,000's (000,000's
Year Ending of Dollars) of Dollars) of Dollars)
i960 2,097 842 1,255
1961 2,951
2,699
1,160 1,791
1962 1,123 1,576
1963 2,459 1,505 954
1964 3,403 1,874 1,529
1965 4,358 1,962 2,396
1966 4,672 2,005
2,744
2,667
1967 4,670 1,925
1968 6,820 3,839 2,981
1969 6,718 3,662 3,057
Source; Investment Company Institute, Mutual Fund Fact Book,
1970, p. 14.
In 1969, despite the depressed conditions of the securi­
ties markets, investors purchased $6,7 billion of new mutual fund 
shares compared with $6.8 billion in I968. Redemptions totalled 
approximately $5.7 billion in 1969; the corresponding amount in 
1968 was $5.8 billion. The net increase in capital during I969 
amounted to approximately $75 million more than in I968, Con­
sidering the mass liquidation of portfolio holdings by investors 
in 1969, and the near panic conditions which existed, a greater 
percentage of redemptions might have been expected.
In Table 10, total net assets of mutual funds for the
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period 196O-I969 were shown. Interesting to note is the distri­
bution of mutual fund assets by type of portfolio security as 
shown in Table 12.
TABLE 12
DISTRIBUTION OF MUTUAL FUND ASSETS 
FOR THE PERIOD I96O-I969
Year
Assets 
(000,000's 
of Dollars
Net Cash and 
Equivalent
(96)
Corporate
Bonds
(96)
Preferred
Stock
(^)
Common
Stocks
(^)
i960 17,026 5.7 7.3 4,2 82.8
1961 22,789 4,3 6.9 3.4 85.4
1962 21,271 6,2 7.6 3.5 82.7
1963 25,214 5.3 7.1 2.9 84.7
1964 29,116 4,6 7.4 2,4 85.6
1965 35,220 5.1 7.3 1.7 85.9
1966 34,829 8.5 8,4 1.4 81.7
1967 44,701 5.7 6,6 1.7 86.0
1968 52,677 6,0 6,5 3.2 84.3
1969 48,291 8,0 7.4 2.5 82.1
Source: Investment Company Institute, Mutual Fund Fact Book,
1970, p. 52.
The relationship between the various portfolio securities 
appear relatively constant. Investment in common stocks ranged 
between 8l,7 per cent in I966 and 86,0 per cent in 196?. Hold­
ings of net cash and equivalent was at a high of 8,5 per cent in 
1966, and at a low of 4,5 per cent in I961, Again in I966, 
assets' in the form of corporate bonds was 8,4 per cent, its peak 
for the ten year period. An inverse relationship exists between
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the state of the market as measured by any of the stock market 
indexes and the level of bond holdings. In 1966 and 1969 when a 
drastic decline in security values occurred, assets in the form 
of common stock were at their lowest, while holdings in the forms 
of cash and bonds were at their peak.
Despite adverse economic conditions in 1969» purchases of 
portfolio securities (common and preferred stocks and bonds) by 
mutual funds were the highest in the industry’s history. Total 
purchases amounted to #24.8 billion while total sales were #22.1 
billion, for a net purchase total of approximately #2.7 billion. 
Purchases of common stock alone amounted to #22.0 billion in 
1969, compared with sales of #19.8 billion; net purchases of 
common stock were about #2.2 billion. Tables 15 and l4 review 
the purchases, sales and net purchases of mutual funds for the 
ten year period 196O-1969.
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TABLE 15
PURCHASES, SALES AND NET PURCHASES OF PORTFOLIO SECURITIES 
BY MUTUAL FUNDS FOR THE PERIOD I96O-I969
Year
Purchases 
(000,000's 
of Dollars)
Sales 
(000,000's 
of Dollars)
Net Purchases 
(000,000's 
of Dollars)
i960 3,314 2,315 999
1961 4,620 3,249 1,371
1962 4,533 3,403 1,130
1963 4,363 3,603 760
1964 5,340 4,257 1,083
1965 7,571 6,002 1,569
1966 11,520 10,167 1,353
1967 16,318 14,821 1,497
1968 22,013
24,807
20,105 1,908
1969 22,140 2,667
Source : Investment Company
1970, p. 38.
Institute, Mutual Fund Fact Book, 
TABLE 14
PURCHASES, SALES AND NET PURCHASES 'OF COMMON STOCKS
BY MUTUAL FUNDS FOR THE PERIOD 1960-1969
Purchases Sales Net Purchases
(000,000's (000,000's (000,000's
of Dollars) of Dollars) of Dollars)
i960 2,785 2,001 784
1961 3,936 2,756 1,200
1962 3,696 2,719 977
1963 4,010 3,232 778
1964 4,768 3,844 884
1965 6,530 5,166 1,364
1966 10,363 9,320 1,043
1967 14,926 13,325 1,601
1968 20,102 18,496 1,606
1969 22,012 19,773 2,239
Source: Investment Company Institute, Mutual Fund Fact Book,
1970, p. 58.
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Commissions Generated by Mutual Fund Orders
In September of 1969» Mr. John C. Bogle, Chairman of the
Investment Company Institute, which represents mutual funds in
matters of legislation and regulation, stated that the volume
discount instituted by the NYSE in December of 1968 had reduced
Mutual Funds commission costs by approximately 25 per cent,^ The
growth in recent years in commissions generated by mutual fund
orders had been as dramatic as the growth in fund trading,
if
According to a Business Week estimate, commissions paid by 
mutual funds in the period I965-I967 were:
1963 % 59.7 million
1964 72.0 million
1965 101.8 million
1966 162.6 million
1967 235.0 million
Business Week's estimates were based on data obtained 
from the Investment Company Institute. When the author visited 
Washington, he spoke to Mr. Alfred P. Johnson, Vice-President and 
Economist of ICI, about Business Week's estimates. Mr. Johnson 
had some doubts about the exactness of the commissions since they 
were not obtained directly from ICl. The Business Week estimates 
were determined by taking the average of total purchases and 
total sales of portfolio securities for the year, and applying a
^"Mutual Fund Official Sees Some Problems in Exchange 
Membership, Commission Cuts," Wall Street Journal, September I6,
1969, p. 3.
if
"Give-ups Kick Back on Funds," Business Week, July 27»
1968, p. 97.
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1.5 per cent factor. For example, total purchases of securities 
by mutual funds amounted to $16,5 billion in 196?, and sales to 
$l4.8 billion; the average of purchases and sales was approxi­
mately $15.6 billion; 1.5 per cent of this figure is roughly 
$233 million. If the same factor is applied to the averages of 
purchases and sales for I968 and 1969» the commission costs would 
be; 1968, $315.9 million; and 1969, $352.1 million.
The use of the 1.5 per cent factor is debatable since 
this supposes that the average share price in mutual fund trans­
actions is approximately $l4, based on transactions of 10,000 
share blocks. During the period 1963-I969, the average price of 
a share on the NYSE varied between $39.90 to $44.00. The major 
part of mutual fund trading is in NYSE listed stocks; in addition 
the favorites of many funds have been the high priced glamor 
stocks. The factor of 1.5 per cent used by Business Week appears 
then to be high. Since exact commission costs of mutual funds 
are impossible to obtain, not even from ICI, the estimates of 
Business Week for the period I963-I967 will be accepted, and the
1.5 per cent factor will be used to obtain estimates for 1968 and 
1969. Any method used to estimate commissions generated by mutual 
funds is subject to criticism. The main reasons for estimating 
these commissions are: (1) to show the rapid growth in commis­
sions; and (2) to show the significant decline in I969, supposedly 
caused by the volume discount. If commissions for I968 and I969 
are adjusted to reflect the volume discount which became effective
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in December 1968, then estimated commissions paid by mutual funds 
during I963-I969 would have been as follows;
1963 $ 59.7 million
1964 72.0 million
1965 101.8 million
1966 162.6 million
1967 233.0 million
1968 309.5 million
1969 264.1 million
Supposedly, the volume discount would result in substan­
tial savings for mutual funds. However, many of the respondents 
to the author's questionnaire, and many individuals connected 
with the securities industry who were interviewed by the author 
expressed doubts that the volume discount has been beneficial to 
the mutual funds. These individuals claim that mutual funds have 
been breaking up large orders, and splitting these orders among 
many brokers; previously, the lead broker technique had been 
employed. This technique is fully described at the beginning of 
Chapter III. If this assumption is correct, and the evidence 
suggests that it is, then Mr. Bogle's statement of reduced com­
mission costs cannot be completely accepted, especially since the 
ICI does not keep records on commissions generated by mutual fund 
orders.
CHAPTER III
EVENTS LEADING TO THE PROHIBITION 
OF CUSTOMER-DIRECTED GIVE-UPS
Since the Investment Company Act became effective in 
1940, and probably prior to the enactment, mutual funds with 
portfolio orders compensated brokerage firms that sold their 
shares. This compensation was a reward for research ideas and 
other services provided by the brokerage firms. Many of the 
brokerage firms to which orders were given by mutual funds were 
small and lacking in the expertise to execute the orders in an 
efficient manner. Since serious questions were being raised as 
to whether trades were being executed by funds as efficiently as 
possible, the lead broker technique was developed by mutual funds 
in approximately 1951. This approach was a technique whereby a 
lead broker, usually a large member firm of the New York Stock 
Exchange, would execute the whole order from a mutual fund and 
split the commission with broker-dealers who otherwise would have 
participated in executing the order. The lead broker technique 
was simply a method devised to prevent a large order from being 
broken into several smaller orders which would normally be 
executed on less favorable terms. This splitting or sharing of 
the commission between the lead broker and other brokerage firms 
has been better known as the give-up. The rules of the New York
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Stock Exchange did not permit its members to share commissions 
with non-member firms. This rule led to another technique being 
developed, the execution of mutual fund orders on the regional 
exchanges where fee-splitting rules were more liberal. New York 
and American Stock Exchange member firms simply joined the 
regional exchanges, executed large mutual fund orders there, and 
were able to comply with the directives of the mutual fund to 
share the commission generated by these orders with other broker­
age firms.
In Chapter II, the growth in institutional trading, 
especially that of mutual funds, was described in some detail.
The relationship between the increase in institutional trading 
and the increase in the number of block transactions executed on 
the various exchanges was also discussed. Little doubt exists 
that the dramatic increase in institutional trading had seriously 
impaired the effectiveness of the commission rate structure of 
the New York Stock Exchange. To be noted is the fact that the 
rate structure formulated by the NYSE had always been adopted by 
the other securities exchanges, and that the last revision of the 
NYSE commission structure had taken place in 1959- On December 5 » 
1968 when the give-up was prohibited, a volume discount was 
instituted by the NYSE on the portion of an order exceeding 1000 
shares. On an order up to and including 1000 shares, no change 
in commissions occurred. Until the inception of the volume dis­
count, the commission rate structure was based on a single round
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lot of 100 shares. Thus the commissions charged on an order of 
5000 shares was equivalent to 50 times the commission charged on 
100 shares. Regardless of the size of the order, no volume dis­
count was obtainable. Anyone who was not an exchange member was 
charged the minimum commission. While a broker executing an 
order of 5OOO shares could be expected to incur greater costs 
than on an order of 100 shares, most students of the market 
accepted the view that the cost was not equivalent to 50 times 
the cost of a 100 share order. Therefore, institutional orders, 
including those of mutual funds, were quite profitable to large 
brokerage firms, although these firms had to maintain institu­
tional trading departments which increased their operating costs.
Because of the profitability of institutional orders, 
there was fierce competition between brokerage houses for these 
types of orders. Mutual fund and other institutional managers, 
aware of the intense competition for their orders, were able to 
utilize the willingness of brokerage firms to accept less than 
minimum commissions, and were able either to direct the give-up 
of part of the commission to other brokers, or to use the rebate 
to lower their management fees to the funds.
For many years prior to its proposed ruling on give-ups 
of commissions, the Securities and Exchange Commission had been 
aware of the give-up and its relationship to the rigidity of the 
minimum commission rate structure of the New York Stock Exchange, 
As early as 1953, the New York Stock Exchange Special Committee
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on Rate Structures had concluded that the cost of an order and
its size were related and had recommended a volume discount.^
The recommendation, however, was not acted on until 1968, and
for different reasons than those originally proposed. In 1959*
the Securities and Exchange Commission suggested to the New York
Stock Exchange that a volume discount was desirable and stated
that "an Exchange committee will further study the use of a so-
called volume block discount for transactions involving multiple
2
round lot units."
In the Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets
published in 1963* the SEC for the first time critically reviewed
the methods by which mutual funds allocated brokerage commissions
generated by their orders. For the first time the relationship
between the give-up and the round-lot commission structure was
examined in detail. The Special Study of the Securities Markets
pointed out that
. . .  the give-ups for volume and block customers stem from 
the fact that the New York Stock Exchange commission rate 
structure does not formally recognize such customers as 
deserving treatment different from the average round lot 
customer.5
^Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the 
Special Study of Securities Markets, Part II (1963),pp. 332-333*
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3889 (February 20, 
1959), quoted in Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of 
the Special Study of Securities Markets, Fart II (1963), p. 332.
^Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the 
Special Study of Securities Markets, Part II (I963), p. 318.
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On July 18, 1966 the SEC sent out a circular to the National
Association of Securities Dealers and the national exchanges
expressing its concern over the give-up practice. In its 196?
Annual Report, the SEC also pointed out that
. , , it is apparent that a commission rate structure which 
requires the same commission per share for large blocks as 
for 100 share blocks is unrelated to the cost of handling 
transactions, a fact reflected in the willingness of exchange 
members to forego a large proportion of their regular commis­
sions derived from mutual fund business, "through give-ups", 
"give-aways" and "reciprocal arrangements",^
The New York Stock Exchange Release of January 2, 1968, 
to its Members and Allied Members on a 
Commission Rate Structure Proposal
In this release, the NYSE pointed out that the principal 
unsolved problem facing the securities industry was the commis­
sion rate structure of the Exchange, The rate structure had been 
heavily criticized by Congress, government agencies, the SEC and 
the press. It further pointed out that the Exchange enjoyed the 
right of self-regulation and operated under a government-approved 
rate structure and certain anti-trust immunities. The NYSE 
admitted that the minimum commission rate no longer could be con­
sidered a minimum because large institutional investors and non­
member brokerage firms were employing a wide range of practices 
to evade the minimum rate. This practice resulted in
, . . an intricate maze involving give-ups, give-aways, 
reciprocal practices, manufactured participations in trades.
4
Securities and Exchange Commission, 33rd Annual Report
(1967), p T 8.
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transported trades moved from one Exchange to another, all
of which result in a leakage of the commission dollar.5
Because of increased institutional activity and the special 
characteristics of institutional business and demands, the NYSE 
believed a change in its commission charges was necessary and 
proposed the following:
1, Incorporation of a volume discount in the minimum commis­
sion schedule, the amount and nature to be subsequently deter­
mined.
2. Continuation of the practice of customer-directed give- 
ups on their own transactions with a limitation on the percentage 
amount which could be given-up.
3- Prohibition of reciprocal practices which result in "de 
facto" rebates to NYSE commissions even where those arrangements 
involved markets other than the NYSE floor; this provision would 
depend in the SEC's prohibiting such practices in other markets.
4. A discount in the minimum commission schedule for non­
member brokers.
5. Adoption of rules limiting membership and broker-dealer 
allowances to bona-fide broker-dealers.
^NYSE Release to Members and Allied Members on Commission 
Rate Structure Proposals (January 2 , 1968), pp. 1-2.
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Rule lOb-10 of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
On January 26, 1968, the SEC issued Securities Exchange 
Act Release No, 8239» The release commented on the proposals of 
the New York Stock Exchange and then went on to detail the 
reasons for its proposed rule lOb-10, and also those leading to 
the New York Stock Exchange pending rate structure revisions.
Some interesting examples of the give-up and reciprocal business 
were pointed out by the SEC, For example, give-ups were fre­
quently used in connection with "cross" transactions, A "cross" 
occurs when an order cannot be adequately executed through the 
normal auction process on the floor of an exchange and the broker 
handling the order has to find the other side of the trade off 
the floor of the exchange. In other words, the broker has to 
locate a buyer or seller depending on the nature of the order, 
and then "cross" the order on the floor. Exchange rules did not 
permit members to complete crosses either on the over-the-counter 
market or in their offices at a negotiated commission, but 
members were permitted to send the order to any regional exchange 
to which they belonged. By this method, the brokers were able to 
give up commissions on the cross according to the give-up rules 
of the specific exchange. Thus, mutual funds and institutional 
brokers were able to utilize the rules of the regional exchanges 
with respect to the types of brokers who were permitted to 
receive give-ups.
New York Stock Exchange member firms, at the direction of
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mutual funds, compensated non-members with cash payments and 
credited these payments to over-the-counter trades for unconnected 
customers. This device was used whether or not commissions were 
actually charged on the over-the-counter market trades. The 
brokers who were compensated had absolutely no participation in 
the trades.
Some managers of funds, especially those whose shares 
were sold by captive sales forces, created affiliates which were 
members of the National Association of Securities Dealers. Some 
of these affiliates were also members of regional exchanges. The 
fund managers then directed the lead brokers to give the affili­
ates give-ups and reciprocal business. The income received by 
the affiliates was credited to the advisory fees the fund managers 
received from the funds. By this method mutual fund shareholders 
were able to recapture a substantial part of the commissions paid 
out, despite the restricted and rigid commission rate structure. 
The SEC also pointed out that in some cases, income from give-ups 
and reciprocal business received by the affiliates were not 
credited to the advisory fees, but were kept by the affiliates 
without a decrease in the fees. In the majority of cases, how­
ever, commissions were not recouped for the benefit of share­
holders, but were used to provide additional rewards to indepen­
dent broker-dealers which distributed fund shares.
According to this release of the SEC, all the practices 
described above led to (l) a tremendous increase in the volume of
ko
trading on regional exchanges; (2) commissions being diverted to 
non-members of the NYSE, although they performed no function in 
the execution of orders by NYSE members on the regional exchanges; 
and (5) a trend whereby excess commissions were being partially 
returned to mutual funds to the benefit of the shareholders of 
the funds.
Rule lOb-10 of the SEC, considered a landmark in the 
securities industry, and by the majority of broker-dealers an 
infamous one, contained the following statements:
1. It shall be considered unlawful for any registered 
investment company or affiliated person of such regis­
tered investment company directly or indirectly, to 
order or request any broker or dealer:
(a) to pay or arrange for the payment, directly or indirectly,
of all or any portion of a commission on any securities
transaction to any broker, dealer or any other person 
unless pursuant to a written contract the full amount of 
such remittance is required to be paid over to such 
registered investment company, or fees owned by or charged 
to such registered investment company are required to be 
reduced in an amount equal to the remittance ;
(b) to designate or employ any broker or dealer on any trans­
action to transmit, execute or clear a transaction or to
perform any other function for which compensation is 
required or made unless pursuant to a written contract 
the full amount of such compensation is required to be 
paid over to such registered investment company or fees 
owed by or charged to such registered investment company 
are required to be reduced in an amount equal to such 
compensation.
2, For the purpose of this rule a person is affiliated with 
a registered investment company if such person:
(a) is an officer, director trustee, employee, investment
adviser, member of an advisory board, depositor, promoter 
of or principal underwriter for the registered investment 
company, or
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(b) directly or indirectly, through one or more intermediar­
ies, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common 
control with the registered investment company, its 
investment adviser or principal underwriter, or
(c) directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with the 
power to vote, five per centum or more of the outstanding 
voting securities of the registered company.^
Basically the proposed Rule lOb-10 prohi-bited give-ups of
commissions which were directed by mutual funds, unless all
amounts given up were returned to the mutual funds.
The SEC's release concluded with a statement inviting
interested persons to submit their opinions on both its proposed
rule, and the proposal of the NYSE with any alternative solutions
or suggestions for dealing with the give-up and related problems.
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8324 of May 28, 1968 
In this release, the SEC concluded that on the basis of 
information gathered, the devious practices connected with the 
current commission rate structure did not provide for fixed mini­
mum charges on a great many exchange transactions. As a result, 
the SEC requested the NYSE to adopt a provisional revised commis­
sion rate schedule which would permit reduced commission charges 
on the portion of an order involving round lots in excess of 400 
shares. As an alternative to this proposal the NYSE could do 
away with minimum commission rates on orders in excess of 
$50,000. Other registered exchanges also were requested to
^Security Exchange Act Release No. 8259» Proposed 
Commission Rule lOb-10 (January 2.6, 196S), pp. 9-10.
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modify their rules relating to commission rates.
Important to note is the fact that the SEC did not order 
or direct the NYSE and other registered exchanges to change their 
commission rate schedules. Instead, the word, "request", was 
used. The following paragraph is a direct quotation from the 
letter written by Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman of the SEC to Robert 
W. Haack, President of the NYSE. The date of the letter, May 28, 
1969, is identical to the date of SEC Release No. 8324.
The Commission hereby makes written request pursuant to 
Section 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act that your 
Exchange effect on its own behalf changes, to become effec­
tive on or before September 13, I96S, in its rules, policies 
and practices in respect of its commission rate by modifying 
Article XV, Section 2(a)(1) and appropriate other sections of 
the exchange constitutions and rules either (a) in accordance 
with the revised minimum commission rates as set forth in 
Attachment A, or alternatively, (b) by eliminating, with res­
pect to orders in excess of $30,000, requirements for minimum 
rates of commission.7
An additional comment made was that the request was based on defi­
ciencies in the present rate structure that did not allow approp­
riate discounts, but instead permitted give-ups to be directed by 
mutual fund managers, resulting in deviations from the minimum 
rate structure in a discriminatory and arbitrary manner. The 
Chairman of the SEC also informed the President of the NYSE that 
public hearings would be held, beginning July 1, 1968, to discuss 
the commission rate structure of registered securities exchanges.
7
Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Association, Oxford 
Securities, Inc., and James C. Butterfield, Inc., v. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, No. 22,552, United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 31 (1968).
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Letter from Robert W» Haack, President of the NYSE, 
to Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman of the SEC,
August S , 1965
In this letter, Mr. Haack informed Mr. Cohen that on
June 28, 1968, the Board of Governors of the NYSE had approved
in principle a volume discount, a gradual elimination of the
customer-directed give-up over a period of at least one year, and
a 33^ per cent discount to honafide non-member broker-dealers.
However, Mr. Haack pointed out that on August 7 » 1968, the Board
of Governors had reconsidered the issues and had proposed:
. . .  (1) a specific interim non-member commission schedule 
embodying a reduced rate for volume orders; (2) specific 
interim intra-member commission schedules embodying across 
the board reductions; (3) additional language to the Exchange 
Constitution which would prohibit customer-directed give-ups 
of work or money in consideration of listed business; and 
(4) a postponement of consideration of non-member access.^
The NYSE-proposed volume discount differed somewhat from 
that of the SEC. The NYSE suggested that no change in commis­
sions should take place on orders under 1000 shares, compared to 
400 under the SEC's proposal. The NYSE further stated that based 
on the responses of 306 member firms doing about 93 per cent of 
all securities business on national exchanges, the proposed 
interim rate schedule of the NYSE would reduce annual commission 
from securities transactions by approximately S130 million.
On June 28, I968, the Board of Governors of the NYSE pro­
posed a gradual elimination of the practice of customer-directed
^Ibid., p. 36.
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give-ups. On further reflection, the Board decided that a 
gradual elimination would not be suitable, because the intricate 
and complex arrangements through which customer-directed give- 
ups took place involved the use of unrelated trades. The Board 
therefore decided that only a complete prohibition would prevent 
the flagrant continuation of give-up practices. Finally, the 
NYSE proposed that both the interim commission schedule and the 
rule prohibiting customer-directed give-ups should become effec­
tive at the same time. Thus, according to the new rule,
. . .  no member, member firm or member corporation shall, in 
consideration of the receipt of listed business and at the 
direct or indirect request of a non-member or by direct or 
indirect arrangement with a non-member, make any payment or 
give up any work or give up all or any part of any commission 
or other property to which such member, member firm or member 
corporation is or will be entitled.9
The reason the NYSE gave for postponing the discount to 
non-member brokers (which in reality would permit limited access 
to the Exchange), was that the question of institutional member­
ship and non-member access could not be separated. Since both 
subjects were being discussed at the SEC hearings, it would reach 
a decision when the hearings were concluded.
9
New York Stock Exchange Constitution and Rules 
(April 15» 1970), Article XV, Section 1, pp. 1091-1094.
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Letter from Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman of the SEC, 
to Robert W. Haack, President of the NYSE,
August 30» 1965
In this letter, Mr. Cohen pointed out that the NYSE's 
proposed amendment to its constitution prohibiting customer- 
directed give-ups of work or money in consideration of listed 
business should not interfere with non-customer-directed inter­
dealer reciprocal business on regional exchanges, nor should it 
prevent broker-dealer affiliates of institutions from crediting 
or returning commissions to institutions with which they were 
affiliated.
Mr. Cohen further stated that the SEC would accept the 
proposed interim non-member commission schedule, if the members 
of the NYSE approved the proposal. If the interim schedule 
proposed by the Board of Governors of the Exchange was not 
approved, then the alternative would have to be adoption of the 
elimination of minimum rates of commission for orders in excess 
of $50,000.
Mr. Cohen concluded with these final remarks;
We wish to emphasize that these changes are interim 
steps. The Commission has reached no conclusion on whether 
the particular rates embodied in the interim non-member 
commission schedule reflect the optimum form of rate struc­
ture for your Exchange or that any schedule of specific 
rates would provide a complete answer to the problems raised 
in Release No, 8239 and the comments thereon. Additional 
measures with respect to these and other matters are under 
continuing consideration and will be examined further in the 
course of our hearings. In directing you to adopt these 
measures on an interim basis we assume that you will address 
yourself as promptly as possible to the matter of changes of 
a permanent nature.10
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For the first time in letters to the NYSF, the SEC used 
"direct". This is pointed out because, among firms involved in 
mutual fund operations, it is a widely-held belief that the New 
York Stock Exchange was forced by the SEC to prohibit customer- 
directed give-ups.
The original proposal of the NYSE was to phase out the 
give-up over a period of time, instead of an abrupt cessation of 
the practice, which eventually took place. Because of the words 
"direct" and "direction", the Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade 
Association, Oxford Securities, Inc., and James C. Butterfield, 
Inc., filed a law suit against the SEC claiming that Mr. Cohen's 
letter to Robert W. Haack, President of the NYSE constituted an 
unlawful order which was in excess of its statutory authority 
because no opportunity for a hearing was given prior to its 
release. This procedure is required by section 19(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In subsequent chapters, more 
details of the law suit will be given.
Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Association, Oxford 
Securities, Inc., and James C. Butterfield, Inc., v. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, No. 22,552, United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 53 (1968).
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Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8399 of September 4,
19^8, and Letter from Irving M. Pollack, Director of the 
Division of Trading and Markets of the SEC to 
Robert W. Haack, September 4, 1968
Release No. 8599 pointed out that because of problems 
beyond the control of the NYSE, the SEC had agreed to modify its 
original request for the institution of the interim commission 
rate schedule. The date would be moved from September I5, 1968 
to one not later than December 5 » 1968.
Mr. Pollack pointed out in his letter of September 4, 
1968, that for the new proposals to be equitable to all parties, 
there should be uniform application of the abolition of customer- 
directed give-ups on all exchanges. He further stated that the 
other exchanges would probably want to effect changes to remain 
competitive with the NYSE new commission schedule. Mr. Pollack 
went on to say that from evidence developed at the rate structure 
hearings,
. . .  any purported change in rate structure, other than the 
adoption of a provision for freely negotiated rates would be 
a sham, unless there was evidence that it was to be realisti­
cally adhered to by inclusion of appropriate provisions for 
abolition of customer-directed give-ups. While any exchange 
would of course, be free to argue to the contrary, we believe 
that the Commission's policy on abolition of give-ups has 
already been clearly expressed.Ü
Obviously, from the tone of the letter, the SEC certainly
expected the regional exchanges to abolish or prohibit customer-
directed give-ups if they wished to adopt a volume discount to
remain competitive with the NYSE.
^^Ibid., p. 54.
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Special Membership Bulletin from the NYSE 
to its Members on the Proposed Amendment 
of Article XV, Oc.tober 10, 1968
Members were informed that the Board of Governors had 
approved the proposed amendment to Article XV of the Exchange's 
Constitution, which called for a prohibition of customer-directed 
give-ups, a volume discount for portions of large orders over 
1,000 shares, and a reduction in intra-member rates. The bul­
letin specified that the amendment was necessary for the preser­
vation of the minimum commission structure, as it would eliminate 
abusive practices which had caused leakages in commissions. 
Legally reduced commission rates would remove much of the pres­
sure to obtain them in a circuitous manner; the abolition of
give-ups would eliminate the means for doing so.
The institution of the volume discount proposed by the 
NYSE would result in an annual reduction in gross commission of 
about $150 million compared to approximately $l8o million if the 
commission schedule proposed by the SEC had been adopted.
The Board of Governors of the NYSE felt that it would be 
unreasonable to permit or defend give-up devices and simultane­
ously justify the retention of minimum commissions. For this 
reason, the abolition of customer-directed give-ups was made an 
integral part of the revised commission rate structure, although 
the SEC in its statement of May 28, I968 did not specifically
request the abolition of the give-up.
The NYSE would not eliminate the traditional non-customer
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directed inter-dealer reciprocal business on regional exchanges, 
but only give-ups of money or work directed by a non-member. In 
addition, the prohibition would not preclude broker-dealers who 
were affiliated with institutions from crediting commissions to 
the affiliated institutions.
Miscellaneous Correspondence and Bulletins
On October 11, 1968 the Securities and Exchange 
Commission was requested by legal counsel for the Independent 
Broker-Dealers' Trade Association to set aside its request of 
August 30, 1968, to the NYSE relating to the revised commission 
structure and rates. The legal counsel for the appellants also 
requested the SEC to instruct the NYSE not to count ballots or 
take any other action to implement any changes in its commissions 
structure.
The SEC replied to Shipley, Ackerman and Pickett, legal 
counsel for the IBDTA, on October I8. The SEC stated it had 
decided to deny all requests of Shipley, Ackerman and Pickett 
since there had been no commission action appropriate for judi­
cial review. In addition, the SEC stated it had no control over 
voting or balloting on the NYSE.
On October 25, 1968, in a special membership bulletin, 
the NYSE announced that by a membership vote of 925 to 266, 
Article XV of the Constitution had been amended to include the 
new interim commission rate schedule which would become effective
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December 5 of the same year. The prohibition of customer-directed 
give-ups would be an integral part of the interim schedule. The 
special bulletin emphasized that the future of the minimum com­
mission could well depend on the success of the interim schedule. 
On December 5» 19^8, the customer-directed give-up became 
illegal. The volume discount proposed by the NYSE became effec­
tive on the same date. Ironically, December, 1968 marked the 
beginning of the worst bear market of recent times. The sequence 
of events leading to the prohibition of the customer-directed 
give-up has been related in the previous pages. The two main 
protagonists in these events were the SEC and the NYSE, The 
views of the United States Department of Justice on give-ups and 
the NYSE commission rate structure were not reviewed, although it 
is a foregone conclusion that fear of intervention by the 
Department of Justice prompted the NYSE to alter its original 
proposal on elimination of give-ups. In Part IV the legality and 
ethical overtones of prohibiting give-ups will be discussed, and 
the views of the Department of Justice are presented in that 
section.
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PART II
THE IMPACT OF THE ABOLITION OF CUSTOMER-DIRECTED 
GIVE-UPS ON MUTUAL FUND RETAILERS
When reforms in the management of open-end investment 
companies (mutual funds) and in the distribution of fund shares 
were first proposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
among those who strongly objected to the proposals was the 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. In 1938, the 
passage of the Maloney Amendment to the Securities Acts of 1933 
and 1934, empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission to 
supervise the formation and functioning of associations created 
for the purpose of regulating the conduct of over-the-counter 
trading. Consequently, the National Association of Securities 
Dealers was formed in 1939» It is a nonprofit organization which 
establishes and enforces fair rules of business conduct for its 
members and promotes ethical trade practices. Any broker or 
dealer engaged in the investment banking business is eligible for 
membership, provided he can meet the moral and ethical require­
ments of the Association.
In 1967, the National Association of Securities Dealers 
published a report entitled, "ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR THE 
SECURITIES BUSINESS of Proposals of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in its Report to Congress Entitled 'Public Policy
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Implications of Investment Company Growth' Part II of this
dissertation will Review this study and the conclusions reached 
by the National Association of Securities Dealers.
In addition, Part II will also review the results of a 
questionnaire survey made by the Independent Broker-Dealers'
Trade Association in the latter part of 1969* The Independent 
Broker-Dealers' Trade Association, a nonprofit trade association, 
was formed in late I966 "to protect and assert the rights and 
interests of independent brokers and dealers who are not members 
of the New York Stock Exchange."^ At present, the Independent 
Broker-Dealers' Trade Association has approximately 400 members 
and any of the more than 3000 registered brokers and dealers in 
America who are non-members of the New York Stock Exchange are 
eligible for membership.
The studies of both the National Association of 
Securities Dealers and the Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade 
Association related not only to the ban of the customer-directed 
give-up, but to total mutual fund reform proposals which include 
(1) reduction of the sales charge on mutual fund shares; (2) eli­
mination of the front-end load on periodic payment contractual 
plans; and (3) elimination of the sales charge on reinvestment of 
income dividends. Only the results of these studies in relation 
to the give-up problem will be discussed in this section.
^The Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Association, First 
Annual Report (1969), p. 1.
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Finally, Part II of this dissertation will review in 
detail the results of the questionnaire study carried out by the 
author to determine how the ban of customer-directed give-ups has 
affected retailers of mutual funds. This study is related solely 
to the commission-splitting or give-up problem, and is not an 
attempt to determine the effects of total mutual fund reform 
proposals.
CHAPTER IV
REVIEW OF THE STUDIES BY THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF SECURITIES DEALERS AND THE INDEPENDENT BROKER- 
DEALERS' TRADE ASSOCIATION
The Design and Selection of the National Association 
of Securities Dealers* Sample Questionnaire
In January of 196?, the Board of Governors of the 
National Association of Securities Dealers, alarmed at the mutual 
fund reform proposals of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
authorized a study to determine the probable economic consequen­
ces of the Commission's proposals. Booz-Allen Applied Research, 
Inc. of Washington was selected to assist the National 
Association of Securities Dealers in the preparation, processing 
and analysis of the questionnaires.
The following statement describes the method employed by 
Booz-Allen Applied Research, Inc, to design and select the sample;
The first step in designing and selecting a sample of 
NASD member firms to be surveyed was to stratify (or array) 
the 2,479 firms which responded to Questionnaire 1 of the 
Over-the-Counter Market Study (prepared for the NASD by Booz- 
Allen & Hamilton, Inc., August 1966) in a cross classifica­
tion by (a) total gross income, and (b) ratio of mutual fund 
income to total gross income. In both cases the 1964 reported 
income figures were used. Next, those firms reporting no 
mutual fund income were deleted from the universe. The 
remaining 1,826 firms fell into 24 cells of the cross classi­
fication which constituted the universe from which the sample 
was selected. Based upon the estimated degree of variability 
of results and upon the degree of reliability sought, it was 
determined that a ten per cent sample would be more than
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adequate. This provided l8l names, to which were added an 
additional selected l4 firms to broaden the sample in areas 
where it appeared to be deficient in number and to provide a 
control group. Questionnaires were directed to these 195 
firms, and were returned by I85, In accordance with NASD 
instructions, Booz-Allen Applied Research, Inc, applied stand­
ard statistical tests of reliability and significance to many 
of the results cited in this report. These support the 
validity of the conclusions stated,^
Conclusions of the Study
Based on the findings of the study the National
Association of Securities Dealers stated that its members
, , , will suffer a significant loss of income and a great 
many firms would be forced to leave the business should the 
proposals of the Securities and Exchange Commission, legisla­
tive and otherwise, relating to open-end investment companies 
(mutual funds), actually take effect. Moreover, it appears 
that there could be so significant a reduction in the proba­
bility of the comparatively small sale that large numbers of 
potential investors may no longer have this important invest­
ment medium brought to their attention,3
The conclusions of the preceding paragraph referred to
the effect of all recommendations of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, With regard to the elimination of give-ups, the
National Association of Securities Dealers maintained that
. , , in the aggregate for the 183 firms included in the 
sample, elimination of give-ups in I966 would have resulted 
in an increase in net income after tax, because thirteen of 
the largest firms in the sample paid out by way of give-ups 
considerably more in total than they received from that
2
The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc,, 
Economic Consequences for the Securities Business of Proposals of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission in its Report to Congress 
Entitled "Public Policy Implications of Investment Company 
Growth" (April 196? )« pp. 48-49.
^Ibid,, p, 1,
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source. The other 172 would have suffered a loss. For all 
registered broker-dealers in the aggregate, payments of give- 
ups would equal receipts from give-ups in any particular time 
period; thus elimination of give-ups for all would leave 
unchanged the aggregate net income after tax for the industry, 
while simultaneously changing substantially the profits 
within the industry, in effect shifting profits from the 
smaller and medium size firms to the largest firms,^
According to the study, give-ups in 1966 amounted to more 
than 98 per cent of the net income of the smallest income class 
of the firms sampled, and exceeded by over 100 per cent the total 
net income of the next largest class ($100,000 - $200,000), This 
statement is somewhat confusing, but a review of Table 15 shows 
that the sample firms with gross incomes under $100,000 received 
$119,000 in give-ups. Since this amount represented 98,3 per 
cent of their net income, this meant that the net income for this 
group of firms was approximately $121,000, Firms in the gross 
income category of $100,000 - $200,000 received $9^,000 in give- 
ups; if $94,000 amounted to 209 per cent of their net income,
then the net income for the group must have been approximately
$45,000, For further clarification, the sample income statement 
illustrates how the NASD probably arrived at the figure of 209 
per cent:
Operating income $ (4,000)
Income from give-ups 94,000
Net income before taxes $ 90,000
Tax (50 per cent rate) 4-5,000
Net income after taxes $ 45,000
I = 209 per cent
4
Ibid,, p, 6,
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TABLE 15
CUSTOMER-DIRECTED GIVE-UPS PAID AND RECEIVED 
BY SAMPLE FIRMS IN THE NASD STUDY
Gross Income of Firms 
(Thousands of Dollars)
Give-ups Received Give-■ups Paid
Thou­
sands
of
Dollars
Per 
Cent 
of Net 
Income
Per
Cent
of
Give-
ups
Thou-
sands
of
Dollars
Per 
Cent 
of Net 
Income
Per
Cent
of
Give-
ups
Over $2,500 (26) 5,017 35.4 81.1 7,472 52.8 98.1
$200 - $2,500 (41) 960 58.0 15.5 151 9.1 1.9
$100 - $200 (17) 94 209.0 1.5 0 0.0 0.0
Under $100 (101) 119 98.3 1.9 0 0.0 0.0
Total (185) 6,190 100.0 7,625 100.0
Source: National Association of Securities Dealers. Economic
Consequences for the Securities Business of Proposals of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission in its Report to 
Congress Entitled "Public Policy Implications of 
Investment Company Growth," April 196?, p. 51.
Notes :
The 185 firms sampled by the NASD received $6,190,000 in 
give-ups while paying out $7 ,625,000 in give-ups. Thus, these 
firms paid out approximately $1,455,000 more than they received.
Figures in parentheses represent the number of firms in 
the sample.
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The National Association of Securities Dealers noted that since 
virtually no business expense is allocable to the receipt of this 
kind of revenue, any loss of give-up revenue may be expected to 
be directly reflected in reduced net profits of the receiving 
firms. A review of Table 15 also shows that firms with gross 
income in I966 exceeding $2,500,000 received 8I.I per cent of 
customer-directed give-ups; these same firms accounted for 98.1 
per cent of all give-ups paid by the firms sampled.
Table I6 shows how 1966 net income of the sample firms 
would have been affected by the elimination of give-ups. Accord­
ing to the NASD study, firms in the $100,000 - $200,000 gross 
income category would have been most affected. This group of 
firms would have lost l49 per cent of 1966 net income, and more 
than half would have had deficits for the year.
While there is an increase in net income for the whole
group because of the elimination of give-ups, only firms in the
largest income group would have benefited from the increase. The
National Association of Securities Dealers states that
. . . detailed analysis of the sample shows that 13 firms of 
the 185 would have realized gains. This group of 13 includes 
the seven largest firms in the sample, each of which had 
gross income in I966 in excess of $l4 millions; nine of the 
firms that would have gained are among the 10 largest in the 
sample ; and all had gross incomes in I966 in excess of 
$300,000. As would be expected, each of the 13 is a member 
of at least one securities exchange and 12 of the 13 are 
members of the New York Stock Exchange and other exchanges. 
When the 13 exceptionally large firms that would realize a 
gain are excluded from the sample, the remaining 172 firms 
would have suffered a loss in excess of $1.5 millions, or
TABLE 16
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THE EFFECT OF ELIMINATION OF CUSTOMER-DIRECTED GIVE-UPS 
ON 1966 NET AFTER TAX INCOME OF FIRMS IN THE NASD STUDY
Net Income After Taxes 
(Thousands of Dollars)
Gross Income of Firms 
(Thousands of Dollars)
Number
of
Firms
Before
Elimi­
nation
After
Elimi­
nation
Amount
of
Change
Percentage
Change
Over $2,500 26 14,160 16,040 1,880 13.4*
$200 - $2,500 4l 1,655 1,255 (402) (24.3)
$100 - $200 17 45 (22) (67) (149.0)
Under $100 101 121 33 (88) (72.7)
Total 185 15,981 17,304 1,323 8.2
Source: National Association of Securities Dealers. Economic
Consequences for the Securities Business of Proposals of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission in its Report to 
Congress Entitled "Public Policy Implications of 
Investment Company Growth," April 19Û7, p. 33»
*Since firms with gross income of over $2,500,000 paid 
substantially more in give-ups than they received, it follows that 
eliminating give-ups would benefit these firms, with a resulting 
increase in net income.
6l
about 31.6 per cent of their 1966 net income after taxes.^
The section of the study on the elimination of give-ups concludes 
with a statement that the result of abolishing customer-directed 
give-ups would be to concentrate the substantial income from that 
source in the hands of a few of the largest firms in the business, 
while seriously reducing the profitability of many of the remain­
ing firms.
Evaluation and Criticism of the National Association 
of Securities Dealers' Study
In reviewing the study of the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, the question arises as to why a regulatory 
body sponsored a study, the conclusions of which were directly 
opposite to those of another more powerful regulatory organiza­
tion, the Securities and Exchange Commission. The passage of the 
Maloney Amendment to the Securities Acts of 1933 and 193^» 
empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission to supervise the 
formation and functioning of associations formed for the purpose 
of regulating the conduct of over-the-counter trading. While it 
may not be correct to state that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission is the parent organization of the National Association 
of Securities Dealers, it does play an important role in the 
functions of the Association. For example, an applicant who has 
been refused membership to the National Association of Securities
^Ibid., p. 32.
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Dealers may appeal to the Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
have his appeal upheld.
Why then did the National Association of Securities 
Dealers authorize the study? Was it an act of rebellion against 
the Securities and Exchange Commission? Was it forced on the 
Association by its members? Or did the National Association of 
Securities Dealers genuinely believe that abolition of traditional 
give-up practices would jeopardize the existence of its members, 
and consequently also jeopardize the existence of the Association? 
The National Association of Securities Dealers cannot exist with­
out broker-dealer members. Possibly the major reason for the 
study was neither an act of rebellion against the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, nor a genuine concern for the welfare of the 
members of the National Association of Securities Dealers; rather 
it may have been done purely to placate its members who were 
angry and disgusted at the proposed reforms of the Securities and 
Exchange, and who also believed very strongly that their inter­
ests were not being adequately protected by the National 
Association of Securities Dealers.
In gathering data for this dissertation, the author 
interviewed many broker-dealers. In these interviews one unani­
mous complaint arose— the broker-dealers believed that they were 
not being properly represented by the National Association of 
Securities Dealers. In the Securities Industry Questionnaire for 
Non-NYSE Members carried out by the Independent Broker-Dealers*
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Trade Association,^ one of the questions asked was, "Do you feel 
the NASD is anti-small business?" Of the 189 replies— ll4 
answered yes, 4? answered no, and 28 were undecided. To the 
question, "Do you feel the SEC is anti-small business?"— 156 
answered yes, 20 answered no, and 13 were undecided. The answer 
to the SEC question could be expected since the majority of 
businessmen do not particularly care for government intervention 
or control, but it appears rather tragic that members of an 
organization consider it detrimental to their own interests.
If members are dissatisfied with the policies of the 
National Association of Securities Dealers, why do they not 
resign? Why bother to join the Association? The answer is quite 
simple. Broker-dealers really have little choice; they either 
join or find themselves barred from many preferential business 
advantages. A recent article in the Wall Street Journal points 
out that the National Association of Securities Dealers encour­
ages broker-dealers to join the Association by offering preferen­
tial business advantages.
Probably the major inducement of the rule is a section 
that bars NASD members from participating with nonmember 
broker-dealers in any distribution of securities to the 
public. Thus, NASD membership is a prerequisite to receiv­
ing lucrative underwriting fees and the price discounts that 
NASD members get for selling mutual fund shares to the 
public. The NASD won't permit the shares of a mutual fund
^The Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Association, 
Securities Industry Questionnaire for Non-NYSE Members (December 
1969), p. 1.
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underwritten by an NASD member to be sold by nonmember 
broker-dealers. Neither will it permit the shares of a 
mutual fund underwritten by a non-NASD broker-dealer to be 
sold by NASD broker-dealers.7
Worth noting is the disagreement between the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the National Association of Securities 
Dealers. The SEC states that the NASD cannot prohibit its 
members from receiving price discounts.
As was previously noted, the study of the NASD was pub­
lished in April of 196?. In its 196? annual report, the presi­
dent of the NASD said that
. . .  we are strongly opposed to the 10b-10 rule on the basis 
that traditional give-up practices of the investment business 
are an integral part of the distribution system for mutual 
funds, providing the most efficient procedure for the execu­
tion of relatively large orders placed by investment compan­
ies. Any restriction that would prohibit present give-up 
practices could seriously disrupt the complex distribution 
pattern for mutual funds and also fractionalize the handling 
of large investment portfolio transactions to the detriment 
of shareholders in a fund.8
In 1968, according to NASD members interviewed by the
author, a confrontation took place between the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the National Association of Securities
Dealers over the study of the NASD and its stand against mutual
fund reforms, particularly the elimination of the customer-directed
7
The Wall Street Journal, Legal Test Looms for NASD 
Regulation Covering Securities Distribution (April 28, 1970),
p. 2.
g
The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 
Annual Report to Members (1967), p. 22.
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give-up. The NASD was censured for acting as a trade association 
instead of a quasi-governmental regulatory body. Chastened and 
subdued, the NASD decided to stop its attacks on the proposed 
mutual fund reforms, and instead adopted a new ploy to placate 
its members. This was the limited access rule to the New York 
Stock Exchange, whereby nonmembers would receive a 33^ per cent 
commission discount on orders executed. Naturally, the new stand 
taken by the National Association of Securities Dealers did not 
meet with member approval. In the survey taken by the Independent 
Broker-Dealers’ Trade Association, the following question was 
asked: "Do you feel the proposed 33^ per cent commission access
to the New York Stock Exchange for nonmembers is adequate?” Of 
those replying— 137 said no, 36 answered yes, and I6 were non­
committal, On the average, those who felt the proposed commis­
sion discount was inadequate suggested a figure of approximately 
50 per cent,^ The author agrees with the opinion of these indi­
viduals since a nonmember of the major or regional exchanges in 
most instances can execute trades on the Third Market at rates 
more advantageous than the one proposed above.
On page I6 of the 1967 NASD Report to Members, there is a 
statement that at year end the membership numbered 3669, On page 
two of the NASD report entitled Economic Consequences for the
^The Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Association, 
Securities Industry Questionnaire for Non-NYSE Members (December
1969), p. 3.
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Securities Business, the report states that some 3|600 NASD 
broker-dealers employ about 90,000 salesmen, nearly all of whom, 
at some time or other, sell mutual fund shares to their customers. 
With more than 36OO broker-dealers involved in mutual fund sales, 
one wonders why the sample for the NASD study was selected from 
only a population of 1826 firms, which constituted approximately 
50 per cent of mutual fund retailers in I967.
When the NASD published the results of its study, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission was somewhat skeptical of the 
findings. The Commission requested the NASD to hand over its 
records, since the SEC wished to verify the results. The NASD 
was unable to provide the SEC with any of the data collected for 
the study, since the data had been destroyed by Booz-Allen 
Applied Research, Inc. Presumably the data had been destroyed to 
protect the identities of the respondents.
Tables 15 and I6 which were prepared from statistics con­
tained in the NASD report, are somewhat confusing and definitely 
misleading. For example, Table 15 shows that the 101 firms, each 
with gross income less than #100,000, received a total of #119,000 
in give-ups, which amounted to 98.3 per cent of total net income. 
What these tables imply is that each and every firm received 
give-ups. In no part of the NASD report is the fact mentioned 
that many many firms never received a dollar of give-ups. The 
reason was simply because the volume of their mutual fund sales 
did not justify give-ups being directed to them by mutual funds.
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According to Mr. Raymond W, Cocchi, President of the Independent 
Broker-Dealers’ Trade Association, only the firms who were large 
retailers of mutual funds received give-ups which amounted to a 
significant amount of dollars. In his opinion, a large retailer 
of mutual funds would be one selling approximately $10,000,000 of 
a particular fund. The sales charge or the dealers' commission 
on these sales would be approximately six per cent; thus the 
dealers' gross income on sales of $10,000,000 would be approxi­
mately $600,000.^^ The point to be made here is that the average 
broker-dealer with a gross income under $100,000 probably received 
no income from customer-directed give-up, or an amount which would 
be insignificant in relation to his total gross income. If the 
elimination of an insignificant amount of income was sufficient 
to change the average dealer from a position of profit to one of 
loss, how efficiently could the operations of the average dealer 
have been in the first place?
On page 30 of its report, the NASD stated that
. . .  since there is virtually no business expense allocable 
to the receipt of this kind of revenue, any loss of give-up 
income may be expected to be directly reflected in reduced 
net profits of the receiving firms. In many cases, the 
reduction would throw individual firms into loss positions.
^^Raymond W. Cocchi, President of the Independent Broker- 
Dealers' Trade Association, Springfield, Massachusetts, July 1970.
^^The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 
Economic Consequences for the Securities Business of Proposals of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission in its Report to Congress 
Entitled "Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth" 
(April 1967), p. 30.
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This statement is debatable since some business expenses are 
allocable to give-up revenue. Mutual funds directed give-ups to 
firms selling their fund shares, not because of unbounded gener­
osity or because of their altruistic natures, but simply because 
the mutual fund retailers were providing needed research for the 
mutual funds or extra services to the buyers of mutual fund 
shares. The time spent on research by the mutual fund retailers 
must have had a cost; the extra time spent servicing the accounts 
of mutual fund buyers must have resulted in time spent which 
could probably have been utilized in procuring new sales. The 
results of the author's survey which will be presented in the 
next chapter show that mutual fund retailers did allocate costs 
to give-up revenue and have reduced these costs to compensate for 
any loss they may have suffered through the elimination of 
customer-directed give-ups.
Review of the Study of the Independent 
Broker-Dealers* Trade Association
In the latter part of 1969 a survey entitled "Securities
Industry Questionnaire for Non-NYSE Members" was prepared by the
Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Association. According to Mr.
Raymond W. Cocchi, President of the Association, the
. . .  survey was prompted by members of Congress who have 
expressed deep concern over the continued profitability of 
independent brokers and dealers, particularly in the face of 
loss of give-ups, pending Mutual Fund Legislation, and rising 
costs in maintaining small businesses.12
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This study was not a sophisticated one, and according to 
Mr. Cocchi it was conceived on a plane trip back to Springfield, 
Massachusetts, the headquarters of the Association, Question­
naires were sent to approximately 400 of the Trade Association 
members and replies were received from 189 members, or a little 
less than 50 per cent. Second requests were not sent to the non­
respondents. The following questions were asked about give-ups:
Question: Did your firm receive "give-ups" or "reciprocal" from
Mutual Funds prior to December 5 » 1968?
Replies: Yes, I66; No, 17; Non-committal, 6
Question: Approximately what percentage of "give-ups" or
"reciprocal" did you receive in relation to your 
Mutual Fund sales?
Replies : Average 1.44 per cent
Question ; Have you received "give-ups" or "reciprocal" since 
December 5 » 1968?
Replies : Yes, 23; No, I6O; Non-committal, 3
Presumably the "reciprocal" in the questions refers to 
orders for sales or purchase of securities given to the firms by 
mutual funds. This is a perfectly legitimate practice.
IBDTA members were also asked for their opinions of the 
SEC and the NASD.
12The Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Association, 
Securities Industry Questionnaire for Non-NYSE Members (December
1959), p. 1.
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Question ; Do you feel the SEC is anti-small business? 
Replies ; Yes, 1$6; No, 20; Non-committal, 13
Question; Do you feel the NASD is anti-small business? 
Replies : Yes, ll4; No, 4?; Non-committal, 28
Question : Do you feel like part of the industry? That is, are
you posted on the effects of new regulations and new 
legislation prior to their enactment?
Replies: Yes, 74; No, 106; Non-committal, 9
The general opinion of the respondents was that both the 
SEC and the NASD were anti-small business. A majority of broker- 
dealers also felt that they should be informed of the possible 
effects of new regulations and legislation before the regulations 
and legislation became effective.
CHAPTER V
A QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY TO DETERMINE THE IMPACT 
ON INCOME OF MUTUAL FUND RETAILERS DUE TO THE 
ABOLITION OF CUSTOMER-DIRECTED GIVE-UPS
Chapter V is devoted to the questionnaire survey carried 
out by the author of this dissertation. The purpose of the study 
was stated in detail in Part I. One of the main reasons for the 
study was to determine if a significant redistribution had taken 
place during I969 in (1) gross income of mutual fund retailers; 
and (2) in income from mutual fund operations as a per cent of 
gross income. Another reason for the questionnaire was to 
ascertain what changes had taken place in the organization 
structure and operations of firms that may have been affected by 
the elimination of customer-directed give-ups.
Chapter V deals with the following topics: (l) the
design and the selection of the sample; (2) questionnaire mail­
ings; (3) statistical tests performed; (4) analysis of the 
collected data; (5) selected comments by the respondents; and 
(6) the author's conclusions on the survey.
The purpose of the questionnaire was not to try to prove 
or disprove the assertions of the National Association of 
Securities Dealers and broker-dealers that the elimination of 
give-ups would result in tragic consequences for many firms.
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Neither was it an attempt to justify the actions of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and the New York Stock Exchange. Instead, 
it should be considered purely an effort to determine the results, 
beneficial or detrimental, of legislation which had created a 
considerable amount of furor in the securities industry.
The Design and Selection of the Sample Questionnaire
Considerable time was spent interviewing broker-dealers 
to discuss the format of the questionnaire. The advice of the 
National Association of Securities Dealers and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission was also enlisted. On the advice of all par­
ties, a decision was made not to ask for specific dollar income 
figures, but rather to obtain percentage figures. In addition, 
to insure complete confidence that replies would not be unethi­
cally used, the names of the respondents were not requested. The 
belief was held that the response would be greater if the survey 
was kept as confidential as possible. The final format incorpor­
ated suggestions of the broker-dealers, the NASD, the SEC, and 
the members of the candidate’s committee.
A considerable problem developed in obtaining population 
data from which to draw a sample. The SEC very kindly consented 
to allow the author to use its computer listings of broker- 
dealers v/ho had registered with the SEC. These listings contained 
firms which at the time of registration indicated that mutual 
fund sales either accounted for, or would account for, ten per
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cent or more of annual gross income. The total number of firms 
on the SEC's list amounted to 3115• Of this amount, however, 327 
were not coded as having ten per cent or more of annual gross 
income from the retailing of mutual funds. Possibly some of the 
327 firms may have sold mutual fund shares, although the coding 
indicated that a great many were primarily concerned with selling 
variable annuities or in mutual fund underwriting. Since it was 
not possible to indicate the extent of their mutual fund retail 
operations, they were deleted from the population to be sampled. 
This deletion left a group of 2788 firms which, at the time of 
registration, indicated that the retailing of mutual fund shares 
would contribute ten per cent or more to total annual gross 
income. Three points should be noted here : (l) although at the
time of registration mutual fund sales were expected to contri­
bute ten per cent or more to gross income, expectations may not
have materialized; (2) the dates of registration were at differ­
ent times— for example, it is possible for a firm to have regis­
tered in 1950 and to have done more than a ten per cent gross in
mutual fund sales at that time, but in I969 the same firm's share
of mutual fund income could have been less than ten per cent; and 
(3) the list contained firms which, for many reasons, were 
inactive. The author discussed this problem with the SEC and was 
told that many broker-dealers were indeed inactive but had not 
informed the SEC and thus were still included on the computer 
listings.
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standard deviations of the gross income of the firms or 
standard deviations of income from mutual fund operations as a 
per cent of gross income were not available. Since time and cost 
factors did not permit a small sample study to obtain these 
figures, a decision was made :
1. To use the standard error formula as the determinant of 
sample size.
2. To be ultraconservative and to set p (the percentage of 
the sample possessing the given attribute) equal to 0.5 
which is its highest possible value.
5. To use a confidence limit of 99 per cent.
4. To have an error limit (or tolerance specification) of
+ or - 5 per cent. If this level were any lower, with a
confidence limit of 99 per cent, the sample size would be
abnormally large. For example, with an error limit of
2.5 per cent the sample size would be approximately 2660, 
almost the total population.
5. To modify the formula for the standard error of a per­
centage, since the sample constituted a large portion of 
the population— approximately 20 per cent.
6. To use an unrestricted sample, that is, the sample 
members would be selected from the population at large; 
and to choose the sample by systematic selection.
The precision of the sample estimate was to be within +
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or - 5 per cent with a 99 per cent reliability. This precision 
means that when a sample of size n is selected, and the estimate 
X equal to 0.5 is found, this x equal to 0.5 is to be within + or 
- 5 per cent of the population mean with a reliability of 99 per 
cent.
The Questionnaire Mailings 
Table 17 which follows shows the response to the first 
and second mailings.
On the first mailing, 256 firms replied out of a total of 
540 questionnaires mailed; the response was approximately 4? per 
cent. The 222 questionnaires which were complete in information 
amounted to approximately 4l per cent of the total number mailed.
Of those replying, approximately 120 indicated their 
names, although this information was not requested. This report­
ing meant their names could be deleted from the second mailing 
request, which amounted to approximately 420 questionnaires. The 
420 questionnaires included lj6 firms which had replied to the 
first request but whose identities were unknown. For calculation 
purposes one must consider the second request as 284 (420 - 136) 
questionnaires.
There were 86 replies to the second mailing, which 
amounted to a J>0 per cent response. Of the 86 replies, 64 (or 
23 per cent of the total) were usable. In total, 540 question­
naires were mailed out and 343 or approximately 64 per cent were
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returned; of this amount, 286 or approximately 53 per cent were 
totally usable,
TABLE 17
RESPONSES TO THE FIRST AND SECOND 
QUESTIONNAIRE MAILINGS
Usable
Incomplete
Information
No Mutual 
Fund 
Business Inactive Total
First Mailing 222 19 7 8 256
Second Mailing 64 11 4 8 87
Total 286 30 11 l6 343
Note :
In addition, 9 letters could not be delivered because of 
incorrect addresses; 8 were also received confirming they had 
already replied.
In order to avoid duplication of replies, the following 
steps were taken: (1) firms were requested not to answer the
second questionnaire if they had replied to the first; and (2) a 
record of the replies were kept by State, which could be deter­
mined from the postmark on the envelope; these were checked 
against the master list of questionnaires mailed, to determine 
that no more replies were received from a particular State than 
were mailed to that State. While some duplication in the returns 
is possible, there is no evidence that such duplication exists, 
nor does the possibility appear to be great.
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Statistical Tests Performed 
Statistical tests were performed to determine:
(1) whether the responses to the first and second questionnaire 
mailings came from the same population; (2) whether there was a 
significant change between 1968 and I969 in (a) income from 
mutual fund operations as a per cent of gross income for the two 
complete samples, and (b) gross income of the two complete 
samples; and (3) whether gross income of the sample firms was 
independent of income from mutual fund operations as a per cent 
of gross income.
1. To determine whether the two sample responses came from 
the same population, the Test of Homogeneity, one application of 
the Chi-Square Distribution was used. The null hypothesis for 
all tests in sections 1(a) and 1(b) is that the two samples came 
from the same population. The tests were applied to:
(a) Income from mutual fund operations as a per cent of gross 
income for I968 and I969. The results of the tests were 
as follows:
1968
The value is 4.4$
Present are (r-l)(s-l) = (6-1)(2-1) = 5 degrees of 
freedom
For a 5 per cent level of significance,
P (11.07 <  ) = 0.05
2 N.The rejection region is x ^  11.07
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2
Since x is equal to 4.4$, the null hypothesis that both 
samples came from the same population is accepted.
1969
The value is 1.1?
Present are (r-1)(s-1) = (6-l)(2-l) = 5 degrees of 
freedom
For a 5 per cent level of significance,
P (11.07 = 0.05
2
The rejection region is x >  11.07 
?
Since x is equal to 1.17, the null hypothesis that both 
samples came from the same population is accepted.
(b) Gross income for 1968 and I969. The results of the tests 
were as follows:
1968
The x^ value is 8.9I
Present are (r-l)(s-l) = (10-1)(2-1) = 9 degrees of 
freedom
For a 5 per cent level of significance,
P (16.92 <  x^<<^) = 0.05
The rejection region is x ^ ^  I6.92 
2
Since x is equal to 8.91» the null hypothesis that both 
samples came from the same population is accepted.
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1969
The value is 8,68
Present are (r-1)(s-1) = (10-1)(2-1) = 9 degrees of 
freedom
For a 5 per cent level of significance,
P (16.92 <  x^<oo) = 0.05
The rejection region is 16.92
2
Since x is equal to 8.68, the null hypothesis that both 
samples came from the same population is accepted.
2. To determine whether there had been a significant change 
between 1968 and I969 in the distribution of (a) income from 
mutual fund operations as a per cent of gross income, and (b) 
gross income, both the Test of Homogeneity and the t Distribution 
were used. For tests (a) and (b) in section 1, responses to the 
first questionnaire mailing were compared with responses to the 
second questionnaire mailing to determine if the responses were 
slightly different. Separate tests were performed for individual 
years, that is, for I968 and I969. For the tests in sections 2 
and 3, total responses to both questionnaire mailings were used. 
To further clarify this point, information in the aggregate for 
1968 was tested against similar information for I969.
The last class of the distribution of gross income was 
open; this class was for more than #2 ,500,000. To use the t Test 
under this condition was impossible, since the standard deviation
8o
could not be obtained. An adjustment of the open class was 
necessary. Three class intervals were estimated: These were
$2,500,000 - $10,000,000; $2,500,000 - $5,000,000; and 
$2,500,000 - $3,500,000. This circumstance was the reason why 
three separate t Tests were performed in section 2(b).
(a) Test of Homogeneity
Income from mutual fund operations as a per cent of gross 
income for 1968 and 1969.
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference 
between the distributions for 1968 and I969.
The value is 3*10
Present are (r-l)(s-l) = (6-l)(2-l) = 5 degrees of 
freedom
For a 5 per cent level of significance,
P (11.07 <  = 0.05
2
The rejection region is x >  11.07 
2
Since x is equal to 3.10, the null hypothesis is
accepted; the distribution of income from mutual fund 
operations as a per cent of gross income is not sig­
nificantly different for the years I968 and I969.
t Test
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference in 
the distribution of income for the years I968 and 1969* 
Null hypothesis : u^ = u^
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Alternative hypothesis ^
z = 1.15
For a two tail test, the results are significant at a 
.05 level if z lies outside the range -I.96 to I.96, and 
at a ,01 level if z lies outside the range -2,58 to 2,58, 
Since z = 1,15» the conclusion is that no significant 
difference exists in the distribution of mutual fund 
income as a per cent of gross income for the years I968 
and 1969; the null hypothesis is therefore accepted,
(b) Test of Homogeneity
Gross income for 1968 and 1969.
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference 
between the distribution for I968 and I969,
The value is 5.58
There are (r-1)(s-1) = (10-1)(2-1) = 9 degrees of 
freedom
For a 5 per cent level of significance,
P (16.92 <  x^<oo ) = 0.05
2
The rejection region is x ^  16,92 
2
Since x is equal to 5.58, the conclusion is that the
distribution of gross income in 1968 does not differ 
significantly from that of 1969; the hypothesis is 
therefore accepted.
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t Test
i) The null hypothesis is that there is no difference in
the distribution of gross income between I968 and 1969- 
Null hypothesis : u^ = u^
Alternative hypothesis u^
Using a last class interval of
$2,500,000 - $10,000,000, z = 0.22 
At both the 0,05 and 0,01 levels of significance, no 
significant difference exists in the distribution of 
gross income between I968 and 1969; the null hypothesis 
is therefore accepted.
ii) Using a last class interval of
$2,500,000 - $5,000,000, z = 0,24 ■
Again the conclusion is that at both the 0,05 and 
0,01 levels, no significant difference exists in the dis­
tribution of gross income between I968 and 1969; the null 
hypothesis is therefore accepted,
iii) Using a last class interval of
$2,500,000 - $3,500,000, z = 0,25 
Again the conclusion is that at both the 0,05 and
0.01 levels of significance, no significant difference 
exists in the distribution of gross income for the years 
1968 and 1969; the null hypothesis is therefore accepted.
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As the range of the last class interval narrows, the z 
statistic becomes a little larger. To assume that of the firms 
sampled in the over $2,500,000 category, none had income in 
excess of $3,500,000 would be unrealistic. This belief is not 
really important, since even if the last class interval exceeded 
$2,500,000 by only a dollar, the z statistic would not be more 
than the required 1.96, to alter the results at the 0,05 level of 
significance.
3. To ascertain whether gross income, and income from mutual 
fund sales are independent, another application of the Chi-Square 
Distribution, the Test of Independence using contingency tables 
was utilized. The null hypothesis is that income from mutual 
fund sales and gross income are independent. The results were;
1968
The x^ value is 125.29
Present are (r-1)(s-1) = (10-1)(6-1) = 45 degrees of 
freedom
For a 5 per cent level of significance,
P (61.7 < x ^ < ‘>o ) = 0.05
2The rejection region is x >  6I.0?
2
Since x is equal to 125.29, the hypothesis that income 
from mutual fund sales and gross income are indepen­
dent is rejected.
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1969
The value is 117.70
Present are (r-1)(s-1) = (10-1)(6-1) = 4$ degrees of 
freedom
For a 5 per cent level of significance,
P (61.7 ) = 0.05
The rejection region is x ^ ^  61.07 
2
Since x is equal to 117.70, the hypothesis that income 
from mutual fund sales and gross income are indepen­
dent is rejected.
Analysis of the Collected Data
Table l8 shows the distribution of income from mutual 
fund operations as a per cent of gross income for all the ques­
tionnaires received, and also for the first and second responses. 
An increase in I969 was found in the lower class limits, while in 
the upper class limits the number of firms decreased. While 
there was some change in the distribution between I968 and I969, 
as the statistical tests showed, differences in the distribution 
were not significant.
Table 19 gives the distribution of firms by gross income. 
All the firms sampled are shown in the first groups, and the next 
two show the distribution for the individual responses. In all 
the categories up to $1,500,000 there are some changes, but none 
of these appear to be significant except in the $100,000 -
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TABLE 18
DISTRIBUTION OF QUESTIONNAIRES BY INCOME FROM MUTUAL FUND 
OPERATIONS AS A PER CENT OF GROSS INCOME
All Questionnaires Numbers 1-222 Numbers 223-286
Mutual Fund Number of Firms Number of Firms Number of Firms
of Gross Income 1968 1969 1968 1969 1968 1969
0 - 1 0 43 48 31 35 12 13
10 - 30 30 55 23 27 7 8
30 - 50 20 21 15 15 5 6
50 - 70 20 27 15 22 5 5
70 - 90 50 4o 36 30 14 10
90 - 100 123 115 102 93 21 22
Total 286 286 222 222 64 64
Source; Questionnaires received from mutual fund retailers. 
Notes :
Questionnaires 1 - 222 were received from the first 
mailing request.
Questionnaires 223 - 286 were received from the second 
mailing request.
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TABLE 19
DISTRIBUTION OF QUESTIONNAIRES BY GROSS INCOME
All Questionnaires Numbers 1-222 Numbers 223-286
Number of Firms Number of■ Firms Number of Firms
Gross Income 1968 1969 1968 1969 1968 1969
Under #30,000 127 131 100 105 27 26
#50,000 - 
#100,000 50 53 38 4o 12 13
#100,000 - 
#200,000 38 30 31 23 7 7
#200,000 - 
#300,000 11 15 9 12 2 3
#300,000 - 
#500,000 14 11 8 7 6 4
#500,000 - 
#1,000,000 16 20 15 17 1 3
#1,000,000 - 
#1,500,000 10 7 8 7 2 0
#1,500,000 - 
#2,000,000 3 2 2 1 1 1
#2,000,000 - 
#2,500,000 1 2 1 1 0 1
Over
#2,500,000 16 15 10 9 6 6
Total 286 286 222 222 64 64
Source; Questionnaires received from mutual fund retailers. 
Notes :
Questionnaires 1 - 222 were received from the first 
mailing request.
Questionnaires 223 - 286 were received from the second 
mailing request.
87
$200,000 category where there was a decline from 38 to 30 in
1969.
Table 20 is constructed to show contingency tables for
1968 and 1969 by the two variables: (l) income from mutual fund 
operations as a per cent of gross income, and (2) gross income. 
These tables were necessary for the utilization of the Chi-Square 
Tests of Independence. Tables 21 and 22 show firms contemplating 
mergers. In Table 21, by far the greatest number is in the class 
limits 90 - 100 per cent; that is, the firms derive 90 - 100 per 
cent of their gross income from mutual fund sales. Table 22 
shows that 37 of the 49 firms contemplating mergers have gross 
incomes of $100,000 or less. Forty-nine of the 53 firms contem­
plating mergers consider themselves to be principally retailers 
of mutual funds.
Table 23 gives a breakdown of the firms contemplating 
mergers, and an analysis of their gross incomes. For example, of 
the 49 firms considering a merger and which are principally 
mutual fund retailers, the gross incomes of 37 were unchanged in 
1969» Of the 12 with changes in their gross incomes, income 
increased for three firms in 1969, and for nine firms income 
declined.
Tables 24 and 25 give a description of the firms which 
actually merged in I969, broken down bjf the two income variables. 
Table 26 points out how much of an increase to gross income in
1969 the merger contributed. These tables bring out a significant
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TABLE 20
QUESTIONNAIRES ARRAYED BY GROSS INCOME AND INCOME FROM 
MUTUAL FUND OPERATIONS AS A PER CENT OF GROSS INCOME
Mutual Fund Income as a Per 
Cent of Gross Income
rer
0 10 30 50 70 90 Cent
to to to to to to of
Gross Income 10 30 50 70 90 100 Total Total
1968
Under #50,000 i4 3 3 7 24 76 127 44.4
$50,000 - #100,000 2 7 13 4 7 17 50 17.5
$100,000 - $200,000 3 6 1 4 8 16 38 13.3
$200,000 - $300,000 5 3 1 1 2 1 11 3.8
$300,000 - $500,000 3 2 0 0 5 4 l4 4.9
$500,000 - $1,000,000 5 3 0 2 2 4 16 5.6
$1,000,000 - $1,500,000 5 0 1 0 1 3 10 3.5
$1,500,000 - $2,000,000 0 1 0 1 1 0 3 1.0
$2,000,000 - $2,500,000 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 .4
Over $2,500,000 8 5 1 1 0 1 16 5.6
Total 43 30 20 20 50 123 286 100.0
1969
Under $50,000 19 5 7 8 17 75 131 45.8
$50,000 - #100,000 1 9 10 9 9 15 53 18.5
$100,000 - $200,000 4 7 1 4 1 13 30 10.5
$200,000 - $300,000 2 5 1 3 3 1 15 5.2
$300,000 - $500,000 2 1 0 1 3 4 11 3.9
$500,000 - $1,000,000 9 2 0 1 3 5 20 7.0
$1,000,00(5"- $1,500,000 2 2 0 0 1 2 7 2.4
$1,500,000 - $2,000,000 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 .7
$2,000,000 - $2,500,000 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 .7
Over $2,500,000 8 4 0 1 2 0 15 5.3
Total 48 35 21 27 40 115 286 100.0
Source: Questionnaires received from mutual fund retailers.
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TABLE 21
FIRMS CONTEMPLATING MERGERS BECAUSE OF THE 
ELIMINATION OF GIVE-UPS AND OTHER REASONS
Mutual Fund Income 
as a Per cent of 
Gross Income
1969
Mutual Fund Retailers
Total
No. of Firms 
(1)
No. of Firms 
(2)
0 - 10 1 0 1
10 - 30 1 2 3
30 - 50 2 1 3
50 - 70 6 1 7
70 - 90 8 0 8
90 - 100 31 0 31
Total 49 4 53
Source: Questionnaires received from mutual fund retailers.
Notes:
Firms whose principal business is retailing mutual funds 
and which are thinking of mergers numbered 4$.
Firms contemplating mergers but which are not principally 
involved in the retailing of mutual funds amounted to 4,
1. Column (1) shows the number of firms whose principal 
business is retailing mutual funds.
2. Column (2) shows the number of firms whose principal 
business is not retailing mutual funds.
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TABLE 22
FIRMS CONTEMPLATING MERGERS BECAUSE OF THE 
ELIMINATION OF GIVE-UPS AND OTHER REASONS
Gross Income
1969
Mutual Fund
No. of Firms 
(1)
Retailers
No. of Firms 
(2) Total
Under $50,000 23 1 24
$ 50,000 - $ 100,000 14 2 16
$ 100,000 - $ 200,000 4 0 4
$ 200,000 - $ 300,000 1 1 2
$ 300,000 - $ 500,000 3 0 3
$ 500,000 - $1,000,000 3 0 3
$1,000,000 - $1,500,000 0 0 0
$1,500,000 - $2,000,000 1 0 1
$2,000,000 - $2,500,000 0 0 0
Over $2,500,000 0 0 0
Total 49 4 53
Source: Questionnaires received from mutual fund retailers.
Notes:
Column (l) shows firms whose principal business is 
retailing mutual funds.
Column (2) shows firms whose principal business is not 
retailing mutual funds.
91
TABLE 23
FIRMS CONTEMPLATING MERGERS SHOWN BY PRINCIPAL TYPE 
OF BUSINESS AND BY CHANGE IN GROSS INCOME
Gross Income 
in 1969 
Unchanged From
1968
Gross Income 
in 1969 
Changed From
1968 Total
Retailing Mutual Funds—  
Principal Business 37 12* 49
Retailing Mutual Funds—  
Not Principal Business 4 - 4
Total 4l 12 53
Source: Questionnaires received from mutual fund retailers,
*Gross income of 3 firms increased in 1969: '
From under #30,000 to $50,000-$100,000 2
From $200,000-$300,000 to $300,000-$500,000 1 3
*Gross income of 9 firms decreased in I969:
From $50,000-$100,000 to under $50,000 3
From $100,000-$200,000 to $50,000-$100,000 2
From $100,000-$200,000 to under $50,000 1
From $300,000-$500,000 to $200,000-$300,000 1
From $l,0O0 ,000-$l,500,G00 to $500,000-$1,000,000 2 9
12
92
TABLE 2k
FIRMS THAT MERGED IN I969 BROKEN DOWN 
BY GROSS INCOME
Gross Income
Merged in I969 
Number of Firms
Under #50,000 1
I 50,000 - #100,000 k
#100,000 - #200,000 k
#200,000 - #500,000 2
#300,000 - #500,000 1
Over #2,500,000 1
Total 13
Source: Questionnaires received from mutual
fund retailers.
TABLE 25
FIRMS THAT MERGED IN 1969 BROKEN DOWN
BY INCOME FROM MUTUAL FUND OPERATIONS
AS A PER CENT OF GROSS INCOME
Merged in I969
Mutual Fund Income as Per
Cent of Gross Income Number of Firms
0 - 10 1
10 - 30 2
30 - 50 0
50 - 70 2
70 - 90 2
90 - 100 0
Total 13
Source: Questionnaires received from mutual
fund retailers.
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TABLE 26
FIRMS THAT MERGED IN I969 AND PER CENT INCREASE 
IN GROSS INCOME CAUSED BY MERGER
Percentage Increase in I969 Gross 
Income Contributed by Merger 
(Number of Firms)
Gross Income 0-10 10-30 30-50 50-70 70-90 90-100 Total
Under $50,000 1 - - - - - 1
$ 50,000 — $100,000 4" — — — — — 4"
$ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0  - $ 2 0 0 ,0 0 0  2 - 1 1 - -  4-
$ 2 0 0 ,0 0 0  - $3 0 0 ,0 0 0  2 - - - -  - 2
$ 3 0 0 ,0 0 0  —  $5 0 0 ,0 0 0  1 —  —  —  —  —  1
Over $2,500,000 1 — — — — — 1
Total 11 - 1 1 - - 13
Source: Questionnaires received from mutual fund retailers.
point; despite the predictions that widespread mergers would 
result from the prohibition of customer-directed give-ups, few 
mergers actually occurred in 1969.
Tables 27, 28 and 29 indicate the amount of new recipro­
cal business received by firms to compensate for the loss of 
income brought about by the elimination of give-ups. As illus­
trated in Table 27, 44- firms specifically pointed out that they 
received no reciprocal business, although the questionnaire did 
not have a category for "zero" reciprocal business. The ques­
tionnaire had four categories, the first of which was 0 - 2 5  per
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TABLE 27
NEW RECIPROCAL BUSINESS TO COMPENSATE FOR INCOME LOST 
THROUGH THE ELIMINATION OF GIVE-UPS
Per Cent of Lost Income 
Compensated by New 
Reciprocal Business Number of Firms
0 44
0 - 2 5 214
25 - 50 10
50 - 75 12
75 - 100 6
Total 286
Source; Questionnaires received from mutual fund 
retailers.
cent. In this category are 214 firms, and perhaps many firms 
checking this category may have received no new reciprocal busi­
ness since the firms did not specify actual percentages received. 
Tables 28 and 29 show new reciprocal business received by the two 
income variables. In Table 28 for example, in the ’’under $50,000” 
class, 26 firms received no new reciprocal business, while 102 
firms received between 0 - 2 5  per cent. In Table 29 for example, 
for firms receiving 90 - 100 per cent of gross income from mutual 
fund sales, 19 received no new reciprocal business, while 92 
received 0 - 2 5  per cent.
95
TABLE 28
NEW RECIPROCAL BUSINESS TO COMPENSATE FOR INCOME LOST 
THROUGH THE ELIMINATION OF GIVE-UPS 
(DISTRIBUTION BY GROSS INCOME)
Gross Income 0
Per Cent of New Reciprocal 
Business in I969 
(Number of Firms)
0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100 Total
Under $50,000 26 102 2 1 0 131
$ 50,000-$ 100,000 10 39 2 2 0 53
$ 100,000-$ 200,000 k 26 0 0 0 30
$ 200,000-$ 300,000 2 9 1 3 0 15
$ 300,000-$ 500,000 2 5 1 2 1 11
$ 500,000-$l,000,000 0 17 1 1 1 20
$1,000,000-$l,500,000 0 3 2 0 2 7
$1,500,000-$2,000,000 0 2 0 0 0 2
$2,000,000-$2,500,000 0 0 1 1 0 2
Over $2,500,000 0 11 0 2 2 15
Total 44 2l4 10 12 6 286
Source: Questionnaires received from mutual fund retailers.
Note :
The table above shows the distribution of new reciprocal 
business to compensate for the loss of income because of the 
elimination of give-ups.
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TABLE 29
NEW RECIPROCAL BUSINESS TO COMPENSATE FOR INCOME LOST 
THROUGH THE ELIMINATION OF GIVE-UPS (DISTRIBUTION BY 
MUTUAL FUND INCOME AS A PER CENT OF GROSS INCOME)
Mutual Fund Income 
as a Per Cent of 
Gross Income 0
Per Cent of New Reciprocal 
Business in I969 
(Number of Firms)
0-25 25-30 30-73 73-100 Total
0 - 10 3 37 2 2 2 48
10 - 30 4 27 2 1 1 33
30 - 30 3 16 1 1 0 21
30 - 70 6 18 1 2 0 27
70 - 90 7 24 2 3 2 40
90 - 100 19 92 2 1 1 115
Total 44 214 10 12 6 286
Source; Questionnaires received from mutual fund retailers.
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Table 30 shows the various types of comments made by the
firms. A complete section has been devoted to these comments, so
no further details will be given here.
Tables 31» 32 and 33 are devoted to the exchange member­
ship of the firms surveyed. In I968 only 57» or 20 per cent of 
the firms in the survey, belonged to a national or regional 
exchange; in I969 the figures were 72, or 25 per cent. Tables 32 
and 33 show the distribution of exchange membership by the two 
income variables. Very little change in membership was found to 
occur in individual exchanges except for the Philadelphia- 
Baltimore-Washington and Boston Stock Exchanges, For the 
Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington, membership increased from 21 
to 29 in 1969; and for the Boston, the increase was from 10 to 19
in 1969.
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TABLE 30
COMMENTS ON HOW THE ELIMINATION OF GIVE-UPS HAS AFFECTED FIRMS 
Type of Comment Number of Firms
No comment made 76
The ban was detrimental, causing a 
decline in income 60
The ban had little or no effect on 
the firm's operations 45
Because of the ban changes were 
made in operating procedures: 
Income nevertheless declined 23
No explanation of how the 
changes affected the firm 53 56
Despite the ban, no changes were made 47
The ban was justified 2
Total 286
Source: Questionnaires received from mutual fund retailers.
TABLE 51
EXCHANGE MEMBERSHIP OF FIRMS SURVEYED
1968 1969
Member of an Exchange 57 72
Non-member of an Exchange 229 214
Total 286 286
Source: Questionnaires received from mutual
fund retailers.
TABLE 32 - Page 1
DISTRIBUTION OF EXCHANGE MEMBERSHIP BY INCOME FROM MUTUAL FUND 
OPERATIONS AS A PER CENT OF GROSS INCOME
Mutual 
Income as a 
of Gross :
Fund 
Per Cent 
Income
Exchange Membership
None 
1968 1969
NYSE
1968 1969
AMEX
1968 1969
Pacific
1968
Coast
1969
Midwest
1968 1969
P-B
1968
-W
1969
0 - 10 19 20 10 12 11 13 7 7 12 14 5 7
10 - 30 14 21 7 5 5 3 1 1 6 4 9 7
30 - 50 15 14 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 1 2
50 - 70 18 21 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 3
70 - 90 46 31 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 3 5
90 - 100 117 107 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 5
Total 229 214 19 19 18 18 12 12 20 20 21 29
vD
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TABLE 32 - Page 2
DISTRIBUTION OF EXCHANGE MEMBERSHIP BY INCOME FROM MUTUAL FUND 
OPERATIONS AS A PER CENT OF GROSS INCOME
Mutual Fund 
Income as a Per Cent 
of Gross Income
Exchange Membership
Boston
1968 1969
Detroit
1968 1969
Pittsburgh
1968 1969
Cincinnati
1968 1969
Other
1968 1969
Total
1968 1969
0 - 10 5 5 1 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 75 85
10 - 30 1 2 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 46 45
30 - 50 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 21 24
50 - 70 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 27 31
70 - 90 1 4 1 ■ 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 56 46
90 - 100 1 5 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 122 123
Total 10 19 4 4 7 8 2 5 5 6 347 354
Source: Questionnaires received from mutual fund retailers.
Note :
The totals do not equal 286 (number of firms surveyed) as several firms have memberships
on more than one exchange.
TABLE 35 - Page 1
DISTRIBUTION OF EXCHANGE MEMBERSHIPS BY GROSS INCOME CATEGORIES
Gross Income
Exchange Membership
None NYSE AMEX Pacific Coast Midwest P-B-W
1968 1969 1968 1969 1968 1969 1968 1969 1968 1969 1968 1969
Under $50,000 124 125 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 4
$ 50,000-$ 100,000 45 46 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
$ 100,000-$ 200,000 52 21 2 0 4 2 0 0 1 2 4 4
$ 200,000-$ 300,000 5 5 0 1 0 1 2 2 2 1 2 6
$ 300,000-$ 500,000 7 5 2 0 2 0 3 3 2 2 2 1
$ 500,000-$! ,000,000 7 6 1 3 1 2 2 2 4 4 4 6
$1 ,000,000-$! ,500,000 4 2 2 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 3 1
$1 ,500,000-$2 ,000,000 2 1 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
$2 ,000,000-$2 ,500,000 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1
Over $2,500,000 2 3 11 12 10 11 1 0 10 8 4 3
Total 229 214 19 19 18 18 12 12 20 20 21 29
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TABLE 33 - Page 2
DISTRIBUTION OF EXCHANGE MEMBERSHIPS BY GROSS INCOME CATEGORIES
Gross Income
Boston
1968 1969
Exchange Membership
Detroit Pittsburgh Cincinnati Other Total
1968 1969 1968 1969 1968 1969 1968 1969 1968 1969
Under $50,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 127 133
$ 50,000-$ 100,000 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 50 58
$ 100,000-$ 200,000 2 3 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 46 35
$ 200,000-$ 300,000 0 3 0 2 1 2 0 1 1 1 13 25
$ 300,000-$ 500,000 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 25 12
$ 500,000-$l ,000,000 3 6 1 1 2 4 0 2 0 0 25 36
$1 ,000,000-$l ,500,000 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 i4 7
$1 ,500,000-$2 ,000,000 1 1 0 ■ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 5
$2 ,000,000-$2 ,500,000 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 6
Over $2,500,000 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 42 37
Total 10 19 4 4 7 8 2 5 5 6 347 354
Source; Questionnaires received from mutual fund retailers.
Note :
The totals do not equal 286 (number of firms surveyed) as several firms have memberships
on more than one exchange.
Horo
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Conclusions on the Findings of the Survey
The results of the statistical tests indicated no signi­
ficant change in the distribution of income from mutual fund 
operations between 1968 and I969. The tests also indicated that 
changes in gross income of the firms surveyed were insignificant. 
Based on the sample results, must it be concluded that all mutual 
fund retailers were no worse off in I969 than they were in I968? 
This conclusion may not be warranted for two reasons: (l) thei’e
was not a one hundred per cent return on the questionnaires 
mailed; and as a result,the statistical purist would find such a 
conclusion improper; and (2) because of the size of the class 
limits of the two income variables, gross incomes of firms may 
have declined, yet not sufficiently for them to have moved to 
another class limit. For example, a firm in the $100,000 - 
$200,000 category may have grossed $l80,000 in I968 and $120,000 
in 1969, but this change would not have been taken into account. 
Again, a firm may have received 83 per cent of its gross income 
from mutual fund sales in 1968, and only 71 per cent in I969, but 
still it would have remained in the same class limit.
This limitation is but one to be found in the study; it 
was recognized by the author and members of his committee. How­
ever a large number of class limits was believed to detract from 
the compactness of the questionnaire, and seriously threaten the 
success of the responses.
Is the conclusion, then, that mutual fund retailers have
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been seriously hurt by the elimination of customer-directed give- 
ups? On the contrary, the comments made would seem to indicate 
that a great many firms were (1) either not affected because they 
never received give-ups, or had received insignificant amounts; 
and (2) had made changes to compensate for the income lost from 
the elimination of give-ups. Some of the more important changes 
were :
(a) A decrease in commissions to registered representatives 
selling fund shares.
(b) An increase in sales of life insurance, and over-the- 
counter securities.
(c) Introduction of block trading departments.
(d) Membership on the regional exchanges.
(e) Merging with other firms.
(f) A reduction in office and sales personnel.
(g) A decline in services to clients, and a marked decrease 
in extra services.
(h) Sales of mutual fund shares which paid higher dealer 
allowances.
Many respondents indicated that the ban had been detri­
mental and was directly responsible for a decline in net income. 
Somehow this claim seems exaggerated, especially since almost all 
of the firms surveyed were involved in security transactions, 
other than the sale of mutual fund shares. One may recall that
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1969 was a poor year for the securities industry. Therefore, the
total decline in the securities markets must be taken into
account, and must have contributed to any loss of income suffered 
by the firms in the survey. Perhaps the following comment from 
one of the questionnaires, and a very honest one at that, best 
illustrates what has really occurred:
It is not the loss of customer-directed give-ups which 
have caused this industry problems, rather the severe reduc­
tion of trading volume and the associated decrease in value 
in the securities traded. Firms geared up too late to meet 
the volume crisis in I968-I969, and once again are too late 
in reducing fixed cost levels in proportion with the reduced 
volume. The pricing structure in this business is anti­
quated. It is currently related to number of shares and 
price rather than to cost. The proposals to restrictive 
commissions rates currently before the SEC is definitely a 
step in the right direction.
If the comments are to be taken at face value, then per­
haps one unfortunate consequence of the ban may have been its
effect on the investing public, since the two most recurrent 
comments were: (1) services rendered to the investing public
have declined; and (2) mutual fund retailers are now pushing 
mutual fund shares which pay a higher dealers' allowance, and 
which may not be suited to the clients' needs. This aspect will 
be further discussed in the chapter dealing with the author's 
conclusions.
The author’s conclusion is that the death tolls prophe­
sied by the NASD and others for retailers of mutual funds were 
premature. These predictions were based on three premises:
(1) that all firms received give-ups; (2) that no costs were
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allocated to the receipts of give-ups; and (3) that firms which
lost income from the elimination of give-ups would quietly fade
away, without initiating changes to compensate for lost income.
An examination of the comments shows quite plainly that all firms
certainly did not receive give-ups. As one firm stated,
. . .  the funds wanted a large volume from us before they 
would give much in the way of give-ups. If anything, the 
ban may have helped us by causing a trend toward higher 
direct commissions of which we automatically receive our 
share.
While the NASD and others may not have allocated costs to give- 
ups, the mutual fund retailers certainly did, and their reduction 
of services to clients bears out this fact. This was one of the 
most prevalent of the comments. Finally, the firms did not stay 
static, but made changes in their organization structures to 
offset any loss in income, and these changes were previously 
listed. Not all these changes were beneficial; apparently join­
ing regional exchanges did not prove to be the panacea to mutual 
fund retailers, notwithstanding claims of the regional exchanges.
Selected Comments from the Questionnaires 
Question 7 of the questionnaire asked, "Have you any com­
ments on how the ban on give-ups has affected your firm? Has it 
caused changes such as the introduction of a block trading 
department, changes in the sales force, etc., in your company 
that would not normally have taken place?" Some of the more 
interesting and pertinent ones have been selected for inclusion.
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The comments are quoted verbatim; no attempt has been made to 
correct grammatical errors or improve sentence structure, because 
to tamper with them would destroy their stark and honest realism. 
In addition, the comments have been grouped by type. For example, 
one group of comments relates to changes made by broker-dealer 
firms as a direct result of the ban; another group of comments 
are from firms which received few or no give-ups, or were not 
affected by the ban.
1. Comments Relating to Changes in the Organization Structure
Absolutely necessary to receive give-ups just to survive. 
We have changed Commission schedules, merged and introduced 
block trading.
Opening a New York City office. Installing equipment and 
arranging organization for block trading.
More consideration to having customers purchase stock and 
no load funds.
It forced me on to PBW— only to find out holding seat to 
get Mutual Fund Portfolio Trades to replace give-ups didn't 
pay. Sold seat— merged with firm that has seat.
Required setting up block trading department and hiring 
floor broker on exchange.
Net profit sharply reduced and have had to cut many 
"extra" customer services or charge for what used to be free.
It has caused us to place less emphasis on mutual fund 
sales and more on individual stock and bond sales.
When I can, I nov/ sell funds with the highest dealer 
allowance. This may not always be in the best interest of 
client. However it does help to make up some for loss of 
give-ups. The loss of give-ups together with poor business 
has greatly reduced our income. As a small business we are 
working hard to swim.
108
Forced us to go into over-the-counter stock business.
Now business is such that we have neither mutual fund or OTC 
business.
Reduced funds for promotion, office help, etc., consider­
ing moving to a member firm to allow for reciprocal,
I have had to reduce commission percentage to reg, reps, 
and as a result have lost l/3 my sales force. This l/3 being 
the best producers.
More concentration on Life and H & A Insurance sales.
We have reduced compensation paid R. R. from 60% to ^0% 
on mutual fund orders.
Reduced commissions to salesman; cut profit on gross 
sales 60% almost put us out of securities business; sell 
insurance and bank certificates of deposits now too.
This will, in our opinion, have serious effects on the 
investing public that apparently the SEC does not forsee.
Its immediate personal affect on us is to reduce our net 
income to the point where we may be forced to merge (unwanted) 
or go out of business. Our sales force was reduced and our 
commission schedule lowered— we can't spend the time super­
vising and training to the extent we would like to.
We were "victimized" in 19^9 by computers and opera­
tional problems of our two fund distributors (both long 
established and quality organizations) which caused us to 
spend the first four months of I969 doing virtually nothing 
but trying to get records straight.
This caused thousands of dollars loss to us and there was 
no way such through a give-up to pay us for something that we 
were not at fault in any way. We try to keep our expenses 
down and have considered any give-up revenue (which we have 
had small amounts of) as a plus. However, expenses are going 
up so fast the small dealer can't survive under a competitive 
disadvantage against stock exchange firms.
The problem for the dealer is not separable to give-ups 
alone, he must consider all phases of industry changes such 
as brokerage commissions, access to the NYSE, declining 
income from rights of accumulation, quality of customer ser­
vice and the tremendous impact of the compliance requirements 
of the SEC, NASD and state securities commissions. It's 
getting impossible to function properly to the detriment of 
the customer/client.
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It has made the sale of mutual funds non-remunerative 
after commissions paid to salesmen. This firm has organized 
an over-the-counter trading department to try to compensate.
Caused our firm to get a Boston Exchange seat which has 
been useless in 1970 due to mutual funds being frightened by 
stockholders* suits and SEC pressures. The SEC has bolstered 
the NYSE as the dealer to mutual funds has no access and very 
little or no give-up business. It has forced us to concen­
trate more on life insurance sales.
The old give-up system was great— we’ve lost money by 
having to buy and operate a PBW seat. We're lucky we're not 
out of business.
Has reduced incentive to recruit and train new sales 
personnel.
More effort toward a strong institutional sales 
department.
(1) Reduction— in commissions to salesmen.
(2) Reduction of back office help.
(3) Lowering of service level to clients.
(4) Diversification of efforts from M. F. sales.
(5) Merger.
Caused us to join Boston Stock Exchange ($l4,000); put on 
full time trader $1,000 per month; install Bunker-Ramo quote 
machine 350.00/month. All this encourages retail sales of 
individual stocks, however, so there is partial offset to 
expense.
(1) Formed Institution (block trading) dept.
(2) Changed structure of company to pay less commissions.
(3) Developed new product lines.
(4) Cut back overhead where possible.
Formed affiliate and joined PBW. Results: have not
received one order from mutual funds.
2. Firms Receiving Few Give-ups— Firms Not Affected by the Ban
Small firm - sole propriator - only had 1 give-up.
We were not seriously hurt in I968-69 by discontinuance 
of give-ups. Our mutual fund business has been going down 
since I966.
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Our firm derived kO-6^ % of its net operating profit from 
reciprocal mutual fund brokerage. In 1968, we made $30,000. 
In 1969 we lost $6,000. We have had a loss every month of 
1970. Mutual fund recip, is vital— oust, give-ups are of no 
importance to us.
As a small firm we never relied on give-ups from funds 
although we did receive them from time to time.
Our receipt of give-ups was not material in the first 
place so the ban on give-ups has not been materially effec­
tive in reducing our income.
We are a small office and we never did receive anything 
of any consequence even before.
We never received give-ups, therefore the ban has not 
affected us as much. However, we were close to being put on 
a list to receive give-ups when the ban went into effect. 
Needless to say we are unhappy about it.
Very little. Sold funds that paid direct commission 
instead of using give-ups.
Our firm is too small to be affected in any way. Our 
growth will continue regardless of ban on give-ups.
This firm never has received give-ups, therefore 
question 6 is not applicable.
Being a small broker dealer the give-ups while nice to 
get, make no difference in the years picture of financial 
earnings.
No effect due to ban as I never asked for a give-up.
No real change —  Fund volume didn’t justify many give-
ups.
None - we had none to begin with.
This operation is too small to be affected.
It is not the loss of customer directed give-ups which 
have caused this industry problem, rather the severe reduc­
tion of trading volume and the associated decrease in value 
in the securities traded. Firms geared up too late to meet 
the volume crisis in 1968-69 and once again are too late in 
reducing this fixed cost levels in proportion with the
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reduced volume. The pricing structure in this business is 
antiquated. It is currently related to number shares and 
price rather than to COST. The proposals to restrictive 
commissions rates currently before the SEC is definitely a 
step in the right direction.
We had had only one give-up transaction, back in I962 or 
1963 where we received less than $100, if memory serves 
correctly.
3. Firms which Considered the Ban Detrimental
The ban on give-ups will soon result in our going out of 
business or forcing us to merge. We have been in business 
for 36 years specializing in Mutual Funds and Term Life 
Insurance. As time passes the amount of time required to 
service clients when there is no new business or profit 
involved increases substantially and the give-ups partly 
compensate for the time and expense of their service. This 
expense is not recognized by the SEC but it is real for any 
dealer who lives up to his responsibilities; without compen­
sation for the cost of this service you can't stay in busi­
ness and the investor is the one who will suffer in the end.
It has all but forced us to close down business. I'm 
afraid that it is certain that we will have to. If legisla­
tion is not forthcoming within a few months. The major 
Broker-Dealer firms in bed with the SEC have precipitated 
this calamatous situation, inimical to the American free 
enterprise system.
It has had a direct affect of the profitability of the 
firm. Firms such as this one have built the mutual fund 
industry and give-ups were a vital means of compensation for 
this effort.
It is true that practically all mutual fund portfolio 
trading is handled by the larger firms with exchange connec­
tions. The small dealer had been squeezed out of this busi­
ness. Of course, to us the small dealer, this does not seem 
fair. Only those who have tried to market mutual funds know 
how small the commissions are for the effort involved. So 
the reciprocal became an important part of our gross with 
which to help cover the overhead in maintaining a brokerage 
office for service to the public.
Most business is based somewhat on reciprocal arrange­
ments and practically all political government is, too. 
Whatever savings, if any, has been made for the public by the
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new ban on reciprocal, has been lost by the huge expenditure 
of time and money the government took to investigate it.
We, as a small dealer, are still considering whether or 
not to continue the business.
In 1968 I received 2400 dollars in give-ups. In I969, 
none. My personal income was 11,600 in I968 and #9,400 in 
1969. Despite the decline in the market in 19^9 I did almost 
as much business —  thus the decline in my personal income 
was almost directly proportional to the end of give-ups.
With exactly the same production of Mutual Fund business, 
our commission income was reduced by exactly 12,000 dollars - 
accountable only because of ban on give-ups.
We were selling cash and open accounts (no contractuals); 
the ban effectively eliminated our net profits and we merged 
with a larger N.Y. City firm. Increase in record keeping and 
over-regulation of small brokers is an even bitter item. The 
N.Y.S.E. deserves all that is coming to them for trying to 
"hog" all the business.
The ban on give-ups has ruined us along with low volume, 
if the intent of SEC ban on give-ups is to put small broker 
dealers bankrupt they have suceeded only far too well - 
larger firms too are in chaotic condition. The only alterna­
tive is to nationalize as will happen to Penn Central. The 
Ban begins the death throes of our free enterprise system.
4. Firms which Considered the Ban Justified
The ban on give-ups restricts the profitability of mutual 
fund oriented firms by 23% to $0^; however, where savings in 
commissions rebound to fund shareholders, I believe the ban 
is justified.
Being a small firm, we received very little in the way of 
give-ups. The funds wanted a large volume from us before 
they would give much in the way of give-ups. If anything, 
the ban may have helped us by causing a trend toward higher 
direct commissions of which we automatically receive our 
share. We always resented the fact that large houses spe­
cializing in trading often received more on fund sales than 
we did, so we are not unhappy with the loss of give-ups.
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5. Miscellaneous Comments
Changes on give-ups made us think and act. We took 
membership on an exchange, bought another company and both of 
these were very helpful to us. (and started block trading). 
However, we were fortunate to have some money and also know­
how in regards to security business. Others were not as for­
tunate. Therefore we have increased our business as a result 
of the changes and I think we will continue to do so in the 
future.
Without trying to sound like a "do-gooder", our sales 
organization was structured to do the best for our clients.
Our commission structure to our sales people was, and is the 
same, regardless of which fund they sell. Thus we felt the 
sales people would not be swayed in recommending a fund to 
their clients whether sales commission to us was 6% or 8%; we 
paid our people the same commission on all funds. There were 
funds that came to see me offering "give-ups" that were 
directed to us. However at the peak it never reached more 
than $10,000 since the majority of funds we sold had a "no 
give-up" policy. I also used "give-ups" to purchase dealer 
service by directing this business to a house that offered 
these services. Therefore the ban on "give-ups" didn't 
necessitate any changes on our part - although with business 
the way it is this year that extra income could have come in 
handy as I would imagine it has with many other organizations.
The problem as I see it was that "give-ups" did no harm 
as originally instigated but, like every good thing it was 
abused out of proportion. The funds instead of spreading out 
this money to all in proportion to the business, were giving 
"member firms" 4% to 6% while allocating little if nothing to 
planning companies such as ours. Their argument was that it 
was easier to direct the business to "member firms" when the 
real reason in my mind was that they were looking for the big 
ticket sales. My feeling was that they were wrong from an 
ethical point as well as from a business point (which is the 
bigger error in judgement).
My personal feelings are that "give-ups" if allocated 
properly are a good thing - but they were abused. I had a 
"no load" fund offer me 8% reciprocal to sell their fund - 
can you imagine the churning necessary to generate that com­
mission, Still I cannot see the difference of selling a fund 
for give-ups or an organization having a "house fund" and 
pushing this fund with higher commissions to the sales 
people. It boils down to the same thing - not selling the 
best but selling where you get the most.
I hadn't intended to go into such a lengthy note but 
above are my feelings. I hope this gives you some, insight of
Ilk
the problem and if I can be of any further assistance please 
do not hesitate contacting me.
My gross income last month was 106 dollars. Did the SEC 
people who wrote the report accept an increase in salary 
recently? I've done statistical analysis all my life. The 
SEC report was either the most incompetent or completely dis­
honest statistical work I have ever seen. You may quote me.
It is not the loss of customer directed give-ups which 
have caused this industry problems, rather the severe reduc­
tion of trading volume and the associated decrease in value 
in the securities traded. Firms geared up too late to meet 
the volume crisis in 1968-69 and once again are too late in 
reducing thin fixed cost levels in proportion with the 
reduced volume. The pricing structure in this business is 
antiquated. It is currently related to # shares and price, 
rather than to COST. The proposals to restrictive commis­
sions rates currently before the SEC is definitely a step in 
the right direction.
There was no real consensus in the comments of the res­
pondents. While many stated that the ban on customer-directed 
give-ups had been detrimental to their firms, a large group 
either were not directly affected, or made adjustments to offset 
any harmful effects of the ban. The fact that there was no con­
sensus as to the detrimental effects of the abolition of give-ups 
is significant, since the lack of consensus supports the author's 
contention that too much emphasis had been placed by the securi­
ties industry on the negative or harmful effects of the abolition 
and not enough on the beneficial aspects. The comments also 
indicated that a great many broker-dealers never received give- 
ups, and that a decline in income for individual firms was caused 
by factors other than the abolition.
PART III
THE IMPACT OF THE ABOLITION OF CUSTOMER-DIRECTED 
GIVE-UPS ON REGIONAL EXCHANGES
CHAPTER VI
THE REACTION OF THE REGIONAL EXCHANGES TO 
THE PROPOSALS OF THE NYSE AND THE SEC
When the SEC invited comments on its proposed Rule lOb-lO 
and the NYSE commission rate structure proposals, among those 
eagerly accepting the invitation were the Midwest, Pacific Coast, 
P-B-W, Boston and Detroit stock exchanges. These five exchanges 
accounted for approximately 90 per cent of the volume on all 
regional exchanges during the period I96O-I969. During the same 
period, volume on the Midwest and Pacific Coast exchanges was 
approximately 70 per cent of total volume on all regional 
exchanges. In view of what later occurred, a brief review of the 
comments of the major regional exchanges should prove rewarding.
Midwest Stock Exchange
With regard to the proposed volume discount of the NYSE, 
the President of the Midwest Stock Exchange stated that a volume 
discount on large transactions without attention paid to the 
economic consequences for the securities industry would probably 
be disastrous.
If the consequences of a volume discount would eliminate, 
through pressure for merger or other reasons, regional 
brokerage firms serving legitimate objectives, then we feel 
the investing public would be the ultimate loser. Because, 
in addition to high-grade distribution facilities which could
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be maintained by the merged entity, the regional firms 
represent a diversity of judgement and, therefore, an 
element of competition that benefits the securities industry 
and the public it serves,^
One of the initial proposals of the NYSE was to support 
continuation of customer-directed give-ups, but to limit the 
amount which could be given up. The Midwest Stock Exchange had 
no objections to this proposal, as long as the limitations pro­
posed by the NYSE did not give one exchange an advantage over the 
other exchanges.
As explained in Part I, Rule lOb-10 was meant to prohibit 
investment companies from directing brokers executing orders for 
the companies to split commissions with other brokers or dealers 
unless the benefits of the division accrued to the investment 
companies. The Midwest Stock Exchange strongly opposed adoption 
of the rule because it believed this adoption would lead to 
institutions fragmenting their orders among various brokers. 
Although this method would provide some commission business to 
brokers for services rendered to the investment companies, the 
end result would be less efficient execution of orders. In addi­
tion, the Midwest Stock Exchange felt that Rule lOb-10 did not 
deal with the real problems, but instead created new or magnified 
existing problems. According to the President of the Midwest 
Exchange, the Rule paid no attention to the economic consequences
Selected Comments on SEC Proposed Rule on Give-ups and 
NYSE Proposal on Commission Rates (Chicago; Commerce Clearing 
House, Inc,, 1968), p. 50,
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of its adoption since it would "obviously create pressure for
mergers of brokerage firms, a reduction of competition at the
firm level, a concentration of business in one market, and a
reduction of effective competition with that market by other 
2
exchanges,"
Pacific Coast Stock Exchange 
The Pacific Coast Stock Exchange considered the NYSE pro­
posals nothing more than an effort to receive the assistance of 
the SEC in increasing the NYSE's share of trading in NYSE listed 
securities from 90 per cent to close to 100 per cent. This would 
be accomplished by an almost total elimination of trading on 
regional exchanges of NYSE listed securities. The Pacific Coast 
Exchange, in the words of its President, strongly opposed the 
NYSE proposal
. . .  since it would not be in the public interest and no 
justification for it has been advanced. It would not solve 
the problems raised by the Commission (SEC), and it would 
have a devastating impact on the regional exchanges. Its 
purpose is plainly anticompetitive. It would result in a 
virtual monopoly of exchange business at a time when facili­
ties in New York are inadequate to handle present and 
potential volume,5
Among the other comments made by the Pacific Coast
Exchange relative to the NYSE proposals were:
1. The NYSE did not want to abolish all types of reciprocal
business practices resulting in commission leakage, but only
^Ibid., p. 53. 
^Ibid.. p. 68.
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those arrangements which aided its competitors; in other words, 
the NYSE wanted to prohibit only those reciprocal arrangements 
which utilized the facilities of competing regional stock 
exchanges,
2, An estimated 35 per cent to 4$ per cent of all Pacific 
Coast Stock Exchange volume was supposed to be a direct result of 
reciprocal practices; this volume would be lost if reciprocal 
arrangements were prohibited.
5. The Pacific Coast Exchange believed that each regional 
exchange should be responsible for determining the percentage of 
commissions to be given up. It considered a uniform limitation 
on give-ups which would be applicable to all exchanges unneces­
sary and extremely dangerous.
The Pacific Coast Stock Exchange was less hostile to the 
SEC-proposed Rule lOb-10, Nevertheless, the Exchanged pointed 
out that adoption of the rule would have a marked impact on 
existing practices relating to give-ups and reciprocals, and 
would inevitably cause a large reduction in the volume of trans­
actions on the Pacific Coast Exchange. The Exchange estimated 
that if Rule lOb-10 had been in effect during 196? volume would 
have declined by approximately 25 to 35 per cent. The President 
of the Pacific Coast Exchange concluded by stating that
. . .  it seems clear that, after adoption of the proposed 
rule, very small firms now receiving give-ups as compensation 
for sales of investment company shares would not be able to 
receive that compensation by executing portfolio orders, that 
some larger firms would get more portfolio orders, and that
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the combination of forces that determine the market in which 
an order is executed would be changed dramatically with a 
resulting change in those markets.%
Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Stock Exchange 
The President of the P-B-W Stock Exchange termed the NYSE 
proposals,
. . .  the product of hasty drafting, designed to meet the 
threat of SEC regulatory action in the form of Rule 10b-10. 
Though they deal with rather specific aspects of the commis­
sion structure, they are designed to implement a series of 
complex value judgements on the relative roles of the NYSE 
and the regional stock exchanges (assuming there is to be 
any role left for the regional stock exchanges).5
The P-B-W Stock Exchange further stated that the NYSE proposals 
were primarily directed at the regional stock exchanges because 
of the competition v/ith which they threatened the NYSE.
The P-B-W Stock Exchange also found fault with the SEC 
proposed Rule lOb-10 since it seemed to be based on the assump­
tion that the person receiving the give-up either incurred no 
cost, or rendered no service in connection with the order from 
which the give-up was derived. The P-B-W flatly rejected these 
assumptions as being unsound.
Boston Stock Exchange 
The Boston Stock Exchange rejected the NYSE proposals on 
the ground that (l) they were not justified by existing conditions
ji
Ibid., p. 64. 
^Ibid., p. 70.
121
in the securities industry and would have serious adverse conse­
quences on competing markets; (2) the aim of the proposals was to 
reduce healthy competition from other markets; and (3) adoption 
of the proposals would have disastrous effects on the growth 
potential of the regional exchanges and would threaten their very 
existence.
In connection with the SEC's Rule 10b-10, the Boston 
Stock Exchange considered it impractical and inequitable. The 
Exchange believed that a volume discount resulting from an 
adjustment in the minimum commission schedule would be more real­
istic and practical.
Detroit Stock Exchange 
Like the presidents of the other regional exchanges, the 
Detroit Stock Exchange President was not sympathetic toward 
either the NYSE or the SEC proposals. The Exchange felt that the 
proposals, if adopted, would have effects completely dispropor­
tionate to the supposed benefits that could accrue. These 
effects would include:
(l) a likely destruction of the ability of virtually all of 
the regional stock exchanges to operate as viable mechanisms 
in the securities markets ; (2) an unhealthy and monopolistic 
concentration of stock exchange business in a single exchange 
in one financial center of the nation; (3) a shift in reven­
ues within the securities industry which would aggrandize the 
major stock exchange firms in New York but would severely 
prejudice and perhaps render insolvent the smaller and medium 
size firms which generally are located in other parts of the 
country and who often perform functions for local investors 
and enterprises that the majors do not provide; and (4) an
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acceleration of the unhealthy trend toward merger into the 
larger securities firms,°
The consensus of all the presidents of the regional 
exchanges was that the NYSE proposals were aimed at reducing 
competition on the regional exchanges. These men believed that 
reduced competition would eventually lead to the destruction of 
the regional exchanges. Based on the increased share volume of 
the major regional exchanges in 1969, this pessimism appeared to 
have been premature and unfounded.
^Ibid., p. 74.
CHAPTER VII 
THE GROWTH OF THE REGIONAL EXCHANGES
Share and Dollar Volume of the Regional Exchange
In Chapter VI, the reactions of the major regional 
exchanges to the prohibition of customer-directed give-ups and 
the institution of the volume discount were reviewed. The 
universal complaint was that adoption of these measures would 
adversely affect the regional exchanges because of the substan­
tial reduction in volume of trading that would occur.
A review of Table 3^ shows that the Pacific Coast, 
Midwest and P-B-W Stock Exchanges increased their volume of trad« 
ing in I969, while the Boston and Detroit Stock Exchanges suf­
fered a decline. In addition, both major stock exchanges, the 
NYSE and AMEX also showed declining volume. Volume on the 
Pittsburgh and Cincinnati Stock Exchanges represents a minute 
portion of total volume.
Table 35 shows the percentage increase or decrease in 
volume of trading in 19^9 for the major registered exchanges.
The P-B-W showed the most significant increase, although to be 
noted here is that part of the increase in I969, and also of 
previous years, can be attributed to orders originating from the 
Pittsburgh Stock Exchange, but executed on the floor of the
TABLE 34
STOCK VOLUME ON THE MAJOR REGISTERED STOCK EXCHANGES, I96O-I969
Year
Number of Shares (Millions)
NYSE AMEX
Pacific
Coast Midwest P-B-W Boston Detroit Pittsburgh Cincinnati
i960 766.7 286.0 44.9 31.0
a 5.6 4.8 0.8 0.7
1961 1,021.3 488.8 73.2 43.0 15.6 6.3 6.5 1.0 0.9
1962 962.2 308,7 50.6 40.0 14.8 5.3 6.2 1.7^ 0.8
1963 1,146.3 316.7 53.1 43.0 15.8 5.6 8.8 1.9^ 0.8
1964 1,236.6 374.2 56.2 50.0 18.6 5.9 11.5 1.1 0.8
1965 1,556.3 534.2 62.4 69.0 20.8 7.1 14.2 1.1 1.3
1966 1,899.5 690.8 88.9 84.0 28.6 13.3 15.1 1.2 1.8
1967 2,530.0 1,145.1 114.3 109.0 38.5 20.1 15.3 1.2 1.1
1968 2,931.6 1,435.8 143.3 l4l.O 48.1 42.4 17.1 1.3 0.6
1969 2,850.8 1,240.7 171.9 146.0 62.5 23.4 6.4 1.4 0.3
Sources: NYSE Fact Book, 1970, p. 72.
Letter from John C. Ford, American Stock Exchange, March 18, 1970.
Letters, questionnaires and annual reports from the Regional Exchanges.
^The P-B-W was unable to supply this information.
^These figures include shares executed on the P-B-W and Boston exchanges. Prior to its 
merger with the P-B-W at the end of I969, the Pittsburgh exchange had an association with the 
P-B-W and Boston exchanges. No breakdown on the figures for I962 and 1963 were available.
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TABLE 55
PERCENTAGE INCREASE (DECREASE) IN I969 SHARE VOLUME 
FOR THE MAJOR REGISTERED STOCK EXCHANGES
Exchange
Share Volume
1968
(Millions)
1969
Percentage
Increase
(Decrease)
NYSE 2,931.6 2,850.6 (2.8)
AMEX 1,435.8 1,240.7 (13.6)
Pacific Coast 143.3 171.9 20.0
Midwest l4l.l 146.0 3.5
P-B-W 48.1 62.5 29.7
Boston 42.4 23.4 (44.8)
Detroit 17.1 6.4 (62.6)
Source: Calculations made from data shown in Table 3^»
P-B-W. The Pacific Coast also increased its share volume by 
approximately 20 per cent, and the Midwest by a more modest 3»5 
per cent. A significant decline occurred in share volume on 
both the Boston and Detroit Exchanges. The decline on the 
Detroit Stock Exchange was so severe, that one would have to go 
as far back as I962 to find a lower annual volume.
Table 36 shows the dollar volume on the major registered 
exchanges for the ten year period ending I969. The movement in 
dollar volume parallels that of share volume; for example, as 
share volume increased, the corresponding dollar volume also
TABLE 36
DOLLAR VOLUME ON THE MAJOR REGISTERED' STOCK EXCHANGES 1960-1969
Year
Market Value of Shares (Millions of Dollars)
NYSE AMEX
Pacific
Coast Midwest P—B—W Boston Detroit Pittsburgh Cincinnati
i960 37»960.0 4,235.7 883.4 1,235.0 ^a 272.2 154.5 28.3 34.9
1961 52,699.0 6,863.1 1,279.8 1,761.0 663.3 318.5 240.6 35.4 46.6
1962 47,341.0 3,736.6 1,097.2 1,512.0 577.1 252.4 230.0 66.1b 38.5
1963 54,887.0 4 ,844.9 1,542.4 1,756.0 688.4 274.1 334.9 77.8b 40.9
1964 60,424.0 6,127.2 1,800.0 2,286.0 827.9 310.1 481.3 45.3 46.4
1965 73,200.0 8,874.9 2,179.9 3,086.0 1,009.0 382.4 630.5 45.3° 72.5
1966 98,565.0 14,647.2 3 ,524.0 3,887.0 1,365.3 700.6 706.1 49.2 97.7
1967 125,329.0 23,491.3 4,538.6 4,996.0 1,832.9 1,091.6 709.6 49.2^ 62.3
1968 144,978.0 34,775.4 5 ,242.0 6,151.0 2,115.8 2,055.2 696.6 53.3° 34.1
1969 129,603.0 31,036.9 5,513.7 6 ,000.0 2,750.0c 1,191.3 216.6 46.6 19.1
Sources: NYSE Fact Book, 1970, p. 75»
AMEX Databook, 1969» p. 36.
American Stock Exchange Annual Report, 1969» P» 1.
Letters, questionnaires and annual reports from the Regional Exchanges.
^The P-B-W was unable to supply this information.
^These figures include shares executed on the P-B-W and Boston exchanges through an 
association agreement.
^The exchanges were unable to supply the information. The figures are therefore 
estimates based on average share price for the preceding years. h
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increased and vice versa. One exception occurred in 1969» and 
this exception was the Midwest Stock Exchange; dollar volume of 
shares traded declined, despite an increase in the number of 
shares traded.
Table 37 compares the percentage of shares traded on the 
NYSE with the AMEX and all other registered exchanges.
TABLE 37
PERCENTAGE COMPARISON OF SHARES SOLD 
ON REGISTERED EXCHANGES, I96O-I969
Per Cent of Total
Year NYSE AMEX Other
i960 69.1 21.6 9.3
1961 64.3 26.1 9.6
1962 71.3 20.0 8.7
1963 73.5 18.3 8.2
1964 72.5 19.4 8.1
1965 70.0 22.5 7.5
1966 69.2 22.9 7.9
1967 64.1 28.6 7.3
1968 62.1 29.6 8.3
1969 64.0 27.0 9.0
Source : Securities and Exchange ( 
quoted in New York Stock
Commission, 
Exchange Fact
Book (1970) » P» 73«
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Table 38 gives similar information, but market value of 
shares traded is substituted for share volume. After five 
successive years of decline, the NYSE percentage of all exchange 
share volume increased to approximately 64 per cent in 1969. The 
AMEX, in contrast, after five successive years of increasing 
proportions, declined to approximately 27 per cent in 1969 from
TABLE 38
PERCENTAGE COMPARISON OF MARKET VALUE OF SHARES 
SOLD ON REGISTERED EXCHANGES, I96O-I969
Year
Per Cent of Total
NYSE AMEX Other
i960 84.0 9.2 6.8
1961 82.6 10.6 6.8
1962 86.5 6.7 6.8
1963 83.3 7.4 7.3
1964 83.8 8.2 8.0
1965 82.0 9.7 8.3
1966 80.1 11.5 8.4
1967 77.5 14.3 8.2
1968 75.8 17.7 8.5
1969 73.9 17.2 8.9
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission,
quoted in New York Stock Exchange Fact 
Book (1970), p. 75.
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an all time high of 29*6 per cent in I968. The regional 
exchanges improved their proportion in 19^9» with nine per cent 
of all shares traded, almost one full per cent from the prior 
year. This showing was the best for the regional exchanges since 
1961. The story was similar for dollar volume, although a review 
of Table 38 shows that with the exception of 196?» the regional 
exchanges have been increasing their proportion annually. In 
1969, the regional exchanges accounted for.8,9 per cent of dollar 
volume, which was a record high. This increase reflects a con­
centration of trading on these exchanges in higher priced, dually 
listed stocks.
Block Transactions on the Major 
Registered Exchanges
On all the major registered exchanges with the exception 
of the Detroit Stock Exchange, block volume as a per cent of 
total volume of trading increased in 1969, This occurred despite 
the decline of approximately 6,6 per cent in the volume of shares 
traded on all registered exchanges, and the decrease in volume on 
most of the individual exchanges.
Table 39 shows block trading activity on the major regis­
tered exchanges for the period I963-I969, Information for cer­
tain years was unobtainable as the exchanges did not have 
statistics available. Although the Detroit and Cincinnati Stock 
Exchanges did not have records on block transactions, they 
provided estimates. In the case of the Detroit Exchange, the
TABLE 39
BLOCK TRADING STATISTICS ON THE MAJOR REGISTERED EXCHANGES, I963-I969
Per Cent; of Total Volume
NYSE AMEX
Pacific
Coast Midwest P-B-W Boston Detroit Pittsburgh Cincinnati
(a) (b) (b) (c) (c) (d) (b) (e) (b)
1965 3.1 ^f 20,0 ^f ^f _f 70,0 13.0
1966 4,3 1.0 33.0 ^f ,f ,f 73.0 - 30.0
1967 6,7 1.6 33.0 _f ^f 42,3 70.0 - 24,0
1968 10,0 2,3 32,0 27.6 37.3 32,6 65.0 - 4,0
1969 l4,l 4,9 36,0 32.9 50.8 33.8 3.0 - 1.3
Sources : (a) NYSE Fact Book, 1970,
(b) Obtained directly from the exchange.
(c) "The Changing Face of Reciprocity," Securities Magazine (June 1970), p, 26.
(d) Calculated from raw data supplied by the exchange,
(e) There was only one block transaction on the Pittsburgh Stock Exchange during the 
period I96O-I969; this occurred in I963.
(f) Exchange did not have information available.
Note :
On the NYSE and AMEX a block is a unit of 10,000 or more shares. On the Midwest, P-B-W and 
Boston, the unit is 2,000 shares or more, and on the Pacific Coast, 1,000 shares or more.
o
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estimates for the period I965-I968 seem unusually high, while the 
1969 figure seems completely out of line with the other exchanges, 
notwithstanding the extremely sharp decline in volume of trading. 
The estimates for the Cincinnati Exchange are not really material 
because of the low volume of shares transacted on this exchange.
The increased block activity obviously represents 
increased institutional participation in the stock market.
Table 40 shows purchases and sales of common stock by major 
financial institutions for the period I96O-I969. Despite the 
decline in total stock volume in I969, aggregate purchases and 
sales by the major financial institutions reached a record level. 
Since I96O, institutional purchases and sales have increased over 
seven times. In 1969, each of the major financial institutions 
were more active than in any previous years. Undoubtedly, part 
of the increased institutional activity was reflected in the 
increased volume on some of the regional exchanges. In Chapter 
VIII the reasons for the inequitable distribution of volume of 
trading on the regional exchanges during I969 will be discussed.
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TABLE 40
PURCHASES AND SALES OF COMMON STOCK BY MAJOR FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS I96O-I969 (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Year
Non-Insured
Private
Pension
Funds
Open-End
Investment
Companies
Life
Insurance
Companies
Fire and 
Casualty 
Companies
Total
Purchases
and
Sales
i960 3,280 4,785 605
a 8,670^
1961 4,610 6,710 975
a
12,295^
1962 4,200 6,415 790 1,150 12,555
1963 5,315 7,240 940 1,310 14,805
1964 6 ,48o 8,655 1,215 1,545 17,895
1965 8,145 11,695 1,585 1,735 23,160
1966 9,775 19,685 1,935 ■ 1,725 33,120
1967 15,690 28,250 2,560 2,145 48,645
1968 20,105 38,590 4,650 3,890 67,235
1969 25,500 41,915 5,745 6,660 79,820
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission, quoted in New York
Stock Exchange Fact Book (1970), p. 48.
Not available.
Does not include fire and casualty companies.
CHAPTER VIII
THE STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY THE REGIONAL EXCHANGES
TO COUNTERACT THE EFFECTS OF THE BAN ON GIVE-UPS
In Chapter VII, the fact was noted that volume on three
of the major regional exchanges increased in 1969» while volume 
on two others declined. In this chapter, the strategies adopted 
by the regional exchanges to offset the expected decline arising 
from the prohibition of the customer-directed give-up and the
volume discount will be outlined.
Strategy of the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange
Volume of trading totalled 1?2 million shares in 1969» 
approximately 20 per cent more than the 1^3 million shares traded 
in 1968. Some of the major reasons for this increase are as 
follows:
Increase in new listings. New securities admitted to 
trading in 1969 amounted to 121 compared with 83 in I968, These 
new issues accounted for almost 10 per cent of the total I969 
volume. At the end of I969 the Pacific Coast Exchange had 83I 
securities available for trading, "which account for at least 70 
per cent of the combined trading volume of all Exchanges in the 
United States,*'^ Of the 83I issues, 606 were dually traded with
^Pacific Coast Stock Exchange, 1969 Annual Report, p. 2.
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the NYSE, I70 with the AMEX, and 55 were listed exclusively on 
the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange. These 55 issues accounted for 
26 per cent of I969 share volume, compared with 20 per cent in
1968.
Increased membership. In I969, the number of authorized 
memberships was increased to 220 from 200. The number of member­
ships outstanding increased to 206 from 179, a net gain of 27. 
Member firms increased from l47 in I968 to 170 in I969. Of the 
206 memberships outstanding at the end of 1969, 156 were owned by 
member firms of the NYSE and/or the AMEX; the remaining 50 were 
sole member firms of the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange. At the 
end of 1969, seat prices were at a record high of $70,000, up 
from $55,000, while prices of seats on all other major exchanges 
declined.
Computer processing systems. These systems are regarded 
as among the most advanced in the industry. The COMEX system was 
introduced, which is a computerized order handling system for the 
automatic execution of odd-lot market orders. Another innovation 
is the net-to-net system, which regulates clearance of all listed 
and over-the-counter transactions between member firms. This 
system provides a daily record of all securities positions and 
balances, as well a.s a continuing inventory, and eliminates a 
great deal of off-setting trades and other paperwork.
Other observations. The Pacific Coast Stock Exchange has 
always had a unique advantage over the other exchanges. Because
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of its location it can provide longer trading hours, and it is 
the only major exchange that remains open for several hours after 
the eastern markets have closed.
In 1969, block transactions accounted for 36 per cent of 
total volume on the Pacific Coast Exchange, up from 32 per cent 
in 1968. Table 4l shows the breakdown of block transactions for
1969.
TABLE k l
PACIFIC COAST STOCK EXCHANGE 
BLOCK TRANSACTIONS FOR 1969
Units (OOO's of Shares)
Number of 
Transactions
Per Cent of 
Total Volume
1 - 5 12,363 12.0
5 - 1 0 1,529 5.0
10 and over 1,397 19.0
Total 15,289 36.0
Source; Letter from Philip L. Thomas, Vice-President, Pacific 
Coast Stock Exchange, April l4, 1970.
One obvious reason for trading blocks on the PCSE is the 
absence of New York State and City franchise taxes, an advan­
tage the exchange has only recently begun to exploit. Too 
many block trades were automatically going through New York, 
Thomas P. Phelan, Exchange president, points out, which can 
be executed on the PCSE at the same price - but without the 
local taxes. With this in mind, the exchange embarked on a 
campaign to encourage members to trade "locally" and, as the 
recent statistics indicate, these efforts are meeting with 
some success.2
p. 16.
■"Regional Exchanges Come of Age," ISM, December 1969*
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In 1965» the Pacific Coast Exchange admitted a mutual 
fund affiliate to membership. By the end of 1969» seventeen 
institutional members which were affiliates of mutual funds had 
been admitted to membership. Some of the parent companies are 
The Dreyfus Corporation, Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 
Waddell and Reed, Inc., Channing Company, Inc., Equity Funding 
Corporation of America, and City Investing Company. So far, only 
mutual fund affiliates whose parent companies distribute through 
captive sales organizations have been admitted. Moreover, the 
Pacific Coast Exchange permitted three British brokerage firms to 
become members. In I969, the Exchange permitted a subsidiary of 
a mutual fund to operate a specialist post on the floor. The 
obvious advantages to the Exchange from this arrangement are:
(1) the backing of a fund organization with billions of dollars 
in assets should help to stabilize markets and also to swing some 
weight from the New York exchanges to the PCSE; (2) it should 
provide further impetus to block trading on the West Coast; and 
(3) specialist posts are usually a profitable operation, and this 
could well entice other mutual fund affiliates to follow suit.^ 
Volume on the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange had never 
really been affected by the ban on give-ups. According to Thomas 
P. Phelan, President of the Pacific Coast Exchange, a major 
reason for increased volume is that member firms "that have been 
selling mutual fund shares out here are getting direct orders.
^Ibid., p. 17.
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Previously, they had been getting give-ups by check from the
if
executing brokers in New York." Finally, in the words of 
Philip L. Thomas, Vice-President of the Exchange, "as evidenced 
by our volume figures, the give-up ban has not caused a decline 
in volume on the PCSE."^
Strategy of the Midwest Stock Exchange 
Among the regional exchanges, the Midwest Stock Exchange 
was the only one which did not permit its members to split com­
missions with non-members. It thus followed the pattern of the 
NYSE and AMEX which had a similar prohibition. Because of its 
prohibition against fee-splitting, any possible decline in I969 
volume could not be attributed to the abolition of the customer- 
directed give-up. In I969, however, volume on the Midwest 
Exchange increased to l46 million shares from l4l million in 
1968. Despite the increased share volume, a decline occurred in 
the dollar value of shares traded; dollar value for 19^9 was 
S6 billion compared to approximately $6,2 billion in I968,
Some of the innovations introduced by the Midwest are:
1, Permission for member firms to sell all conventional 
forms of life insurance. The Midwest Stock Exchange
A
"The Little Boards: Fee-Splitting Ban Cuts Stock
Trading Sharply on Regional Exchanges," Wall Street Journal, 
January 9» 1969, pp. 1 and ?.
^Letter from Philip L. Thomas, Pacific Coast Stock 
Exchange, April l4, 1970,
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President Michael E. Tobin stated that "it is our 
intention, in allowing member firms also to sell life 
insurance, to make it possible for them to offer a well 
rounded, full service financial program to their indi­
vidual and institutional customers."^
2. Although the Midwest Exchange, for many years, had
several members affiliated with institutional investors,
these affiliates were not allowed to transact business
for the institutions. On December l6, I969 the governors
approved a rules change that apparently would permit
institutions to become members of the exchange. Under
the rules change, the subsidiary of the mutual fund
"would have to meet certain conditions, such as matching
all commission dollars from fund portfolio transactions
with commission dollars generated from public retail
n
business on a dollar-for-dollar basis." At present, no 
subsidiaries of mutual funds are members of the Midwest 
Stock Exchange.
3. The introduction of the SCAN (Service Corporation 
Accounting Network) system offers broker-dealers one of 
the most sophisticated, automated and computerized
^"Regional Exchanges Come of Age," ISM, December 1969»
p. 15.
7
"Midwest Board's Governors Vote to Allow Institutional 
Members; Action is Opposed," Wall Street Journal, January 2,
1970, p. 6.
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back-office systems in the country.
According to President Tobin, the philosophy at the 
Midwest Exchange is to use the exchange to foster the small to 
medium-sized firm, since the regional firm can and should survive 
and grow. Finally, in the words of Gerald A. Cicero, director of 
the marketing department of the Midwest Stock Exchange, "there 
has been no particular impact on the Exchange. Volume in 19^9j 
after the ban, was above I968 volume. The effect has been on
g
member firms, possibly."
Strategy of the P-B-W Stock Exchange 
In 1969, the Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Stock 
Exchange showed the largest percentage increase in share volume 
among the regional exchanges. When the author visited the P-B-W 
in February, 1970, exchange officials he interviewed stated quite 
emphatically that the ban on give-ups had proven a boon to the 
exchange's business.
Prior to the ban, one of the major reasons for the rapid 
growth in share volume was the mergers which took place with the 
former Baltimore and Washington Exchanges. In addition the P-B-W 
signed associate membership agreements with the Pittsburgh, 
Boston, Montreal and Cincinnati Stock Exchanges. At the end of 
1969 the Pittsburgh Stock Exchange was merged into the P-B-W.
g
Comments from a questionnaire completed by Gerald A. 
Cicero, director of the Marketing Department of the Midwest Stock 
Exchange, June 24, 1970.
l4o
Prior to the merger, the associate membership agreement with the 
Pittsburgh Stock Exchange had proved extremely rewarding to the 
P-B-W, Shares originating in the Pittsburgh Stock Exchange but 
executed on the P-B-W for the five year period 1964-1968 were: 
1968 - 3,906,000 shares
1967 - 3,367,000 shares
1966 - 2,331,000 shares
1963 - 1,601,000 shares
1964 - 1,348,000 shares
The major reasons for the significant increase in share volume on
the P-B-W were (l) the splitting of seats two for one in December
of 1968; and (2) permitting institutions to become members of the
exchange. Among the institutions which have become members of
the P-B-W are Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, Dreyfus
Corporation, INA Trading Corporation, and Kansas Cities
Securities, a subsidiary of Waddell and Reed, a leading captive
sales fund group.
Liquidity is no problem because in the case of large blocks 
of stock both the sale and purchase (a so-called cross) are 
arranged before hand and then executed on the floor of the 
exchange.9
In Table 39 of Chapter VII block trading statistics of 
the regional exchanges were reviewed. Block transactions as a 
per cent of total volume increased to approximately 31 per cent
9
"Regional Exchanges Come Out of the Sticks," Business
Week, January 3, 1970, p. 74.
I4l
in 1969 from 57»5 per cent in I968, The increase can certainly 
be attributed to the increase in new members, especially the 
institutional ones.
In addition to the reasons cited above for the increase 
in share volume, the P-B-W in 19&9 conducted transactions in 873 
securities. Of this amount, 107 were solely listed, 70 dually 
traded with the AMEX. In addition, the P-B-W offered trading priv­
ileges in 678 unlisted issues, of which 60O were NYSE stocks.
Strategy of the Boston Stock Exchange 
In 1969, volume declined to 23.4 million shares from 
42.4 million in 1968, a drop of approximately 4$ per cent. Only 
the Detroit Stock Exchange fared worse. While the Boston 
Exchange had anticipated the ban on customer-directed give-ups 
would result in decreased orders, it never really expected that 
volume would decline to such an extent. To offset the expected 
decline, the Exchange adopted the following measures:
1. On October 9» 1968 it split the authorized number of 
seats from 112 to 224. According to James E. Dowd, 
President of the Exchange, ten seats are held in the 
treasury; the remaining 214 seats are divided among I8I 
members, some of whom hold two seats. For tax or other 
reasons, the second seats have not been sold. When the
^*^George Hender, private interview held at the P-B-W
Stock Exchange, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, February, 1970.
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Governors of the Boston Stock Exchange voted a split of 
seats, they fixed the price of the second seats at 
$l4,000 where it will remain until all of the 214 avail­
able seats are sold.^^
2. The acceptance of foreign seatholders. In December,
1968, the Exchange accepted as a member a representative 
of German-American Securities, a wholly owned subsidiary 
of the Dresdner Bank of Frankfurt, Germany. Subsequently, 
the Exchange accepted other members representing Swiss, 
French and Japanese interests. President Dowd states
that the foreign memberships have been extremely 
12successful.
Despite the measures discussed in the above paragraph, a 
tremendous decrease in trading volume occurred in 1969. Possibly 
the major reason for decline was that unlike the Pacific Coast 
and P-B-W Stock Exchanges, the Boston Exchange never permitted 
subsidiaries of mutual funds, banks or insurance companies to 
become members. In addition, before the ban became effective, 
lead brokers were able to find the other side of a trade among 
one of the many financial institutions in Boston, and frequently 
crossed the block order on the Boston Exchange. President Dowd
^^Letter from James E. Dowd, President of the Boston 
Stock Exchange, February 5» 1970.
12
Ibid.
Ik3
has estimated that volume of that kind in I969 was 30 per cent of 
what it used to be in prior y e a r s . W h i l e  the Pacific Coast and 
P-B-W Exchanges were able to cushion some of the impact of the 
give-up ban through business produced by affiliates of institu­
tions, the Boston Exchange could not do the same.
President Dowd does not foresee any change in the policy 
of the Exchange against institutional membership except perhaps 
to the limited extent proposed by the Midwest Stock Exchange,
Mr. Dowd has stated that
. . .  there is no question that the tremendous increase in 
volume on the Boston Exchange during 196? and I968 was 
accounted for by the customer-directed give-up. Since its 
abolition, we have been studiously attempting to find ways 
and means of attracting new business and listings. The 
splitting of the seats and the acceptance of foreign members 
are two steps in this plan.^^
Since most of the new members are mutual fund selling organiza­
tions, reciprocal business may be obtained directly through 
orders executed on the Boston Stock Exchange instead of via the 
give-up.
Strategy of the Detroit Stock Exchange 
Of all the regional exchanges, the Detroit Stock Exchange 
was most severely hurt by the ban on customer-directed give-ups. 
Unlike the other regional exchanges which quickly adopted 
measures to counteract expected decline in trading volume, the
^^Ibid.
^\bid.
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Detroit Stock Exchange moved much slower and with much less 
success. Among the measures eventually adopted were:
1. Permitting institutional members of the National 
Association of Securities Dealers and SECO members to 
share in commissions when they turn over a trade for 
execution by a member of the Detroit Exchange. This rule 
became effective in April, 1969.^^
2. The introduction in August, 1969, of a specialist system. 
At present there are two posts; each post has one spe­
cialist who handles 15 stocks. Eventually the Exchange 
hopes to have specialists in all stocks.
In addition to the above measures, the Detroit Stock 
Exchange hopes to upgrade the present listing of issues, adding 
securities which are more active. The Exchange also hopes to 
obtain more local issues and will emphasize this aspect. Like 
the other exchanges, the Detroit Exchange has become highly auto­
mated and will offer its computer services to firms on a time­
sharing basis. Finally, the Exchange hopes to introduce "cabinet 
securities", which simply means deactivating stocks in which 
there is little trading. This will be beneficial to the sole 
odd-lot dealer firm which will not have its capital tied up in
^^Edward Denny, private interview held at the Detroit
Stock Exchange, Detroit, Michigan, February, 1970.
^^ Ibid.
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17slow moving stocks.
Perhaps the major reason for the sharp decline in I969 
volume is the reluctance of the Detroit Exchange to permit any 
form of institutional membership. According to Mr, Edward Denny, 
Executive Vice-President, the Detroit Stock Exchange is not 
actively seeking subsidiaries of mutual funds and other institu­
tional investors because (1) the members of the exchange are 
against such membership, and (2) the constitution of the exchange
x8will have to be amended to permit such membership.
Other Regional Exchanges 
The Pittsburgh Stock Exchange merged with the P-B-W Stock 
Exchange at the end of 1969. Ironically, it was heavy trading, 
not a decline in volume that caused the merger. As was pointed 
out earlier, there was only one block trade on the Pittsburgh 
Stock Exchange in recent years, so it was not affected by the ban 
on give-ups. The main reason for the merger was the inability of 
the members to devote sufficient time to the exchange, because of
19time involved in running their own brokerage firms.
For years the Cincinnati Stock Exchange has been steadily 
losing volume. When the author interviewed Mr. Charles Steffens,
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
19James V, Kissane, private interview held at the
Pittsburgh Stock Exchange, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, February,
1970,
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President of the Exchange, he was told that the two major reasons
for the decline of trading volume in I969 were: (l) the decision
of Hayden, Stone, Inc., the major odd-lot dealer in the exchange
to give up odd-lot books and send all orders to New York for
execution; and (2) the inability of Brown Securities Company to
20continue as the specialist in 80 issues.
Some Final Reflections 
Despite the predictions of chaos and complete ruination 
by the regional exchanges, with the exception of the Boston and 
Detroit Stock Exchanges, the abolition of the customer-directed 
give-up did not materially affect operations on the majority of 
the regional exchanges. On the Pacific Coast, Midwest and P-B-W 
Exchanges volume actually increased despite a decline in total 
volume of trading on all exchanges. Increased trading on the 
Pittsburgh Stock Exchange was mainly responsible for its merger 
with the P-B-W Exchange. The decline of the Cincinnati Stock 
Exchange was caused by factors other than the abolition of give- 
ups.
Only on the Boston and Detroit Stock Exchanges can the 
decline in volume be partially attributed to the prohibition of 
customer-directed give-ups. The fact was pointed out that the
20Charles Steffens, private interview held at the
Cincinnati Stock Exchange, Cincinnati, Ohio, February, 1970.
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reluctance of these exchanges to permit any form of institutional 
membership was probably the single major factor for the decline. 
In many ways, the prohibition of give-ups proved a boon to the 
exchanges as it forced them to implement changes which were 
necessary. Dynamic and innovative management by the Pacific 
Coast and P-B-W Exchanges resulted in record volume of trading in 
1969» These exchanges were not afraid to face reality. Appar­
ently the regional exchanges need institutional members if they 
are going to survive and prosper. The extreme differences in 
trading volume on the Pacific Coast and P-B-W Exchanges on one 
hand, and the Boston and Detroit Exchanges on the other, bear 
testimony to this point.
PART IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER IX 
SUMMARY
In this chapter the purpose of the study will be briefly 
reviewed and a restatement of the problem made. The methodology 
employed will be outlined, and a summary of the developments of 
the various chapters of the dissertation will be restated.
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the research carried out was to try to 
determine the impact of the prohibition of the customer-directed 
give-up on mutual fund retailers and the major regional 
exchanges. As stated in a prior chapter, the research was not 
undertaken to specifically prove or disprove predictions made by 
various organizations and individuals that the prohibition would 
be disastrous to certain members of the securities industry. 
Rather, the purpose was to review all information in an unbiased 
manner, and then compare the actual results with those predicted.
Restatement of the Problem 
Many individuals predicted that if customer-directed 
give-ups were abolished, one of the results would be a drastic 
shift in income from smaller to larger brokerage houses. Numerous 
small member and non-member firms would find operations unprofit­
able and would eventually be forced out of business. Another
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prediction was that the abolition of give-ups would prove disas­
trous, not only to the continued growth of the regional exchanges, 
but to their actual survival. Yet another prediction was that 
the closing of many small brokerage firms coupled with ineffici­
ently operating regional exchanges would be detrimental to the 
investing public, especially those investors who depended on 
small brokerage firms for execution of their orders.
Research Methodology
To determine the impact of the prohibition of the 
customer-directed give-up on retailers of mutual funds, a ques­
tionnaire survey was undertaken. Using the SEC's computer 
listings of registered broker-dealers, a statistically selected 
sample was obtained, and questionnaires were sent to 5^0 mutual 
fund retailers. A second questionnaire was sent to fund retail­
ers not responding to the first request. Statistical tests were 
performed to determine whether there had been a significant 
change between I968 and I969 in (a) gross income of mutual fund 
retailers, and (b) in income from mutual fund sales as a per cent 
of gross income. These two variables, in the author’s opinion, 
appeared most pertinent in the attempt to determine the effects 
of the ban on mutual fund retailers.
To ascertain how much of an impact the abolition of 
give-ups had on major regional exchanges, the author visited 
several of the exchanges to obtain current information. For the
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exchanges not personally visited, the author communicated with 
responsible executives in writing and by telephone. The belief 
was held that changes in share and dollar volume between I968 
and 1969, block transactions for these two years, increases or 
decreases in exchange membership, and number of securities issues 
traded would be the most important variable to be examined in the 
determination of the impact of the prohibition of the customer- 
directed give-up on the regional exchanges.
Summary of the Chapters 
In Part I, Chapter II, institutional trading and the 
growth of the mutual fund industry for the decade 1960-I969 were 
reviewed. The pertinent points of this chapter were:
1. Financial institution holdings of New York Stock Exchange 
listed stocks had increased from 12.7 per cent in 1949 to 
24.1 per cent in 196?. Between 1959 and 1969» these 
holdings increased from 17.2 per cent to 24.1 per cent.
2. Institutions and intermediaries in I96O were responsible 
for 24.3 per cent of the share volume on the NYSE, while 
in 1969 there was an increase to 4l.l per cent. In terms 
of public volume alone, institutions and intermediaries 
accounted for 31*4 per cent of NYSE share volume in I96O 
and 54.4 per cent in I969.
3. The market value of mutual fund holdings of NYSE listed 
stock increased from 3.8 per cent in 1959 to 6.3 per cent
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in 1969» in dollar amounts the increase was from 11.6 
billion to 39.8 billion,
4. On both the NYSE and AMEX there was a tremendous increase
in block transactions during the past five years.
Between I965 and 1969, block volume as a per cent of 
total volume increased from 3.1 per cent to l4,l per cent 
on the NYSE; on the AMEX between I966 and I969 the 
increase was from 1,0 per cent to 4,9 per cent,
5. Mutual fund assets in I96O amounted to 17 billion
dollars ; in I969 assets had grown to 48.3 billion
dollars. The number of accounts during this period had 
grown from 4,9 million to 10,4 million,
6. Despite the bear market of 1969, mutual fund purchases of
portfolio securities in that year were 24,8 billion 
dollars, almost 3 billion more than in I968; net pur­
chases in 1969 were approximately 2.7 billion dollars 
more than in I968,
In Part I, Chapter III, the events leading to the prohib­
ition of customer"directed give-ups were discussed. Pointed out 
was the fact that for many years prior to its proposed ruling on 
the give-up of commissions, the SEC had been aware of the rela­
tionship between the give-up and the rigidity of the minimum 
commission rate structure of the NYSE, The initial proposal of 
the NYSE relating to a volume discount was reviewed; in this
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proposal the NYSE also supported continuation of the customer- 
directed give-up on a limited scale. The proposed rule lOh-10 of 
the SEC was then examined; this rule would have prohibited the 
give-up of commissions which were directed by mutual funds, 
unless all amounts given up were returned to the funds.
In May of 1968, according to Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 8324, the NYSE was requested to adopt a provisional 
revised commission rate schedule or as an alternative, the NYSE 
was requested to do away with minimum commission rates in excess 
of #30,000. Correspondence between the Chairman of the SEC and 
the President of the NYSE was examined; the fact was noted that 
the NYSE decided, rather surprisingly in view of its previous 
opinions, that a gradual elimination of the customer-directed 
give-up would not be suitable, because the intricate and devious 
arrangements through which give-ups took place involved the use 
of unrelated trades. The NYSE decided that only a complete pro­
hibition would prevent the flagrant continuation of give-up 
practices.
The legal action taken by the Independent Broker-Dealers* 
Trade Association against the Securities and Exchange Commission 
was reviewed. The IBDTA claimed that the directive of the SEC to 
the NYSE regarding give-ups constituted an unlawful order because 
no opportunity for a hearing v/as given, and a hearing is required 
by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The IBDTA was unsuccess­
ful in its attempt to force the SEC to set aside its request or
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directive to the NYSE relating to the revised commission struc­
ture. Finally, the fact should be noted that in its special 
bulletin to members on the proposed amendment to Article XV of 
its Constitution, the NYSE specified that the amendment calling 
for a prohibition of customer-directed give-ups and a volume dis­
count, was necessary for the preservation of the minimum commis­
sion structure.
In Part II of the dissertation, the studies of the NASD 
and IBDTA together with the questionnaire survey of the author 
were reviewed. In Chapter IV it was mentioned that when the NASD 
published the results of its study, the SEC was somewhat skepti­
cal of the findings. The SEC wished to examine the raw data of 
the NASD study, but this was impossible since the data had been 
destroyed. Also pointed out was the fact that the NASD study 
inferred that all mutual fund retailers received give-ups; in no 
part of the study was it stated that many never received a dollar 
of split commissions, simply because the volume of their mutual 
fund sales did not justify give-ups being directed to them. Only 
the large retailers of mutual funds received substantial give- 
ups; broker-dealers with incomes under $100,000 received either 
no give-ups or insignificant amounts. If the elimination of an 
insignificant amount of income was sufficient to throw the 
average dealer from a position of profit to one of loss, one 
wonders how efficiently the operations of the average dealer 
could have been in the first place. Also noted was the fact that
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the NASD erred in its assumption that no costs were attached to 
income derived from the give-up. The results of the author's 
survey showed that mutual fund retailers did allocate costs to 
give-up revenue and reduced these costs when customer-directed 
give-ups were eliminated.
The study of the Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade 
Association was not a professional or sophisticated study, nor 
was it meant to be, according to the president of the Associa­
tion. The important findings of this study appear to be that 
many small brokerage firms do not consider the SEC or the NASD to 
be operated efficiently. These firms feel that both organizations 
were not really interested in small firms in the securities 
industry.
Chapter V dealt with the questionnaire survey of the 
author. A statistically selected sample of 5^0 mutual fund 
retailers were surveyed to determine the impact of the prohibi­
tion of the customer-directed give-up on their operations. The 
two most significant variables tested were (l) gross income for 
1968 and 1969, and (2) income from mutual fund operations as a 
per cent of gross income for I968 and 1969. Statistical tests 
were performed to determine if any significant change had taken 
place in these variables between I968 and I969. As was noted 
before, the purpose of the author's questionnaire was not to try 
to prove or disprove the assertations of the NASD and other 
associations that the elimination of give-ups would result in
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tragic consequences for many firms. Neither was the study an 
attempt to justify the actions of the SEC or the NYSE, Instead, 
the study should be considered purely as a piece of empirical 
research to determine the results, beneficial or detrimental, of 
legislation which created a considerable amount of furor in the 
securities industry.
Among the major findings of the study were: (l) many
firms were not affected by the prohibition of give-ups, either 
because they had never received give-ups, or because the amounts 
received had been insignificant; and (2) many had made changes in 
advance to counteract the loss of income resulting from the pro­
hibition, Some of the more important changes were: (a) a
decrease in commissions to registered representatives selling 
fund shares; (b) an increase in sales of life insurance and over- 
the-counter securities; (c) the introduction of block trading 
departments; (d) membership on the regional exchanges; (e) mer­
gers with other companies; (f) a reduction in office and sales 
personnel; (g) a decline in services to clients, and a marked 
decrease in extra services; and (h) an increase in sales of 
mutual fund shares which paid higher dealer allowances.
Many firms indicated that the ban had been detrimental 
and was directly responsible for a decline in net income. This 
claim seemed exaggerated, since almost all of the firms surveyed 
were involved in security transactions, other than the sale of 
mutual fund shares. One may recall that I969 was not the best of
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years for the securities industry. Therefore the total decline 
in the securities markets must be taken into account, and must 
have contributed to any loss of income suffered by the firms in 
the sample that was surveyed.
Part III of the dissertation dealt with the impact of 
the abolition of customer-directed give-ups on the regional 
exchanges. In Chapter VI, the reactions of the major regional 
exchanges to initial proposals of the NYSE and SEC were reviewed. 
A consensus of opinion existed among the regional exchanges that 
the proposals of the NYSE were not justified and plainly anti­
competitive, since they would result in the NYSE having a virtual 
monopoly of exchange business. Some of the regional exchanges 
stated that the NYSE proposals were primarily directed at the 
regional stock exchanges because of the competition with which 
they threatened the NYSE; if the proposals were adopted, the 
growth potential of the regional exchanges would be disastrously 
affected and the very existence of these exchanges would be 
threatened.
Regarding the SEC's proposal, the regional exchanges in 
the majority considered it impractical and inequitable. The 
P-B-W, for example, found fault with the proposed Rule lOb-10 
because it seemed to be based on the unsound assumptions that the 
person receiving the give-up either incurred no cost, or rendered 
no service in connection with the order from which the give-up 
was derived. Both the NYSE and the NASD also erroneously made
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the same assumptions as the SEC. Among the other comments made 
by the regional exchanges relative to the SEC proposal were;
(1) adoption of the proposal would cause a large reduction in the 
volume of transactions on the regional exchanges; and (2) adop­
tion of the proposal would inevitably lead to many forced mergers 
of brokerage firms.
In Chapter VII, the growth of the regional exchanges for 
the decade I96O-I969 was examined. Among the more pertinent 
findings of this chapter were; (l) despite a decline in total 
volume of trading on all registered exchanges in I969, the 
regional exchanges' share of total volume increased to 9*0 per 
cent from 8.3 per cent in 1968; (2) on the Pacific Coast, Midwest 
and the P-B-W Exchanges, which account for the major portion of 
all regional exchange transactions, there was a substantial 
increase in 1969 volume; and (3) block transactions on all the 
major regional exchanges, excepting the Detroit Stock Exchange, 
increased in 1969.
Chapter VIII reviewed the strategies of the various 
regional exchanges which were adopted to counteract the effects 
of prohibiting give-ups. Noted was the fact that volume of 
trading on the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange increased by 20 per 
cent in I969. Some of the major reasons of the increase were;
(1) an increase in new listings of securities ; (2) an increase in 
exchange membership; (3) the installation of advanced computer 
processing systems ; (4) the increased number of institutional
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members which were affiliates of mutual funds; and (5) the 
increase in direct orders to member firms selling mutual fund 
shares.
Some of the innovations of the Midwest Stock Exchange 
were: (l) permission for member firms to sell all conventional
forms of life insurance; and (2) the approval by the governors 
of the exchange in December, I969, of a rules change that would 
apparently permit institutions to become members of the exchange.
The major reasons for the very significant increase in 
share volume on the P-B-W during I969 could be attributed to 
(1) the splitting of membership seats, two for one in December 
of 1968; (2) permitting institutions to become members of the 
exchange with the resultant increase in block trading; and (5) 
the large number of issues in which trading is conducted.
Although the Boston Stock Exchange split the authorized 
number of seats from 112 to 224 in October, 1968, and began to 
accept foreign seat holders in December, I968, a substantial 
decline in trading volume occurred in I968. Possibly the major 
reason for the decline in trading was that unlike the other major 
regional exchanges, the Boston Exchange never permitted subsidi­
aries of mutual funds, banks or insurance companies to become 
members. Mr. Dowd, the President of the Boston Stock Exchange, 
has stated that the reason for the tremendous decline in volume 
during I969 was because of the elimination of the customer- 
directed give-up.
l6o
The Detroit Stock Exchange permitted institutional mem­
bers of the NASD and SEC to share in commissions when they turn 
over a trade for execution by a member of the Exchange. This 
innovation became effective in April, 1969» The Detroit Stock 
Exchange also introduced a specialist system in August, 1969- 
Despite these innovations, the decline in the 1969 trading volume 
was very substantial. The major reason for the decline was the 
reluctance of the Exchange to permit any form of institutional 
membership.
On the other two major regional exchanges, the Pittsburgh 
and Cincinnati, the elimination of the customer-directed give-up 
was inconsequential. At the end of I969, the Pittsburgh merged 
with the P-B-W Stock Exchange. Ironically, heavy trading, not a 
decline in volume, caused the merger. Volume of trading on the 
Cincinnati Stock Exchange had been declining for a number of 
years because of internal problems with its odd-lot and special­
ist systems.
CHAPTER X
CONCLUSIONS
As a preface to the author's conclusions, the comments of 
the United States Department of Justice on the proposed SEC Rule 
lOb-10 and on the proposal of the NYSE to revise its commission 
rate structure will be briefly stated. The comments of the NYSE 
to the SEC proposed Rule lOb-10 will also be briefly given for it 
must be shown that initially the NYSE had stoutly defended the 
use of give-ups as a most efficient and economical tool. The 
author feels these comments, especially those of the Justice 
Department, would give the reader a better understanding why the 
NYSE changed its defense of the give-up and also why legal action 
was taken by the Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Association 
against the SEC for improperly directing the NYSE to revise its 
commission rate structure.
In its comments on the SEC's proposed Rule lOb-10, the 
President of the NYSE stated that give-ups constituted a highly 
flexible means of compensating various brokerage houses for 
various constructive services within the framework of a single 
commission. Give-ups assumed increasing importance as the value 
of market research and the size of institutional orders increased. 
The NYSE further stated that give-ups were a most efficient and 
economical means of enabling large investors to meet their
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obligations to many brokers, and that the practice of directing
distribution of a part of commissions relative to mutual fund
sales was proper and desirable.^ Despite these statements, on
August 8, 1968 in a letter to the chairman of the SEC, the
President of the NYSE later stated that a gradual elimination
of customer-directed give-ups would not be suitable because the
intricate and complex arrangements through which customer-
directed give-ups took place involved the use of unrelated
trades. The NYSE decided that only a complete prohibition would
2
prevent the flagrant continuation of give-up practices.
Perhaps the reasons for the complete change in opinion 
by the NYSE will be found in the comments made by the United 
States Department of Justice. The following points were the most 
pertinent made by the Justice Department;
1. The Justice Department raised the question about whether 
rate fixing was required or justified by the objectives 
of the Securities Exchange Act. The maintenance of an 
effective auction market did not appear to justify the 
fixing of minimum commission rates by the NYSE. In the 
opinion of the Justice Department, little likelihood
Selected Comments on SEC Proposed Rule on Give-Ups and 
NYSE Proposal on Commission Rates (Chicago: Commerce Clearing
House,Inc., 1958), p. 44.
2
Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Association, Oxford 
Securities, Inc., and James C. Butterfield, Inc., v. Securities 
and Exchange Commission No. 22,552, United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 40 (I968).
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seemed to exist for any significant risk of destructive 
price levels or adverse consequences to the operations of 
the NYSE from price competition; effective competition 
had been taking place for institutional business, but 
because of the minimum rate structure it took the 
indirect form of give-ups and reciprocal business. The 
Justice Department believed that rate fixing was unneces­
sary for institutional trading and large transactions, 
but it did concede that maximum, not minimum rates, may 
be warranted for the protection of the small investors.^
2. The Justice Department considered the proposed volume 
discount of the NYSE a move in the right direction, but 
insisted that rate competition was a more flexible solu­
tion, It strongly objected to the NYSE proposals to 
limit give-ups and prohibit reciprocal practices, without 
any assurance that rates would be set at a competitive 
level. Because of the unrealistic rates of the NYSE, the 
Justice Department stated that give-ups and reciprocal 
business appeared to be the only means by which some 
investors could obtain the services of NYSE member firms 
at a reasonable fee. The Justice Department finally
Comments of the United States Department of Justice, 
Inquiry Into Proposals to Modify the Commission Bate Structure of 
the New York Stock Exchange, SEC Release No. 8239 as quoted in 
Selected Comments on SEC Proposed Rule on Give-Ups and NYSE 
Proposal on Commission Rates (Chicago; Commerce Clearing House, 
Inc., 19éâ), pp, 16-31.
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concluded by stating that while the practices of give-ups 
and reciprocal business raised problems, the only solu­
tion was to revise the rate structure which caused them. 
It suggested that the SEC should take appropriate action 
to confine the NYSE rate fixing within the limits 
required by the Securities Exchange Act and the anti-
If
trust laws.
In view of the Justice Department's extremely strong dis­
like of the NYSE commission rate structure, the decision of the 
Exchange to prohibit customer-directed give-ups and institute a 
volume discount does not seem strange. Again the fact should be 
noted that in its special membership bulletin to its members on 
the proposed amendment of Article XV of the Constitution, the 
NYSE specified that the amendment was necessary for the preserva­
tion of the minimum commission structure. The NYSE was deter­
mined that its minimum commission rate structure should not be 
tampered with and was prepared to change its initial views on the 
give-ups to mollify the Department of Justice and the SEC. The 
author's conclusions that follow show that the predictions made 
by the NASD, the regional exchanges and others regarding the dis­
astrous effects of eliminating the customer-directed give-up did 
not really materialize. However, a crucial point is not so much
^Ibid., pp. 16-31.
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that the give-up was prohibited, but the manner in which the pro­
hibition took place. The author agrees with the Independent 
Broker-Dealers' Trade Association that the NYSE was coerced into 
the abolition of the customer-directed give-up, and believes that 
its legal action against the SEC was justifiable despite claims 
by the SEC that the interim rate schedule, including the ban on 
give-ups, was voluntarily adopted by the NYSE and was not imposed 
on the Exchange by the SEC.
The results of the statistical tests indicated that the 
change in the distribution of income from mutual fund operations 
between I968 and I969 was not significant. The tests also indi­
cated that changes in gross income of the firms surveyed were 
insignificant. Based on the sample results, must it be concluded 
that all mutual fund retailers were no worse off in 1969 than 
they were in I968? This conclusion may not be proper for two 
reasons: (l) A one hundred per cent return on the questionnaires
mailed did not occur and as a result, the statistical purist 
would find such a conclusion improper; and (2) because of the 
size of the class limits of the two income variables, gross 
incomes of firms may have declined, yet not sufficiently for them 
to have moved to another class limit. For example, a firm in the 
$100,000 - $200,000 category may have grossed $l80,000 in 1968 
and $120,000 in I969, but this change would not have been taken 
into account. Again, a firm may have received 85 per cent of its 
gross income from mutual fund sales in I968, and only 71 per cent
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in 1969, but still it would have remained in the same class 
limit.
This limitation was recognized by the author and members 
of his committee, but the belief was held that having an innumer­
able amount of class limits would detract from the compactness of 
the questionnaire, and seriously threaten the success of the res­
ponse.
Is the conclusion, then, that mutual fund retailers have 
been seriously hurt by the elimination of customer-directed give- 
ups? On the contrary, the comments made would seem to indicate 
that a great many firms were (l) either not affected because they 
never received give-ups, or had received insignificant amounts; 
and (2) had made changes to compensate for the income lost from 
the elimination of give-ups. Although these changes were men­
tioned in Part II, they are of sufficient importance to merit 
repetition:
(a) A decrease in commissions to registered representatives 
selling fund shares.
(b) An increase in sales of life insurance and over-the- 
counter securities.
(c) Introduction of block trading departments.
(d) Membership on the regional exchanges.
(e) Merging with other firms.
(f) A reduction in office and sales personnel.
(g) A decline in services to clients, and a marked decrease
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in extra services.
(h) Sales of mutual fund shares which paid higher dealer 
allowances.
Many respondents to the questionnaire indicated that the 
ban had been detrimental and was directly responsible for a 
decline in net income. Somehow, this claim seems exaggerated, 
especially since almost all of the firms surveyed were involved 
in security transactions, other than the sale of mutual fund 
shares. Certainly 1969 was not the best of years for the securi­
ties industry. Therefore the total decline in the securities 
markets.must be taken into account, and must have contributed to 
any loss of income suffered by the firms in the survey. The fol­
lowing comment from one of the questionnaires was quoted in 
Part II; because it best illustrates what has really occurred it 
is worth repeating.
It is not a loss of customer-directed give-ups which have 
caused this industry problems, rather the severe reduction of 
trading volume and the associated decrease in value in the 
securities traded. Firms geared up too late to meet the 
volume crisis in I968-I969, and once again are too late in 
reducing fixed cost levels in proportion with the reduced 
volume. The pricing structure in this business is anti­
quated. It is currently related to number of shares and 
price rather than to cost. The proposals to restrictive com­
missions rates currently before the SEC is definitely a step 
in the right direction.
If the comments of the respondents are to be taken at
face value, then perhaps an unfortunate aspect of the ban is its
effect on the investing public, since the most recurrent comments
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were: (1) services rendered to the investing public have
declined; (2) mutual fund retailers are now pushing mutual fund 
shares which pay a higher dealers' allowance; (3) more emphasis 
was being placed on the sales of common stock, bonds, and life 
insurance; (4) commissions paid to representatives selling mutual 
fund shares had been reduced ; and (5) many employers of mutual 
fund retailers had been released, and the training of those 
employees retained had been severely curtailed.
Each one of these comments will be reviewed to determine
the possible harmful effects on the investing public.
1. Many respondents to the author's questionnaire stated
that they reduced services to their customers. Most of
the respondents, however, were not very specific as to 
the exact nature of the services reduced. Some students 
of the market, including the author, have sometimes won­
dered whether these services were not exaggerated, in 
fact, more mythical than actual. An interesting point to 
note is that in 1969» sales of mutual fund shares were 
only $102 million less than in 1968. The result was an 
increase of $75 in net capital during I969. In addition, 
the number of mutual fund accounts increased from 
9,080,000 in 1968 to 10,392,000 in I969. If services had 
been curtailed so drastically, the increase in the number 
of mutual fund shareholders in I969 is extraordinary, 
especially when one takes into account the poor state of
169
the securities industry in I969.
2, In addition to the respondents who claimed that mutual 
fund retailers were pushing fund shares with a higher 
dealers' allowance, many individuals interviewed by the 
author, including the President of the Independent 
Broker-Dealers' Trade Association, stressed that this 
practice was indeed taking place. If these claims are 
true, then customers may be buying mutual fund shares 
that are not really suited to their needs. When one con­
siders that the majority of mutual fund shares are sold 
through the efforts of salesmen, rather than through the 
spontaneous choice of customers, the question of sales 
ethics is now introduced. If mutual fund salesmen are 
misleading customers, then this is indeed tragic. How­
ever, there is a nagging doubt in the author's mind that 
the practice of pushing mutual fund shares with the high­
est dealer allowance did not materialize when the 
customer-directed give-up was abolished, but had been a 
part of the sales pracbices of the mutual fund industry 
prior to the abo]ition. This practice may have been 
accentuated by the abolition of give-ups, but this is a 
subjective view; a great deal of research would be neces­
sary to validate the claim that since the give-up was 
abolished, mutual fund retailers have been emphasizing 
mutual shares that pay a higher dealers* allowance. The
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author feels that any such research may prove fruitless 
since salesmen of any type always seem able to justify 
their sales practices.
3. As regards the emphasis placed on sales of other securi­
ties, the author's contention is that brokerage houses 
may have been acting wisely, through intent or ignorance, 
since mutual funds in 19^9 and 1970 certainly did not 
out-perform any of the major market indexes. In addition, 
the commissions paid by customers on mutual funds are 
higher than those on purchases of common stock and bonds. 
The only implication here is that a customer dealing in 
common stocks is more likely to have a faster turnover in 
his portfolio, than if his portfolio was composed solely 
of mutual funds,
4. If commissions paid to representatives selling mutual 
fund shares had been reduced, then this decrease may have 
spurred the salesman to increase their selling efforts; 
perhaps this increased effort resulted in the increased 
number of mutual fund accounts in 1969. Again this sup­
position is purely subjective. Perhaps the increased 
efforts of mutual fund salesmen were not beneficial to 
their customers, but to substantiate this hypothesis is 
not really possible,
5. Finally, the claim that training of employees of mutual 
fund retailers has been curtailed is open to doubt. Many
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students of the market, including the author, firmly 
believe that the training procedures have always been 
suspect. The claim that the abolition of the give-up has 
accentuated this lack of training seems exaggerated.
The effects of the ban on the investing public is diffi­
cult to determine. From a purely subjective viewpoint, the
author feels that based on the points discussed in the previous 
pages, the investing public, in its relations with mutual fund 
retailers, is not any worse off now than it was prior to the 
abolition of the customer-directed give-up.
The author's conclusion is that the death tolls prophe­
sied by the NASD and others for retailers of mutual funds were 
premature. These predictions were based on three premises;
(l) that all firms received give-ups; (2) that no costs were 
allocated to the receipts of give-ups; and (3) that firms which 
lost income from the elimination of give-ups would quietly fade 
away, without initiating changes to compensate for lost income.
An examination of the comments shows quite plainly that all firms 
certainly did not receive give-ups. As one firm stated,
. . .  the funds wanted a large volume from us before they 
would give much in the way of give-ups. If anything, the ban
may have helped us by causing a trend toward higher direct
commissions of which we automatically receive our share.
While the NASD and others may not have allocated costs to give-
ups, the mutual fund retailers certainly did, and their claimed
reduction of services to clients bear out this fact. This
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comment was one of the most prevalent made by the respondents. 
Finally, the firms did not stay static, but made changes in their 
organization structures to offset any loss in income, and these 
changes were previously listed. Not all these changes were bene­
ficial; it would appear from the comments, that joining regional 
exchanges did not prove to be the panacea to mutual fund retail­
ers, notwithstanding claims of the regional exchanges.
Despite the predictions of chaos and complete ruination 
by the regional exchanges, the fact remains that with the excep­
tion of the Boston and Detroit Stock Exchanges, the abolition of 
the customer-directed give-up did not materially affect opera­
tions on the majority of the regional exchanges. On the Pacific 
Coast, Midwest and P-B-W Exchanges, volume actually increased 
despite a decline in total volume of trading on all exchanges. 
Increased trading on the Pittsburgh Stock Exchange was mainly 
responsible for its merger with the P-B-W Exchange, The decline 
of the Cincinnati Stock Exchange was caused by factors other than 
the abolition of give-ups.
Only on the Boston and Detroit Stock Exchanges can the 
decline in volume be partially attributed to the prohibition of 
customer-directed give-ups. The reluctance of these exchanges to 
permit any form of institutional membership was probably the 
single major factor for the decline. In many ways the prohibi­
tion of give-ups proved a boon to the exchanges as it forced them 
to implement changes which were necessary. Dynamic and innovative
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management by the Pacific Coast and P-B-W Exchanges resulted in 
record volume of trading in I969. Clearly, regional exchanges 
need institutional members if they are going to survive and pros­
per. The extreme differences in trading volume on the Pacific 
Coast and P-B-W Exchanges on one hand, and the Boston and Detroit 
Exchanges on the other, bear testimony to this point.
What of the investing public and its relations with the 
regional exchanges since the abolition of the customer-directed 
give-up? Many changes have been implemented by the regional 
exchanges, and these changes include (l) increased membership on 
the Pacific Coast, P-B-W and Boston Stock Exchanges; (2) intro­
duction of computer processing systems on the Pacific Coast and 
Midwest Exchanges; (3) increase in new securities listed on all 
the regional exchanges, particularly on the Pacific Coast and 
P-B-W Exchanges; and (4) the increased use of specialists on the 
Pacific Coast and Detroit Exchanges.
Because of these changes, which certainly were acceler­
ated by the abolition of give-ups, the author believes that the 
general public was the net beneficiary. While no empirical evi­
dence exists for this belief (and this belief is purely subject­
ive), the majority of the changes made by the regional exchanges 
would appear to have resulted in more efficiently operating 
organizations. The regional exchanges, because of these changes, 
are able to compete much more vigorously with the national 
exchanges for public transactions. The end result can only be
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beneficial to the general public.
In a prior section the fact was stated that many broker- 
dealers had mentioned in their questionnaire replies that they 
were concentrating on mutual funds which paid the highest dealer 
allowances. This practice was also confirmed by the President 
of the Independent Broker-Dealers* Trade Association, An inter­
esting study would be to compare sales of mutual funds with the 
highest dealer allowances in 1968 and I969» and obtain reasons 
for any large fluctuations.
Another unanswered question is whether anyone has really 
benefited from the abolition of the customer-directed give-up.
On the surface, mutual funds should have been the prime bene­
ficiaries because of the volume discount, but if large orders are 
being broken down into many smaller ones, then the less efficient 
execution which would be expected to take place on many small 
orders may have nullified the anticipated savings from the volume 
discount, A study of the transactions of mutual funds in I969 
could provide the answer to the question posed in the preceding 
paragraph.
In addition to give-ups, many complex reciprocal prac­
tices have developed in connection with institutional trading. 
Institutional traders use a large part of commissions generated 
by their portfolio transactions for some form of reciprocity.
Many banks insist on demand deposits in exchange for commissions. 
Insurance companies direct orders to brokers who buy insurance
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from them. Some corporate pension funds will not direct orders 
to brokerage houses which do not recommend purchase of the cor­
poration's stock. A study of these reciprocal practices could 
prove rewarding since there are ethical and legal implications 
with regard to these practices.
Finally, another unanswered question is the importance of 
the NYSE minimum commission rate structure. Since the volume 
discount became effective in December, 1968, the SEC has held 
hearings on the commission rate structure. On several occasions 
the NYSE has proposed changes on the structure but on each 
occasion nothing permanent came of the proposals. Is the 
Department of Justice correct in its assertions that minimum 
commissions are undesirable, and that rate competition would be a 
more desirable solution to many of the industry's problems? This 
problem appears to be quite important and would certainly merit 
additional research.
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FOR RELEASE Friday, January 26, 1968
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Washington, D, C,
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Release No. 8239
ERRATA
The following changes should be made in the attached copy 
of Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239;
(1) Page 2 - full paragraph 4, sentence 2. The phrase
"institutional order" should read "institution".
(2) Page 3 - full paragraph 4, sentence 2. The phrase
"on the floor" should read "off the floor".
(3) Page 9 - last sentence in carry-over paragraph from
page 8 —  The term "and 23(a)" should be inserted following
"15(c)(1) and (2)".
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FOR RELEASE Friday, January 26, 1968
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Washington, D.C,
Securities  Exchange Act of 1934 
Release No. 8239
The Securities  and Exchange Commission announced that the New York Stock Exchange 
has submitted for Commission comment and reaction the outlines of a proposal for ce rta in  
revisions of i t s  commission rate  s truc tu re .  A copy of that proposal is  attached to th is  
release . As described more fully below, the Exchange proposal generally contemplates
(1) provision for a volume discount in conmissions, (2) access to the exchange market 
for qualified nonmember broker-dealers through a professional discount, (3) recognition 
of limited customer directed "give-ups" of commissions to both members and nonmembers 
on New York Stock Exchange executions and lim itations upon reciprocal business, (4) a 
prohibition of procedures by which in s t i tu t io n a l  investors may recapture a portion of 
the commissions paid by them and (5) a requirement that Che regional exchanges impose 
similar r e s t r ic t io n s .
The Commission also announced that i t  has under consideration a proposal to 
adopt Rule 10b-10 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The ru le ,  e s se n t ia l ly ,  
would prohibit  investment company managers from directing  brokers executing transactions 
for an investment company to divide th e ir  compensation in any way with other brokers 
unless the benefits  of such division accrue to the investment company and i t s  share­
holders. The rule would be adopted pursuant to the antifraud provisions of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and certa in  pro­
visions of the Investment Company \ct of 1940.
Since the proposal of the Exchange as well as the proposed Commission rule would 
have s ignif icant impact upon New York Stock Exchange member firms, nonmember broker- 
dealers, in s t i tu t io n a l  investors, other exchanges and the public, the Commission 
believes i t  appropriate that a l l  in terested persons have an opportunity to comment not 
only on the proposed Commission rule but also on the Exchange's proposal.
Both the proposed Commission rule and the proposal of the Exchange a r ise  out of 
certain  problems presented by the great increase in in s t i tu t io n a l  investment and the 
complex and rapidly developing pattern  of practices and procedures in the secu r i t ie s  
markets associated with that increase which are commonly referred to as "give-ups and 
reciprocal business." Proposed Rule 10b-10 Is limited in scope. I t  assumes that 
present give-up practices will continue and accordingly deals primarily with the 
question of conduct by fiduciaries  in that context. The New York Stock Exchange pro­
posal is more far reaching and, pa rt icu la rly  insofar as i t  involves a volume discount, 
suggests the poss ib i l i ty  that the pri.>blem with which the proposed rule is concerned 
could be dealt  with in a more d irec t and thorough-going way by changing the commission 
ra te  s truc tu re . For th is  reason and because in certain  respects the proposed rule 
of the Commission and the Exchange proposal are inconsistent, the Commission further 
believes i t  appropriate to afford in terested  persons the opportunity not only to 
comment with respect to both the proposed rule and the Exchange proposal but to  suggest, 
i f  they so des ire , a l te rna t ive  means of dealing with the serious and d i f f i c u l t  problems 
presented.
Any consideration, both of these proposals and of the practices and procedures 
to which they re la te ,  must include careful a ttention to the ir  impact upon competition, 
including competition among securities  firms, competition among markets and competi­
tion among in s t i tu t io n a l  investors. This is  mandated by the a n t i t ru s t  laws and the 
polic ies  underlying these laws. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, the Exchange 
commission ra te  s truc ture  includes a number of practices which would c learly  v io la te  
the a n t i t ru s t  lews absent the Securities Exchange Act and notwithstanding the 
Securities Exchange Act the exchanges do not enjoy a blanket exemption from the a n t i ­
tru s t  laws. Nevertheless where the Commission has ju risd ic tion  to review and pass 
upon part icu la r  Exchange a c t iv i t i e s ,  as i t  has in the area of commission ra tes  under 
Section 19(b) of the Exchange Act, a n t i t ru s t  immunity may, under some circumstances,
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be implied. 1 /  Such imnunlty would be implied to the  extent necessary to reconcile the 
sta tu to ry  scheme of the S ecurit ie s  Exchange Act with tha t  of the a n t i t ru s t  laws. This 
necessarily  contemplates that  f u l l  consideration be given to the po lic ies  of the a n t i ­
t ru s t  laws as well as those of the Securities  Exchange a c t  in  evaluating any aspect of 
the coanission ra te  s tru c tu re  or any proposals for i t s  rev is ion . Whether or not the 
mere existence of Commission Ju risd ic t ion  necessari ly  c rea tes  an immunity from the 
a n t i t r u s t  laws was l e f t  open by the Supreme Court in  the S ilver  case. However th is  
may be, i t  i s  c lear  tha t  a n t i t r u s t  considerations should receive the c loses t  sc ru tiny .
BACKGROUND
The Commission believes i t  useful to  ou tline  b r ie f ly  the s i tu a t io n  which prompted 
both the New York Stock Exchange's r a te  s truc tu re  proposal and proposed Coimission 
Rule 10b-10 with the expectation that  th is  may contribu te  to  understanding and analysis 
of these proposals.
In  recent years in s t i tu t io n a l  investors , including banks, insurance companies, 
pension plans and investment companies have accounted for a s tead ily  increasing share 
of the volume of trading on the exchanges. On the New York Stock Exchange in s t i tu t io n a l  
volume as a percent of to ta l  public volume has increased from 25.4 percent in  March 1956 
to 33.8 percent In Septend>er 1961, to  39.3 percent in  March 1965 and 42.9 percent in  
October 1966, the l a t e s t  date ava ilab le . I t  should be recognized tha t  these i n s t i t u ­
tional investors usually  represent a pooling, under professional management, of savings 
belonging to  a grea t many ind iv iduals ,  most of whom are small inves to rs . Consequently 
se cu r i t ie s  market conditions and prac tices  which a f fe c t  the investments of these 
individuals are of wide public in te r e s t .
These in s t i tu t io n s  tend to deal in larger  blocks of s e cu r i t ie s  than individual 
investors o rd ina r ily  do. Consequently increasing in s t i tu t io n a l  p a rt ic ipa tion  in the 
exchange markets has been accompanied by a s ig n if ic a n t  increase in  the number of large 
blocks offered and traded. Studies by the New York Stock Exchange show tha t  the number 
of transactions involving 10,000 shares or more has increased from 2171 in 1965 to 6685 
in  1967, tha t  the number of shares involved in  these transactions has more than t r ip le d ,  
and th a t  th e i r  share of reported volume has increased from 3.1 percent to 6.5 percent.
This s i tua tion  has thrown an increasing s t r a in  on the r ig id  minimum commission 
ra te  s tru c tu re ,  adopted many years ago by the New York Stock Exchange and followed by 
a l l  other national se c u r i t ie s  exchanges, which is  based upon a single  round lo t ,  
usually 100 shares. There i s  no volume discount based e ithe r  on the size of the 
individual order or upon the amount of po r tfo lio  business done by an in s t i tu t io n a l  order 
or upon the amount of p o r tfo l io  business done by an in s t i tu t io n a l  investor over a period 
of time. Thus the commission which a member fli-m is  required by Exchange ru les to 
charge i t s  customer on a 10,000 share transaction i s  100 times the commission i t  i s  
required to charge on a 100 share transaction and the coasnission on 100,000 shares i s  
1000 times the commission on 100 shares. Ostensibly a l l  persons who are not Exchange 
members must pay the minimum commission. There is  no d is t in c t io n  among d iffe ren t  kinds 
of nonmember, e .g . ,  nonmember brokers, individual customers, in s t i tu t io n a l  investors , e tc .
While orders to buy or s e l l  large blocks involve g rea ter  demands on a broker than 
the execution of a s ing le  round lo t order, i t  does not cost a broker anywhere near 100 
times as much to execute a 10,000 share order than to  execute a 100 share order.
Indeed, for ce rta in  aspects of the execution process, such as bookkeeping, the cost i s  
e ssen t ia l ly  the same. As i s  true in other areas of the business world, broker-dealers 
engaged in  e ffec ting  such transactions have enjoyed the great advantages of scale 
accruing from large transactions .  These in s t i tu t io n a l  transactions generally do not 
involve the payment of a commission to a salesman of the broker, although an i n s t i t u ­
tional brokerage business usually does en ta i l  the expense of maintaining an
1/ S ilver  v . New York Stock Exchange. 373 U.S. 341 (1963). See also Kaplan v. Lehman 
Bros., e t  s i . .  250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. 111., 1966), a f f 'd  371 F. 2d 409 (C.A. 7, 
1967), c e r t io r a r i  denied. ___ U.S.  , the Chief Ju s t ic e  d issen ting , (1967).
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in s t i tu t io n a l  trading department and the development of special t a le n ts .  Consequently, 
the executing brokers are w illing  to accept substan tia lly  less  compensation for execut­
ing in s t i tu t io n a l  orders, p a r t icu la r ly  large in s t i tu t io n a l  orders, than is  contemplated 
by mechanical application of the ex isting  minimum commission ra te  rules of the exchanges.
Managers of in s t i tu t io n a l  investors have taken advantage of the competition among 
brokers for in s t i tu t io n a l  business, and the willingness of such brokers to accept com­
pensation far  lower than that contemplated by the Exchange ru les ,  to d ivert  or recapture 
portions of the coimission paid on in s t i tu t io n a l  orders. An increasingly complex pattern  
of prac tices  having th is  objective has developed. Many of these p rac tices  involve the 
so-called  "give-up."
A "give-up" is  s payment by the executing broker to other broker-dcelcrs of e 
part  of the minimum commission he is  required to charge h is  customers. Under the  ru les 
of the stock exchanges, the payment may be made on the executing broker 's  own i n i t i a t iv e  
and for h is  own purposes or i t  may be directed  by the customer. The rec ip ien t  of e 
"give-up" check may have had nothing whatsoever to do with the transaction  for which the 
coimission i s  charged and in fac t may not even know of the transaction  or where or when 
i t  was executed. Thus "give-ups" have been widely used in  connection with mutual fund 
p o r tfo lio  transactions . Managers of mutual funds d irec t  give-ups, for the most pa rt  to 
broker-dealers who have sold fund shares in order to motivate, or reward, such sales 
e f f o r t .  On ce r ta in  orders, the executing broker may re ta in  as l i t t l e  as 25 percent of 
the commission paid by the fund and give up the balance. Brokers who s e l l  fund shares 
are thus compensated for th e ir  e f fo r ts  not only by receip t  of the d e a le r 's  portion of 
the "sales load" but also  by subs tan t ia l  amounts of give-up dollars  generated a t  the 
d irec tion  of the manager of the fund through purchases and sales of fund po r tfo lio  
s e c u r i t i e s .  Fund managers also often use give-ups as a reward for research ideas 
furnished to them in th e i r  capacity as investment advisers to the funds.
While the New York Stock kixchange permits i t s  members to give up commissions only 
to other members of that Exchange, the smaller regional exchanges have, with increasing 
success, competed with the New York Stock Exchange for in s t i tu t io n a l  business, p a r t icu ­
la r ly  the business of mutual funds, by permitting give-ups of commissions not only to 
members of the p a r t icu la r  exchange but also to any member of the National Association 
o f  Securit ies  Dealers, Inc. or even to any reg is tered  broker-dealer. By requiring that 
an order be taken to a regional exchange, a mutual fund manager i s  able to provide 
monetary reward to broker-dealers who s e l l  shares of the mutual fund but who are not 
members of the New York or of any exchange.
Give-ups are widely used in connection with so-called "cross" transactions .
These involve s itua tions  where the order cannot be adequately executed in the auction 
process on the floor of an exchange and therefore the in s t i tu t io n a l  broker finds the 
other side of the trade on the f loo r ,  i . e . . locates a s e l l e r  i f  he has an order to buy 
or a buyer i f  he has an order to s e l l ,  and then merely records or "crosses" the order 
on Che f loo r .  Exchange rules do not allow member brokers to consummate crosses in the ir  
o ff ices  or in  the over-the-counter market a t  a negotiated commission, but they do allow 
the broker to send the transaction to  any exchange of which he is  a member and to give 
up from the commissions he must charge on the cross in accordance with the rules of that 
exchange. By th is  means large in s t i tu t io n a l  orders can, nominally a t  le a s t ,  be executed 
on small regional exchanges, but where th is  occurs the usual motive i s  simply to take 
advantage of the rules of that exchange with respect to che classes of persons who may 
receive give-ups.
In addition to the give-up, there have developed complex prac tices  by which 
executing brokers provide compensation a t  the d irec tion  of in s t i tu t io n a l  investors to 
other brokers by means o f  reciprocal business, i . e . .  permitting such other brokers to 
p a r t ic ip a te  in the commission generated from execution, in  the over-the-counter market 
or on regional exchanges, of orders which the in s t i tu t io n a l  broker has received from 
other customers. More recently , ce rta in  member firms of the New York Stock Exchange 
have developed a procedure whereby they can compensate nonmembers of the New York Stock 
Exchange a t  the d irec tion  of mutual fund managers by paying cash to such nonmembers and 
c red iting  such payments on over-the-counter trades for unrelated cuslomers, whether or 
not commissions were*in fact charged on such trades. The compensated dealers have no
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pirtlclpaCioii In the»# trade» and, In fac t ,  nay naver have heard of t)i 
time whan they were executed.
Clve-upa and reciprocal busineaa practice» In connection with in a t i tu t io n a l  
trading have become so widespread tha t  i t  may plausibly be argued th a t .  In the case of 
large in s t i tu t io n a l  order», there 1» in economic substance no fixed minimum coanission. 
Commissions are negotiated between in s t i tu t io n a l  managers and th e i r  "lead" brokers with 
the lead broker on occasion re ta in ing  no more than 23 percent of the ostensible minimum 
connission. This s i tu a t io n  is  perhaps most s tr ik ing ly  i l lu s t r a t e d  by procedures which 
have been developed and which enable in s t i tu t io n a l  investors to recapture a portion of 
commissions for themselves. Many mutual fund managers have a f f i l i a t e s  which are 
reg is tered  as broker-dealers ; many of these a f f i l i a t e s  are members of the NASD. A small 
number of mutual fund managers have crested a f f i l i a t e s  which have joined a regional 
stock exchange. In the l a t t e r  s i tu a t io n s ,  the manager d i re c ts  that giva-ups and rec ip ­
rocal business be given by i t s  lead brokers to i t s  a f f i l i a t e s .  I t  then c red its  the net 
income thus received by the a f f i l i a t e ,  in whole or in p a r t ,  against the advisory fee i t  
receives from the fund. This re su l ts  in lowering the advisory fee by a l l  or part of 
the net income the manager has thus obtained. Through th is  means, public shareholders 
of in s t i tu t io n s  can, within the framework of ex is ting  prac tices  developed by the 
s e cu r i t ie s  industry, recoup substan tia l  amounts of commissions actually  paid for the 
execution of th e i r  po r tfo lio  orders despite a r ig id  commission s truc tu re  which does not 
otherwise permit the in s t i tu t io n  to benefit from the very subs tan tia l  po rtfo lio  business 
i t  may have to  dispense. In one Instance the advisory fees charged to a large complex 
of mutual funds by th e ir  coimnon manager were lowered in the aggregate by approximately 
33.1 million for the year 1966, th is  sum being the approximate net p ro f i t  of the 
nunager's broker-dealer a f f i l i a t e .  Other managers have elected to  c red it  the advisory 
fees they charge by only 50 percent of the net p ro f i ts  of th e ir  broker-dealer a f f i l i a t e s .  
In  a few instances, the mutual fund manager has kept a l l  give-ups i t  has directed to i t s  
brokerage a f f i l i a t e  for i t s e l f  without lowering the advisory fees i t  charges to the 
fund whose po r tfo lio  transactions are the source of such give-ups.
Although these techniques permit f iduc iar ies  who manage a pooled fund to return 
a portion of p o r tfo lio  conmissions to the shareholders of that fund, they have to date 
been employed mainly by the managers of those mutual funds whose shares arc sold by the 
sunager 's  own "captive" sales force. Managers of those mutual funds which arc d i s t r i ­
buted by independent broker-dealers have a l ,» s t  always used the excess brokerage to 
provide additional reward to dealers who se l l  shares of the fund rather than endeavor­
ing to recapture such brokerage for the fund. This is  because by so compensating 
dealers these mutual fund managers f a c i l i t a t e  the sale of shares and thus maximise 
th e ir  own underwriting and investment advisory income. Many mutual fund managers 
believe that so long as th is  type of sales incentive can be given to dealers, compe­
t i t io n  among mutual fund managers for the favor of dealers will  make i t  d i f f ic u l t ,  i f  
not impossible, for any individual fund manager to f a i l  to provide such compensation 
to dea le rs ,  both members and nonmembers of exchanges, s e l l in g  shares of his funds.
In th is  connection the Commission has been informed that certa in  large member firms 
of the New York Stock Exchange, who maintain extensive mutual fund departments and 
ere a s ig n if ic a n t  fac tor in  the sale  of mutual fund shares through dealers , have 
suggested to mutual fund managers that brokerage be channeled to them i f  they are  to 
continue to s e l l  shares of the manager's funds.
The net e ffec t  of the foregoing developments have been (1) a dramatic increase 
in the volume of transactions on regional exchanges, 2/ (2) a "diversion" of commis­
sions which otherwise might have been retained by New York Stock Exchange members to
2/ In 1961 the to ta l  d o l la r  volume of transactions on regional exchanges was $4.4 
b i l l io n ;  in 1966 i t  was $10.3 b i l l io n .  This represented 6.8 percent of the 
do l la r  volume of transactions on a l l  exchanges in 1961 and 8.4 percent of such 
volume in 1966. By comparison Now York Stock Exchange do llar  volume increased 
from $3?.7 b i l l io n  in 1961 to $98.6 b i l l io n  in 1966; and New York Stock Exchange 
transactions declined from 82.6 percent of to ta l  do lla r  volume of exchange tran s ­
actions in 1961 to 80.1 percent of such transactions in 1966. Dollar volume on 
the /uierican Stock Exchange accounts for the balance. Substantially  a l l  of the 
regional exchange volume consists of trading in s e cu r i t ie s  also traded on the 
New York Stock Exchange.
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(a) other members who perform no function in connection with transactions and (b) non­
members of the New York Stock Exchange who perform no function on transactions effected 
by New York Stock Exchange members on regional exchanges, and (3) a developing trend 
whereby excess commissions—the amounts which, a t  the d irec tion  of in s t i tu t io n a l  managers, 
executing brokers are willing to give up to persons who perform no service or function In 
connection with the execution of portfo lio  transactions—are returned, a t  leas t  p a r t ia l ly ,  
to the in s t i tu t io n a l  customers thereby Indirectly  benefiting the millions of Investors 
who Invest through pooled media such as mutual funds. In short, compétition In the 
secu r i ties  industry between in s t i tu t io n a l  managers and brokers and between exchanges, 
has operated to reduce very substan tia lly  the amount of commissions actually  retained 
by executing brokers—but with re la t ive ly  l i t t l e  Impact or effec t as yet on the commis­
sions actually  paid by the public Investors who invest through in s t i tu t io n a l  media.
In addition to practices with respect to cuimissions on in s t i tu t io n a l  transactions, 
there are certa in  rela ted  competitive phenomena which deserve iiention. As previously 
noted, the New York Stock Exchange ra te  s tructure  expressly provides that nonmembers of 
that Exchange—including broker-dealers who are members of a regional exchange—must pay 
a New York Stock Exchange member a fu ll  commission for transactions executed on the New 
York Stock Exchange. Nevertheless, reciprocal business practices have developed which 
now give such regional exchange members Indirect economic access to the fit or of that 
Exchange.
For example, when a broker-dealer cannot execute I ts  customer's order on the 
regional exchange of which I t  i s  a member, I t  has the order executed on the New York 
Stock Exchange, pays a New York Stock Exchange member a fu ll  New York Stock Exchange 
coimmisslon and co llec ts  that amount from the customer. Thus, the sole member of the 
regional exchange receives no d irec t  compensation for I t s  customer's order. However,
I t  can receive indirect compensation equal to 30 percent of the commission paid by 
the customer. The member of the New York Stock Exchange through whom the order was 
executed brings i t s  own customers' orders to the regional exchange, executes them there 
and names the sole member broker-dealer as the "clearing agent." Typically, under the 
rules of regional exchanges, the sole member may receive up to 50 percent of the stock 
exchange commission for acting as "clearing agent" on such orders, although he performs 
no function except the largely unnecessary one of guaranteeing performance by the New 
York Stock Exchange member.
Recent years have also seen a substantial growth in the so-called third market.
This Involves secu r ities  firms which are not members of any exchange and which deal In 
l is ted  secu r i t ies  over-the-counter, both as principal and as agent, largely for in s t i tu ­
tional customers and broker-dealers not members of an exchange. Since exchange minimum 
commission rates do not apply to them, they have been ab 'e to execute orders e ither  as 
principal or as agent for compensation substan tia lly  less than that provided for in the 
minimum commission ra te  ru le s . On the other hand, the ir  a b i l i ty  to compete for i n s t i tu ­
tional business has been adversely influenced by the fact that they are not in a position 
to provide give-ups for the benefit of in s t i tu t io n a l  managers, since give-ups have 
generally been regarded as proper only where a minimum coimission ra te  is  applicable.
Two incidents i l lu s t r a t e  th is  point. One firm at one time specialized in executing 
In s t i tu t io n a l  orders for l is ted  securities  in the over-the-counter market at a negotiated 
commission lower than that provided by exchange ru le s . Certain mutual fund managers 
suggested that I t  jo in  a regional exchange and thus charge the higher commissions speci­
fied by the exchange and, at the same time, place i t s e l f  in a position to d is t r ib u te  
give-ups at the request of these managers and i t  did so in order to reta in  the ir  
business. Another large over-the-counter firm advised the Commission that Instead of 
negotiating I t s  compensation on each large in s t i tu t io n a l  trade, i t  proposed u n i la te ra lly  
to es tab lish  a fixed non-negotiable commission but to give up a portion of th is  cossnis- 
slon aj  ^ the d irection of mutual fund managers. This arrangement, which has not yet been 
put Into e ffec t ,  was motivated not because the firm thought that I t s  existing negotiated 
compensation was Inadequate b u t , ra ther,  because I t  believed that i t s  a b i l i ty  to provide 
give-ups would substan tia lly  improve i t s  competitive position in seeking business from 
mutual fund manager' even though i t s  regular charges imposed on the funds were already 
lower than the New York Stock Exchange fixed minimum connission.
The Commission's Ju risd ic tion  under Section 19(b) of the Securities  Exchange Act 
over Exchange rules with respect to "the fixing of reasonable rates of coimission"
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obviously extends both to the commission rate  level and to che commission ra te  s tru c tu re .  
P a r t icu la r ly  in the e a r l ie r  years the Commission's a tten tion  appeared to focus primarily 
on questions of leve l ,  although questions of s truc tu re  also arose. The history  of th is  
consideration since 1937 is  outlined in considerable d e ta i l  in the Report of the Special 
Study of Securities  Markets. 3/ As there pointed out, determination of a reasonable level 
of minimum ra tes  for an industry as diverse, complex and, in a sense, competitive as the 
New York Stock Exchange brokerage community presents perplexing problems. In addition , 
questions of s truc tu re  and questions of level are intimately re la ted . Thus the Exchange 
proposal for a volume discount pertains to ra te  level as well as s tructure  and Is a 
response to the fact that the existing level of ra tes  for large in s t i tu t io n a l  transactions 
has, as a r e s u l t  of competitive fac tors , fostered the p ro life ra t ion  of give-ups and 
reciprocal p rac tices .
These prac tices  and problems, as outlined above, some of which are of re la t iv e ly  
recent o rig in ,  have been the subject of intensive consideration by the Commission over 
a period of years. Reciprocal business prac tices  and customer d irected give-ups were 
described in the Report of the Special Study of Securities  Markets. 4/ I t  was suggested 
that they be studied in connection with an intensive inquiry into a l l  aspects of the 
commission race s tru c tu re .  They were further discussed in  the Connlssion's 1966 Report 
on the Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth. 5/ Approximately 19 
months ago the Commission advised the exchanges of i t s  b e l ie f  that Exchange ru les  should 
be changed to preclude customer directed give-ups. j6/
Since consideration of the New York Stock Exchange proposal necessarily  would 
Involve an understanding and consideration of possible a l te rn a t iv e s ,  the Conmlsslon 
believes that proposed Rule 10b-10 should now be noticed for comment. The Commission 
would thus be in the best position to consider a l l  a l te rn a t iv e s ,  including any which 
may be suggested.
THE EXCHANGE PROPOSAL
Tha f i r s t  Item of the New York Stock Exchange proposal Involves the establishment 
of a volume d iscount. The Exchange has not yet determined the amount of such discount 
or tha circumstances under which i t  would be availab le . There are a number of possible 
a l te rn a t iv e s ,  including (1) a discount based upon the size  of a part icu la r  order and
(2) a discount based upon the volume of a pa r t icu la r  in v es to r 's  transactions over a 
specified period of time. The Commission assumes tha t  the discount ultimately arrived 
a t  would be meaningful and workable. Upon that assumption i t  would appear that  th is  
part of the Exchange proposal would make an important contribution to resolving the 
problems discussed above and be in accord with suggestions that the Commission has made 
to tha exchanges on several occasions.
Several other parts  of the Exchange proposal appear to be based on the view that  
(1) the r e la t iv e ly  untrammeled development of reciprocal and give-up p rac tices , (2) the 
competitive advantages which regional exchanges have sought in competing for i n s t i t u ­
tiona l  business by increased l ib e ra l i ty  with respect to give-ups, and (3) the resu l t ing  
"leakage" of conmissions outside the New York Stock Exchange community, as threatening 
Impairment of the depth and liqu id ity  of the New York Stock Exchange market as well as 
the p r o f i ta b i l i ty  and financial s ta b i l i ty  of member firms.
The Exchange proposal seeks to re lieve  th is  s i tua tion  by (1) lim iting to the
2 /  Special Study, Pt. 2, 328-346. H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1963).
4/ Special Study, supra. 301, 318.
Mutual Fund Report, Chapter 4, pp. 162-188. 
b !  Mutual Fund Report, Chapter 4, pp. 185-186.
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extent possible the major types of reciprocal business, (2) specifying the maximum 
percentages of the commission d o l la r  which may be given away in any manner or, 
a l te rn a t iv e ly ,  specifying the minimum amount which must be re ta ined , (3) preventing the 
regional exchanges from offering  d if fe re n t  and more l ib e ra l  give-up arrangements so 
tha t  in s t i tu t io n a l  or other investors w ill  not seek to  execute or cross th e i r  t ra n s ­
actions on regional exchanges in  order to obtain more favorable give-ups, and (4) pre­
venting what is  some times refe rred  to as " in s t i tu t io n a l  membership" on exchanges, 
which appears to include membership of a f f i l i a t e s  of an in s t i tu t io n a l  investor whose 
function i s  to receive give-ups and rec iprocal business and in whole or in part  to pass 
the income therefrom back to  the in s t i tu t io n a l  investor i t s e l f .  This is  a s ig n if ic a n t  
pa rt  of the New York Stock Exchange proposal which would have a p a r t icu la r ly  important 
e ffe c t  upon the s e cu r i t ie s  markets, and would require action by the Commission. 
Consequently, comment with respect to i t  would be appreciated. These aspects of the 
Exchange's proposal may be viewed together as designed to make i t s  minimum commission 
ra tes  e ffec tive  and enforceable insofar as large in s t i tu t io n a l  transactions are  
concerned.
I t  would appear tha t  Che New York Stock Exchange proposal could have a substan tia l  
impact on the regional exchanges. A primary method by which regional exchanges have 
competed for the po r tfo lio  business of in s t i tu t io n s  has been to o ffe r  in s t i ru t io n a l  man­
agers a more flex ib le  r a te  s truc tu re  than t h i t  of the New York Stock Exchange, i . e . .  by 
perm itting give-ups to a wider category of persons. Regional exchanges rely  heavily on 
reciprocal business pa tterns  which permit th e i r  sole members (nonmembers of the New York 
Stock Exchange) to obtain ind irec t  access to the New York Stock Exchange. In  th is  con­
nection regional exchange ru les  f a c i l i t a t e  reciprocal business prac tices  by which dual 
members (members of the New York Stock Exchange and a regional exchange) compensate 
members of regional exchanges for business executed on the New York Stock Exchange. The 
New York Stock Exchange proposal would c u r t a i l  such p rac t ice s .  I t  a lso  would prevent 
in s t i tu t io n s  from obtaining membership on regional exchanges or otherwise engaging in 
reciprocal business p rac tices  which, in e f f e c t ,  reduce the po r tfo lio  commissions such 
in s t i tu t io n s  pay. Both the impact and the significance of the Exchange proposal, inso­
fa r  as i t  involves the regional exchanges, are  affected by a change which has taken 
place in the primary function of the regional exchanges. These exchanges were o r ig ina lly  
conceived of as primarily providing local markets for local s e c u r i t i e s .  With the passage 
of time, the emphasis on most of the regional exchanges has sh if ted  to providing a 
local market for s e cu r i t ie s  traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Technical improve­
ments in comnunication and the development of over-the-counter markets for local secu­
r i t i e s  have contributed importantly to th is  change in che nature of the regional exchanges. 
As pointed out above, in many instances the pa r t ic ip a tio n  of ce rta in  regional exchanges 
amounts to no more than providing a location where p rivately  negotiated "cross" t ran s ­
actions in New York Stock Exchange l is te d  stocks are recorded and give-ups arc d i s t r i ­
buted .
F inally , the New York Stock Exchange proposal permits the continuation of 
customer directed give-ups and would expand them to provide for give-ups to nonmember 
broker-dealers of the New York Stock Exchange on executions on th a t  Exchange. I t  would 
also  provide for minimum reten tions  by executing brokers. The ju s t i f i c a t io n  for these 
r e s t r ic t io n s  presumably is  that competition in  l ib e ra l i ty  with respect to customer 
d irected  give-ups i s  not a desirable  form of competition and tha t  the economic health  of 
the exchange community c a l ls  for a sharp and enforceable d is t in c t io n  between public 
customers and the brokerage industry.
Certain aspects of tha New York Stock Exchange proposal are not sp e c if ic ,  i . e . . 
the amount, kind, or app lic ab i l i ty  of the volume discount, the percentage of the 
minimum commission which a nonmember could receive and the qua lif ica tions  which non- 
members would have to have in  order to become e lig ib le  for th is  "access" and the amount 
of customer d irected  give-ups availab le  to members and nonmembers, e tc .  Further, the 
Exchange proposal does not ind ica te  whether the Exchange contemplates revision of the 
commission ra te  ru les to re la te  commissions more d i re c t ly  to the money involved in a 
transaction rather chan to the number,of shares, thus modifying the ex is t ing  d isp a r i ty  
in commissions paid for a given investment in  low priced stocks and in  high priced 
stocks. This matter was discussed in a report to the exchange community from 
Mr. C. Keith Funston, then president of the Exchange, on July 21, 1967. Revisions along
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th is  l in e ,  as suggested by Mr. Funston, would not only modify th is  d ispa r i ty  but night 
provide a convenient way of introducing the proposed volume discount.
The Exchange apparently is  i n i t i a l l y  concerned with the p rincip les  and objectives 
underlying i t s  proposal. In th is  connection, the Commission assumes that i f  these 
princip les  and objectives are accepted, the Exchange will determine the spec if ic s ,  i . e . . 
the do lla r  amounts, Che percentages and the d e f in i t io n s ,  in such a way that the proposal 
w ill  accomplish i t s  intended purpose. Thus, for example, nonmembers would be offered a 
su ff ic ien t  pa r t ic ip a t io n  in commissions to induce them to bring th e ir  orders to the 
Exchange. The Commission understands that New York Stock Exchange members would be 
required to re ta in  approximately SO percent of the commission on any order with the 
balance availab le  for customer directed give-ups.
The Commission believes tha t  i t  is  possible and appropriate for in terested  persons 
to express th e i r  views on the principles underlying the Exchange's proposal and the 
means by which i t s  objectives may be accomplished even though, in the absence of more 
specif ic  proposals, i t  may not be possible to  determine the specific  financial impact 
of various parts  of the proposal on the earnings of various members and nonmembers or 
on the amount of commissions which in s t i tu t io n a l  investors would pay.
PROPOSED COMMISSION RULE 10b-10
Proposed Rule lOb-10 represents an approach to the give-up problem which would 
Dot require s ig n if ican t  change in the ex is ting  commission ra te  s truc tu re  of exchanges 
nor require a l l  exchanges to adopt a uniform approach to the question of give-ups and 
reciprocal business.
The Coimission recognises tha t  the proposed rule i s  not a subs ti tu te  for fu ll  
reexamination of the s truc tu re  and rates of commissions on the national secu r ities  
exchanges. The proposed rule  was under consideration p rio r  to che announcement of 
the New York Stock Exchange proposal and has i t s  antecedents in the Commission's Report 
on Investment Company Growth, which stated a t  p. 173:
" I t  would not be inconsistent with [the] rules [of certa in  regional 
stock exchanges] for dea le r-d is tr ibu ted  funds to d i re c t  give-ups to 
th e ir  adviaer-underwriters, a l l  of whom are NASO members, for the 
purpose of applying these give-ups to reduce the advisory fees payable 
by the fund. 82/
"82/ A lterna tive ly , the fund i t s e l f  could form a broker-dealer a f f i l i a t e  
to which i t  could d irec t  give-ups. I f  th is  course were followed— 
and no fund now does so—the give-ups would inure to the d irec t  
benefit  of the fund's shareholders."
The reasoning on which the proposed ru le  is  based is  that i f ,  as pointed out 
above, a mutual fund manager has various means a t  h is  disposal to recapture for the 
benefit  of the fund a portion of the commissions paid by the fund, he is  under a 
fiduciary duty to do so. Furthermore, diversion of such commissions to benefit an 
investment company manager may be viewed as additional compensation to the manager for 
handling the po r tfo lio  transactions of the fund within the meaning of, and in violation 
o f .  Section 17(e)(1) of the Investment Company Act. T J
The proposed ru le  therefore re f lec ts  a duty on the part of mutual fund managers as 
f iduc ia r ie s  not to use commissions paid by th e i r  benefic ia ries  for the benefit of the
U  The Commission does not believe that investment company d irec to rs  may properly view 
the benefits  derived by fund managers from give-ups as simply an additional form of 
compensation for investment management. Not only may th is  run afoul of Section 
17(e)(1) of the Investment Company Act but the benefits  derived by investment 
company managers from th is  source cannot be precisely or adequately disclosed in 
the prospectus, or in the investment advisory con tract ,  as is  required by 
Section 15(a)(1) of the Investment Company Act.
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fiduciary when p rac t ice s ,  procedures, and rules of the markets in which such f iduc ia r ie s  
act permit th e ir  benefic ia ries  to receive tangible  benefits  in the form of reduction of 
the charges now borne by them. The proposed rule is bottomed on the premise that when a
fiduciary uses commissions to obtain benefits  for himself under these circumatances, h is
conduct would appear to v io la te  applicable an ti  fraud provisions of the S ecurit ies  Exchange 
Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 as well as Section 17(e) of the 
Investment Company Act, pa rt icu la r ly  in view of the obscure and often devious ways in 
which th is  is  accomplished. The proposed rule would be adopted pursuant to Sections 10(b) 
and 15(c)(1) and (2) of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934, Sections 206(4) and 211(a) 
of the Investment advisers Act of 1940 and Sections 17(e) and 38(a) of the Investment 
Company Act.
The proposed rule  would not impair the competition which now ex is ts  among brokera
and among exchanges for the business of in s t i tu t io n a l  customers by offering these
customers substan tia l  savings on commissions. On the contrary, the proposed ru le
recognizes t h a t , as mentioned above, developments and competitive forces in the
se cu r i t ie s  markets have, as an economic matter, tended to eliminate the existence of a 
fixed minimum commission race on in s t i tu t io n a l  orders.
The proposed rule would read as follows:
"Rule 10b-10
"(1) I t  sha ll  be unlawful for any reg is tered  investment company or 
a f f i l i a t e d  person of such registered investment company* to 
d i re c t ly  or ind irec t ly ,  to order or request any broker or dealer:
"(a) to pay or arrange for the payment, d i re c t ly  or in d irec t ly ,  
of a l l  or any portion of a comndssion on any secu r i t ies  
transaction  to any broker, dea le r  or any other person
unless pursuant to a w ritten  contract the fu ll  amount of
such remittance is required to be paid over to such
reg is tered  investment company, or fees owed by or charged
to such registered investment company are required to be 
reduced in an amount equal to the remittance;
"(b) to designate or employ any broker or dealer on any trans­
action to transmit, execute or c lear  a transaction or to 
perform any other function for which compensation is 
required or made unless pursuant to a written contract the 
f u l l  amount of such compensation is  required to be paid over 
to such registered investment company or fees owed by or 
charged to such registered investment company are/required 
to be reduced in an amount equal to such compensation.
"(2) For the purposes of th is  rule a person i s  a f f i l i a te d  with a 
reg is te red  investment company i f  such person:
"(a) is  an o f f ic e r ,  d irec to r ,  t ru s te e ,  employee. Investment
* Although the proposed rule is couched only in terms of persons who are a f f i l i a t e s  
of and fiduc iar ies  to investment companies, the principles which are set forth  
above may be equally applicable to othei managers of pooled funds who act in  a 
fiduciary capacity and who are able to reduce the portfo lio  commissions of th e i r  
benefic ia r ie s .  To the extent that such managers d irec t  give-ups for the ir  benefi t ,  
when they are in a position to u i i l iz e  them for the benefit of benefic ia r ie s ,  i t  
would appear that under the Federal Securit ies  Laws or otherwise, th is  use of give- 
ups other than for the benefit of these benefic ia ries  would also consti tu te  an 
improper practice by such f iduc iar ies . Accordingly, the Commission believes that i t  
i s  appropriate to s o l i c i t  comment on th is  issue and w ill  consider whether the 
proposed Rule 10b-10 should be applicable to other fiduciaries  who manage pooled funds.
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adviser, member of an advisory board, depositor, 
promoter of or principal underwriter for the 
reg is te red  Investment company, or
"(b) d i re c t ly  or Ind irec tly , through one or more in te r ­
mediaries, controls, or is  controlled by, or is  under 
common control with the reg istered  investment company,
I t s  investment adviser or principal underwriter, or
"(c) d i re c t ly  or Indirectly  owns, con tro ls ,o r  holds with the 
power to vote, five per centum or more of the outstanding 
voting secu r i t ies  of the registered company."
While the New York Stock Exchange proposal and proposed Rule 10b-10 are not 
mutually exclusive on a l l  points, the New York Stock Exchange proposal i s ,  to a s ig n i f i ­
cant ex ten t, an a l te rn a t iv e  approach. Insofar as the New York Stock Exchange proposal 
would provide In s t i tu t io n a l  Investors with a volume discount while a t  the same time c lo s ­
ing, insofar as possib le , the various avenues by which an in s t i tu t io n a l  manager can 
recoup commissions for the benefit of the fund, i t  could, depending upon the nature and 
extent of the volume discount, provide a d irec t  rather than an indirect means by which 
In s t i tu t io n a l  Investors may obtain the benefit of lower charges. To the extent that i t  
would make Impossible ind irec t  recoupment of commissions by in s t i tu t io n a l  managers, the 
question of a fiduciary duty on their  part  to seek such recoupment would not a r is e .
All in te rested  persons are invited to submit th e ir  views and comments on proposed 
Rule 10b-10 In writing to the Secretary, Securities  and Exchange Commission, a t  I t s  
principal o f f ic e ,  500 North Capitol S tree t ,  Washington, D.C. 20549, on or before March 1, 
1968. The Connission also inv ites  comments on the New York Stock Exchange proposal which 
la set forth  In the attachment of th is  release , as well as eny a lte rna tive  suggestions 
for dealing with the problems presented. Material submitted w ill  be made available for 
public inspection unless request for confidentia l treatment is made.
By the Commission.
Orval L. Ouiols 
Secretary
Attachiwjnt
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IN REPLYING PLEASE QUOTE
U N I T E D  S T A T E S  NY-Q(LEJ)
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
R E G I O N A L  O F F I C E  
2 6  F E D E R A L  P L A Z A
N e w  Y o r k , n . y . 10007
February 9, 1970
Mr. George H. Charles 
The University of Oklahoma 
College of Business Administration 
Department of Finance 
Norman, Oklahoma 73069
Dear Mr. Charles :
We are In receipt of your recent letter In which you pose 
a list of broad and searching questions concerning the 
abolition of customer directed give ups. As you can apprecl* 
ate, this office cannot perform the functions that your 
research studies Impose upon you. However, it Is suggested 
that you Investigate the following sources which should be 
helpful In your search for Information:
(1) Federal Securities Law Reporter - Commerce
Clearing House Publication;
(2) "Securities Regulation," Louis Loss (6 volume treatise);
(3) "Report of SEC Special Study of Securities Markets
(1963)," available for reference only at the Securi­
ties & Exchange Commission;
(4) "Report of the SEC on the Public Policy Implications
of Investment Company Growth - only available for 
reference purposes at Securities & Exchange Commission.
was
Not more than a year ago, the Institutional Investor Study/establl* 
shed, and although no publications have been Issued by them, 
you might wish to contact their office at the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C. for any Information they
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might be authorized to render* in addition, you should contact 
the various exchanges referred to In your letter for materials 
they could make available to you regarding your topic*
Enclosed are some releases dealing with commission give-ups 
and the Classification of Releases and the Government Printing 
Office price list from which you may order whatever statistical 
or other materials in which you might be interested*
In the future you may find it more convenient to communicate 
with the Fort Worth Regional Office which services your area 
of the country* They are located at:
U* S* Courthouse 
10th & Lamar Streets 
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
I trust this will be of some assistance to you*
Sincerely yours,
RICHARD V* BANDLER ^
Branch of Legal Intjenretations
iwrence E* Jaffa, 
Branch of Legal Int
Ends*
CFG price list 
Classif. of Rel* & card 
Releases 8239, 8746 and 8791
:omey
kbretations
(XOta
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
W ashington. D.C. 20549
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O F F I C E  O F  
P O L IC Y  R E S E A R C H
May 27, 1970
Mr. George Charles
College of Business Administration
Department of Finance
University of Oklahoma
Norman, Oklahoma 73069
Dear Mr. Charles:
Enclosed please find a broker-dealer computer list 
which includes those broker-dealers who checked on 
their registration that more than 10 percent of their 
revenue is from mutual fund sales. Because of the. 
difference in the time of registration of these firms, 
you may want to include a query in your questionnaire 
as to the present importance of mutual fund sales.
As you will note, the list is by state and has attached 
a code sheet with the broker-dealer registration form 
for reference.
Sincerely yours,
Gene L, Finn 
Chief Economist
Enclosures
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Se c u r it ie s  a n d  e x c h a n g e  Co m m is s io n
WASHINGTON. D .C . 20549
June 9, 1970
Mr. George Charles
Department of Finance
College of Business Administration
Norman, Oklahoma
Dear Mr. Charles:
Enclosed is the material that we have discussed in our 
telephone conversation:
"Application for Registration as a Broker-Dealer or to 
Amend such an Application Under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934", and "Analysis of the Population of SEC 
Registered Broker/Dealers who Concentrate in Mutual 
Fund Share Sales".
Sincerely yours,
/ ^ e n e  L. Fir 
Chief Economist
Enclosure
**»«»»<*
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20549
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O F F I C E  O F  
P O L IC Y  R e s e a r c h
September 11, 1970
Mr. George M. Charles
University of Manitoba
Department of Accounting and Finance
School of Commerce
Winnepeg, Manitoba. Canada
Dear George:
I appreciate very much your keeping us posted on the 
progress of your thesis. We, of course, are very much 
interested in obtaining a copy as soon as you can make 
it available.
With regard to the computer printouts that we furnished 
you earlier, you can keep them if you desire. We are not 
likely to have need of them in the future and if by any 
chance we do, we would probably want updated lists anyway.
Personally, I am very pleased that we were able to be of 
assistance in your research. It is always a pleasure to be 
associated with someone, such as yourself, who is completing 
his PhD. requirements.
Sincerely yours.
Gene L. Finn 
Chief Economist
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CODE SHEET FOR COMPUTER LIST
1. Coded 6 in the first "Item" column indicates that the applicant 
or registrant is holding itself out as a firm whose principal 
type of business is a mutual fund retailer.
Coded in "Item" column 23 (b)
Coded "N" in this last column indicates that the applicant 
or registrant does not engage in any other nonsecurities 
business.
Coded "Y" in this last column indicates that the applicant 
or registrant engages in other nonsecurities business.
2. Legal form of business, coded in SFCO column:
Coded C indicates a corporation
Coded S indicates a sole proprietorship
Coded P indicates a partnership
Coded 0 indicates some other type of business
3. Coded 1 in none column indicates applicant or registrant is
not a member of any national securities exchange.
Coded 0 in none column indicates that the applicant or registrant 
is a regular or associated member firm of one or more of the 
following national securities exchanges:
American New York
Boston Pacific Coast
Chicago Board of Trade Phila.-Balt.-Wash.
Cincinnati Pittsburgh
Detroit Salt Lake
Midwest Spokane
National
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FORM BD
(Instruction
Street)
A PPLICA TIO N  FOR REGISTRATION A S A BROKER-DEALER OR TO AM END 
SUCH AN A PPLICA TIO N  UNDER THE SECU RITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1 9 3 4
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION •  WASHINGTON. D.C. 20 5 4 9
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARING AND FILING FORM BD
1. This Form and any Schedule and continuation sliectt rc> 
quircd in connection with it shall be completed and filed in 
Iriplicatf with the Securities and Exchange (.'oiiiinissinn, Wash­
ington, D.C. 20549. Retain one exact copy for your records. 
All information required by Form BD and any Schedule there­
under must be submitted on the officially prescribed forms, 
additional copies of which are available, upon request, at any 
office of the Commission.
2. I f  the space provided for any answer on the Form is in­
sufficient, the complete answer shall be prepared on Sehedule 
E, whieh shall be attached to the Form. If the space provided 
for any answer on the Schedules is insufficient, the answer shall 
be completed on additional copies of the applicable Schedule 
which shall also be attached to the Form.
3. Individuals' names, except the executing signature in Item 
9, shall be given in full wherever required (last name, first 
name, middle name).
4 . All three copies of this Form filed with the Commission shall 
be executed with a manual siiinalutc in Item 9. If the Form it 
filed by a  sole proprietor, it shall be signed by the proprietor; il 
It is filed by a partnership, it should be signed in the name of the 
partnership by a  general partner; if filed by an unincorporated 
organization or association which is not a partnership, it shall 
be signed in the name of such organization or association by the 
managing agent—i.e.. a  duly authorized person who directs or 
manages or who participates in the directing or managing of its 
afifairs; if filed by a coqxiration, it shall be signed in the name 
of the corporation by a principal officer duly authorized.
5. A Form which is not prepared and executed in compliance 
with applicable requirements may be returned as not acceptable 
for filing. However, acceptance of this Form shall not constitute 
any finding that it has been filed as required or that the infor­
mation submitted is true, current or complete.
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILING FORM BD AS AN APPLICATION
4. I f  Form BD is being filed as an application for registration, 
all applicable items must be answered in full. If  any item is not 
applicable, indicate by "none” or “N /A ” as appropriate.
7 . I f  the Font! •« fiW  an annlimiinn by a  predecessor 
broker-dealer on behalf of a successor not yet formed or or­
ganized, the information furnished shall relate to the successor 
to be formed. The Form shall be executed by the predecessor. 
Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 
15b2-l provide that registration shall terminate on the forty-
fifth day after the effective date unless prior thereto the succes­
sor shall adopt the application as its ow n. This procedure can­
not be used where the successor is a sole proprietor.
8. Rule 15bl-2 requires a  statement of financial condition to 
be filed in duplicate with every application tor registration. 
Consult Rules 15bl-5 and I7a-7 to determine whether any 
nonresident of the United States named in the Form is required 
to file a  consent and power of attorney, or a  notice or undertak­
ing with respect to books and records.
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR AMENDING FORM BD
9- Rule 15bS-l requires that if the information contained in 
the application, or in any supplement or amendment thereto, is 
or becomes inaccurate for any reason, an amendment must be 
filed promptly on Form BD correcting such information.
10. A completed page 1, including the Execution, must be filed 
with each amendment. Otherwise only the pages being 
amended need be filed.
CAUTION: WHEN ANY ITEM  ON A PAGE IS AMENDED, IT  IS NECESSARY 
T O  ANSWER ALL ITEM S ON THE PAGE BEING AMENDED. PAGES W HICH 
CONTAIN OBSOLETE INFORMATION ARE RETIRED T O  TH E  COM M IS­
SION'S INACTIVE FILES.
DEFINITIONS: Unless the context clearly indicates other­
wise, all terms used in the Form have the same meaning as in
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and in the General Rules 
and Regulations of the Commission thereunder.
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Page L
A P P L IC A T IO N  FOR R EGISTR ATION AS A BROXER-DEALER OR 
TO AMEND SU C H  AN A PPL IC A TIO N  UNDER THE S E C U R IT IE S  
EXCHANGE AC T OF 1 9 3 4
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION •  WASHINGTON, D.C. 2 0 5 4 9
FILE NO. 
8-
DOC. SEQ. NO.
(Read hisfmctiou sheet before preparing Form. Please print or type)
1« ( a )  I f  th ii i i  an  A PP L IC A T IO N  for registration, e h ic k  H i t t ,  O  and complete all items in full.
(b )  I f  this I t an  A M E N D M EN T to  an  Application, c h te k  k n * , □  and specify below all parts  w hich are  am ended.
I tc m (i)  -- o f Page 1 o f Form  BD Schedule A_____________ Schedule B___________
I tc m (t)  - - - o f Page 2 of Form  BD
I icsb(i ) ... . -  o f  Page 3 o f  Form  BD Schedule ^  Schedule D  Schcdula £ »
2* P u ll nam e o f  A pplicant o r  R eg istran t: ( I f  individual, stale  last, first, m iddle nam e) SRS Empl. t i tn L  ATa.
9 .  N am e under w hich business is conducted, if dUferent:
4* I f  nam e of business is hereby am ended, state previous nam e here:
5 .  Address o f principal place of business: (D o no t use P.O. Box N um ber)
Vo. end  S tf t t t C ity Statê ZIP  Code
C  M ailing Address, if  different:
7« Is  A pplicant taking over all o r substantially all o f the assets and  liabilities and  continuing the  business o f a  registered broker-dealer?
Yea O  N o □
I f  "^es" s ta te :
( a )  D ate  o f  succession: - . _ .   .
(b )  D ate o f the last Form  X -1 7 A -3  report p u n u a n t to  Rule 17a-5 
K ider th e  Securities Exchange A ct filed by  the  predecessor:
(c )  P ull nam e an d  1RS Em p. Id c n L  No. of p re d e c e s s o r : .
&  A pplicant or Registrant consents th a t the notice o f any proceeding 
before the  Commission in connection with its application for or 
registration as a  broker-dealer m ay bo given by sending notice by 
registered or certified mail or confirmed telegram  to the person 
nam ed below, a t  the address given.
{L a it n am i) (First noTHt) (M id d lt  aasstf)
(SutnbtT  a a d  s tr s tt)
(C itr) (Stat*) (Z fP  Code)
. E X E C U T IO N : The A pplicant o r R egistrant subm itting this Form 
and  its attachm ents and the person by whom it is executed repre­
sent hereby th a t all inform ation contained therein is true, current 
aisd complete. I t  is understood th a t all required Items and Sched- 
ales are considered integral parts of this form and  tha t the submis­
sion o f any  am endm ent represents th a t all unam ended items and 
Schedules rem ain true , cu rren t and  complete as previously 
subm itted.
ATTENTION— Inten tional m iss ta te m e n ts  o r  o m iss ions  of 
fac ts  c o n s titu te  F ederal C rim inal V iolations. (S ee  18  U.S.C. 
1001  en d  15 U.S.C. 78ff (a ))
D ated  t h e . . d a y  o f . 1 9 .
(V am e o / Corporation, Partntrship or o th tr ortanisatiom)
(M anual signatun o f S o li ProprietotpCentral Partnrr, 
Managing A g tn t or Principal Offierr}
(T itl t )
(A ll  items on this page mast be am weretl in ta i l,)
0 0  N O T  W R I T E  B E L O W T H I S  L I N E  — F O R  S E C  U S E
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10 . A pplicant o r  R eg ittraa t i i  {C h ttk  cn t  frox)
□  A  corporation O  A partnerih ip
O  A  lole proprie tonh ip  □  O ihcr (specify)
11 . I f  A pplicant o r  Registrant is a  io /r  pr^prittor, state full residence 
address:
(N um bir  a n d  S tr u t)
(CU p) (S ta ti)
1 2 . I f  A pplicant o r  Registrant is a  co rp o ftio n :
( a )  S la te  da le  and place of incorporation: -
(Z IP  Cade)
(b )  l i s t  below:
(CZajMi • /  iqn itp  tu u r i l i t t )  {V oting or Non^Voting)
SEC Æ
FILE r:o. UOC. SLQ. NO.
(c) C om plete Schedule A fo r (1 )  officers, directors and persons 
vrith sim ilar status or functions and (2 ) any o ther person 
w ho is directly o r indirectly the beneficial owner of ! percent 
o r snore o f the authorized shares of any class of equity security 
o f nppiicnni o r registrant.
IS .  I f  A pp lican t o r  R egistrant it a  pmrtntrskipt com plete Schedule B.
M BM tND ER: / /  a  rrgU ttrtd  parlnrrrAfp si dsiioford and  a  m at 
aar i t  arralrd fo  ton tinn t tho bustnest of tho old one, tk t  n tw  
^ la r r iA ip  m ail filt a nrtv application for rtgiureiion  a i  a b r o k tf  
daalrr.
1 4 . I f  A pp licant o r  Registrant is afA rr than  a  sola proprietor, partner­
ship, o r  corporation:
(« )  D escribe bare the  type o f  organization o r  association:
(b) Com plete Schedule C
IB . (a ) Does any  person no t nam ed in Item s 2 and  12-14, inclusive, 
o r  any  Schedule thereunder, directly o r  indirectly, through 
agreem ent o r otherwise, exercise o r have pow er to  exercise a 
controlling influence over the  m anagem ent or policies o f A p­
p lican t o r  Registrant? Y et □  N o □
I f  **yar/* S to tt  on S ekedu lt E tk t  fu l l  nom t {U tl, first, 
assddfr) o f  tock  sueh p r r io a  a a d  d tscrib t tk t  ogreem tnt or 
ê tk tr  kotis tkroMgk which such person tx trc is ts  a  controUing 
m ffn tuct.
(b) Is  th e  business o f  A pplicant o r  R egistrant wholly o r  partially  
financed, directly o r  indirectly , by any person not named in 
Iscms 12-14, inclusive, o r  any  Schedule thereunder in anv 
m anner o tk tr  than by:  (1 )  a public olTering of securities 
m ade p u rsuan t to  the Securities Act o f 1933; (2 ) credit ex 
Sessdeo ia  the ordinary cou rst o f businas hv suppliers, banks 
o r  o thers; o r (3 ) a satisfactory subordination agreement, .is 
defined in  Rule l ) e 3 - l  u n d e r the Securities Exchange A rt of 
1934? Yes D  No D
f /  " Y tt,‘* S tott on 5cAediife E th e  fu l l  na m e (last, first, 
m iddle) o f  ta c k  tu c k  p erso n  a n d  describe th e  ogreem en t or 
n reo n g cm en t lAroufA u h ic h  su ck  financ ing  it m a d e  a ia ila b lt ,  
including  am auat th ereo f.
IB . S tate w hether the A pplicant o r  Registrant, any person nam ed in 
Item s 13, 13, 14, and 15 o r  any Schedule thereunder, or anv o ther 
person d irectly  o r indirectly controlling or controlled by She A p­
p lican t o r Registrant, including any employee :
f a )  H as been found by the Commission to  have m ade o r  caused 
to  be m ade in any  application for registration o r report re­
quired to  be filed w ith the Commission under the Securities 
Exchange Act o f 1934, or in any proceeding before the  C om ­
mission w ith  respect to  registration, anv  statement w hich was 
a t  the tim e and in the light of the circumstances under w hich 
i t  was m ade false and  misleading w ith respect to  any m aterial 
fact, o r  to  have om itted to  state in any such application  o r 
report an y  m aterial fac t w hich was required to be stated  
therein. Yes □  N o □
(b )  H as been  convicted, w ithin 10 years of any felony o r  m is­
dem eanor ( I )  involving the  purchase or sale o f any  security : 
(2 ) arising  out o f the  conduct of the business of a  broker, 
dealer, o r  investment adviser; (3 ) involving embezzlement, 
fraudu len t conversion, o r  m isappropriation of funds o r  secu­
rities; o r  (4 )  involving violation o f Section 1341, 1342 or 
1343 o f  T itle  18 U nited  S tates Code (m ail fraud, fraud  by 
wire [including telephone, telegraph, radio or television]).
Yes O  N o □
(c )  Is perm anently  o r  tem porarily  enjoined by order, judgm ent. 
Of decree o f  any  court from  acting as an investment adviser, 
undeiw riter, broker, o r  dealer, o r  as an  affiliated person or 
em ployee o f  any investm ent com pany, bank, o r insurance 
com pany, o r  from  engaging in o r continuing any  conduct or 
practice in connection w ith  any such activity, or in connec­
tion w ith  the  purchase o r  sale of any  security. Yes O  N o Q
(d )  H as been found by the  Commission or any court to  have 
violated o r  to have aided, abetted, counselled, com m anded, 
induced o r  procured the violation by any other person of the 
Securities Act o f 1933, o r the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, o r  the  Invesuucni Auvlxrx» A«.« wf *343, v* U*u
m ent C om pany Act of 1940, o r of any ru le o r regulation under 
an y  o f  such Acts, o r  to  have failed reasonably to supervise 
another person w ho com m itted such a  violation.
Yes □  N o  O
(e )  H as been  th e  subject of an  o rder o f the  Commission entered  
p u n u a n t to  paragraph  (7 ) o f Section 15(b) of the Securities 
Exchange A ct o f  1934, as am ended, barring  or suspending the 
figh t o f  such  person to  be associated w ith  a  broker o r  dealer.
Yes Q  N o  Q
( f )  H as been  denied m em bership o r registration w ith  o r  sus­
pended, revoked o r expelled from  membership o r  registration 
w ith th e  N ational Association of Securities O ealeri, Inc.. o r 
any  national securities exchange; o r has been suspended or 
barred  from  being associated w ith any member of such associ­
ation  o r  any  member o f such exchange. Yes O  N o O
(g ) H as been found to have been a  cause o f the  denial, suspen­
sion, revocation o r expulsion of any p enon 's  m em bership or 
registration w ith  the N ational Association o f Securities D eal­
ers, Inc. Yes Q  N o  □
(h )  H as been denied registration (license) w ith o r  suspended, 
revoked o r  expelled from  registration f license) w ith any state, 
te rritory  o r the D istric t of Colum bia o r  anv agency thereof as 
a  broker, dealer, investm ent adviser, securities salesman o r as a 
person associated w ith a  person engaged in such business.
Y et O  N o  D
( i)  H as been the  subject o f  any  order, judgm ent, decree o r  o th e r 
sanction o f  any foreign court, foreign exchange, o r  foreign 
governm ental o r  regulatory agenc>’ arising out of any securi­
ties or investm ent advisory activities? Yes □  N o Q
( j )  H as been within the past 10 years, the subject of anv cra te  and
desist, desist and  refrain, prohibition o r similar o 'd r r  w hich 
was issued bv any state, territory or the D istrict of C olum bia, 
arising o u t o f the conduct of the busineu  as a  broker-dealer v r
Investm ent adviser? Yes Q  N o  □
If  this it  on omendm ent and the onswer to any parogroph of this  
item  is changed from  "K er"  to  "So," toploin on n sepormte 
Schedule E.
If  omf item  on tb it poge i t  emended, yon must onswer in fa ll a ll o lbe t items on this poge en d file w ith  e  com pleted 
eeed executed pege one. S o  Sehedule required by eny item  on this pege need be filed w ith  on em ended item  unless the 
Schedule itse lf is emended. • u a  eovoeueiî f iw te i cmca : tns-4>sains
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1 7  Comptclc m ic p « n le  Schedule D  to r  e ic h  natural pen o n  named 
in Itrm a 2, 12, 13, 14 and 13 o r any  Schedule thereunder, except 
tha t Schedule D  need not be furnished fo r any person srho meets 
both o f the  folloteing conditions; ( I )  he owns le u  than 10 percent 
ol any  clast of etiuiiy sccurisv o f app lican t or reijistrant and  (2) he 
ia n o t an  oflicer, d irector o r person w ith  sim ilar status o r  functions. 
Also, com plete a  separate Schedule D  for each person subject to  
any action reported under Item  16.
I t .  Does A p p lk an l o r  tegistrant:
(a )  H a n  an y  arrangem ent w ith  an y  o ther person, (m s  o r  arfaa i*  
malia# m sder w hich:
( I )  a n y  o f  the accounu  o r  records o f Applicant o r  Regis­
tra n t a te  kept o r  m ain ta ined  by such o ther person, firm 
o r  orgartiaattonf Yes □  N o Q
( ! )  sisch o ther person, firm  o r  organization (o ther than  a 
bank ) holds o r m ainta ins funds o r  securities o f  applicant 
o r  reg istran t o r  o f  any o f  its  customers? Yes □  N o Q
(b )  H ave any  arrangem ent w ith  an y  o ther broker o r dealer under 
s sh k h  th e  A pplicant o r  R eg istran t re fen  o r  introduces cus­
tom ers to  stscn o ther broker o r  dealer? Yes O  No O
1 /  tk t  m um tr to  an y  porograyk o /  tk i i  slrnt sr "Y rr ,"  /a ra trk  as I t  
rock  sttck arrongsm rn l Ike nom# an d  t d i n t t  of the o ther perron, 
f in e  o r  organiraiion, and  a  rum m ary  of th a  arrangem ent an a  
S t k t i t l t  £ .
It. A pplicant o r  R egistrant;
(a )  H as  an  application pending w ith  o r i t  a  member o f the  N a 
lional Association o f Securities Dealers, Inc. Yes □  N o □
(b) H as w ithdraw n application fo r  o r voluntarily term inated 
m em bership tn  .s.* «r c-.r,
Inc . (A ppltcants o r  reristran ts  n o t m em ben o f the National 
AsatSCtatson o f Securities D ealers should note the provisions of 
Scctiofu 1 3 (b ) (8 ) ,  (9 ) an d  (10 ) of che Securities Exchange 
A ct o f  1934 an d  the rules the reu n d er). Y et □  N o □
2 0 . A pplicant o r  R eg istran t is a  regu lar o r  associated member firm o f 
the  foUtrwing national securities exchange, ( f f ro r r  C hick)
SLC use
FILE NO. ooa SEQ. NO.
8-
Q  N osm
□  A m erican
□  Boston
D  Chicago Board o f Trade 
O  C incinnati
□  D etroit
□  M idw est
□  N ational.
□  New York
□  Pacific Coast
O  Phila.-Baltimore-W ash.
□  Pittsburgh
□  S alt Lake 
O  Spokane
2 1 . Does Applicant o r  R eg iitran t control C, -cl''; o r indirectly  any 
partnership, corporation o r  any  o ther organizauoo engaged in  th e  
securities or investm ent advisory business? II “ Yes," state nam e 
and  ad d reu  of such organization and  describe the  nature of control 
on  Schedule E. Yea O  N o O
12- Check principal types o f business engaged in (o r to  be engaged in , 
i f  n o t yet ac tive) by A pplicant o r  U egistranL D o not check any  
category which accounts for—o r  is expected to  account for— tcsa 
th a n  10 percent o f  annual gross income.
( a )  Exchange m em ber engaged in  exchange ceeemiieion
business  [  )
(b )  Exchange m em ber engaged in  floor ac tivities (  ]
(e )  Broker o r dea ler m aking in ter-dealer over-the-counter
m arkeu in  corporate securities (  )
( d )  Broker o r dea ler retailing  corporate sectirsties over the-
counter  { )
(e )  U nderw riter o r  selling group participan t (corporate
securitiei o th e r than  m utual fu n d s )  ( )
( f )  M utual fund  underw riter o r  sponsor (  ]
(g )  M utual fund r e t a i l e r )
(h )  C ovem tnent o r  m unicipal bond dea le r ( ]
( I )  Broker o r  dealer selling variable annu ities )
(J )  Solicitor of savings and  loan ac co u n u  ( 1
(k ) Real estate syndicator and  m ortgage broker and b a n k e r ..[  )
(I) Broker o r  dea ler selling oil and  gas in terests [ ]
(m) Put and call broker or dealer o r  option w riter ( ]
( ,.)  S i'vIll, ucalv, icili.-.g srcuriUcs s f  cr.!y :r.c  : : : : : :  s r  ss
sociated iuue rs  (O th er than m utual fu n d s )  [  ]
(o ) Broker o r  dealer selling securities of non-profit organiza­
tions (e.g., churches, hosp ita ls) [  ]
(p )  Investm ent advisory serv ices,   (  ]
( q )  Any o ther securities activ ity  [  ]
Specify below;
2 3 . ( a )  Does Applicant o r  R egistrant effect transactions in com modi­
ties a t  a  broker fo r o thers o r  (or its own account?
Yes a  N o □
(b )  Does Applicant o r  R egistrant engage in  any other non securi- 
ties business? I f  yes, describe briefly on a  Schedule E such 
o ther business. Yes □  N o Q
I f  any item  tm  tk i i  page i l  tm tn d td , you m m l as s r im  / •  fu ll t i l  t i h r  il im i on t i i t  page aa d  f il l le itk  a  t tm p h u d  a a d  exarafrd  page as* , 
N t  S c k td t l t  rayatrad  ky  any stam e a  tkcs (age  need ( a  f in t  w ilb  a a  am aadad iS aa  a a la is  Iba Srbadstla H itlf, is assaadad,
ux eow sam r leumM o rra .ia s-o su -s s s
APPENDIX II
DETERMINATION OF THE SAMPLE SIZE 
OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY
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Determination of the Sample Size 
for the Questionnaire Survey
The formula for the standard error of a percentage is:
Since the sample constitutes an appreciable portion of the
N,population, the formula is modified by (l -
cr-
P
Where p = the percentage of the sample possessing the given 
attribute
q = the percentage of the sample not possessing the given
attribute = 1 - p
N = the size of the sample
P = the size of the population
Let p = ,5— this is the most conservative value for p and its 
highest probable value.
Confidence interval = 99 per cent 
Precision = '" 59^
P = 2800
The value used for a— is 2.$8 cr* = «05
P P
o~ = .0194 
P
213
<r
P
.0194 = W
•0194 =
<•0194)"= 220^ 05^
(2800N)(.00037636) = 700 - .25N
I.O538N = 700 - .25N
1.0538 + .25N = 700
I.3038N = 700
N = 536.8 or 537
APPENDIX III
COPIES OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
AND COVERING LETTERS
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CONFIDENTIAL SURVEY TO DETERMINE THE EFFECTS OF THE BAN ON CUSTOMER 
DIRECTED 'GIVE-UPS' ON MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS 
1. Exchange Memberships. (Check memberships held during 1968 and 1969.)
1968 1969 1968 1969
None ( ) ( ) P-B-H ( ) ( )
New York Stock Exchange ( ) ( ) t Boston ( ) ( )
American Stock Exchange ( ) ( ) Detroit ( ) ( )
Pacific Coast ( ) ( ) Pittsburgh ( ) ( )
Midwest ( ) ( ) Cincinnati ( ) ( )
Other (Indicate Exchange and year of membership.).
2. Gross Income. (Checli appropriate space for 1968 and 1969.)
1968 1969 1968 1969
Under $50,000 ( ) ( ) 500,000 - 1,000,000 ( ) ( )
50,000 - 100,000 ( ) ( ) 1,000,000 - 1,500,000( ) ( )
100,000 - 200,000 ( ) ( ) 1,500,000 - 2,000,000( ) ( )
200,000 - 300,000 ( ) ( ) 2,000,000 - 2,500,000( ) ( )
300,000 - 500,000 ( ) ( ) Over $2,500,000 ( ) ( )
3. Income from Mutual Fund Operations as a Percentage of Total Gross
Income, (in determining income figures please take into account give- 
ups.) (Please check.)
Percent 
0 - 1 0  
10 - 30 
30 - 50
1968 1969 Percent 
( ) ( ) 5 0 - 7 0
( ) ( ) 7 0 - 9 0
( } ( ) 90-100
1968 1969 
( ) ( ) 
( ) ( ) 
( ) ( )
4. Because of the ban on give-ups, are you now contemplating a merger you 
fculd not hove previously oonter-plsted? fP3»a«<e chocV,) — , « ... .
S.a.Dld your company mergs in 1969? Yes ( ) NO ( )
b.If a merger took place in 1969, approximately how much of an increase 
in 1969 total gross income was caused by the merger?
Percent 
0 - 1 0  
10 - 30 
30 - SO
Percent 
{ ) ( ) 5 0 - 7 0
{ ) ( ) 7 0 - 9 0
( ) ( ) 90-100
( ) ( ) 
( ) ( ) 
( ) ( )
6. To what extent has the loss in income from customer directed give-ups 
been compensated for by income from new reciprocal business? An example 
of this would be direct orders from mutual funds for execution.
Percent 
0 - 2 5  
25 - 50
Percent 
( ) ( ) 5 0 - 7 5
( ) { ) 75-100
( ) ( ) 
( ) ( )
7, Bave you any comments on how the ban on give-ups has affected your firm? 
Bas it caused changes such as the introduction of a block trading depart­
ment, changes in the sales force, etc., in your company that would not 
normally have taken place? ( Please use back of the page if additional 
comments are necessary.)
0. The principal type of business of my firm is as a retailer of mutual 
funds. Yes ( ) No ( )
9. If you would be interested in receiving the results of this study, please 
check one of the following spaces. Yes ( ) No ( )
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coLtici or
S U I I N I S I  A D M IN IS TRA TIO N 
DBrAATMSHT O f  riA AMCl
THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
N O R M A N ,  O K L A H O M A ,  73 0 6 9  
June 16, 1970
Dear Sir:
I am completing a dissertation to determine (1) how the 
ban on customer directed give-ups has affected the revenues of 
brokerage firms dealing in mutual funds; and (2) to ascertain if 
the ban instituted by the Securities and Exchange commission has 
been detrimental to some firms and beneficial to others.
I discussed this project with the National Association of 
Securities Dealers and the Securities and Exchange commission in 
Washington. Both organizations approve or what l. am doing, it is 
possible that the findings of the survey could result in legislative 
reform beneficial to you as a retailer of mutual funds, in addition, 
you may wish to know how other firms in the industry have been 
affected by the ban on give-ups.
I have enclosed a one-page questionnaire; your cooperation in 
completing and returning it in the stamped addressed envelope will be 
sincerely appreciated.
The questionnaire is simple and should take you only a few 
minutes to complete. Since I am not asking you to indicate the name 
of your firm, the information you give will be strictly confidential. 
Furthermore, neither the questionnaire nor the return envelope is 
coded in any way.
1 hope you will reply as soon as possible, foc I would like to 
make the results of the survey available while the information is 
still up to date.
Sincerely,
George M. Charles
Enclo.
The University of Okiahoma 307 W est Brooks, Room 202
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Norman, Okiahoma 73069
June 30, 1970.
C ollege  of 
B u sin ess  A dm inistration  
D epartm en t o f F inance
Dear air:
Two week# ago I mailed you a questionnaire with a covering 
letter explaining that I was completing a doctoral dissertation 
to determine (1) how the ban on customer directed give-ups 
instituted by the S.B.C. had affected the revenues of brokerage 
firms dealing in mutual funds; and (2) to ascertain if the ban 
had been detrimental to some firms and beneficial to others.
The response to the questionnaire has been very positive, 
but naturally, the more replies received, the more affective 
the study will be. You may already have replied, but I  have 
no way of knowing the names of the respondents. You will 
recall that in order to keep the replies absolutely confiden­
tial I did not request names on the questionnaires; neither 
were they coded in any way for purposes of identification.
If you have replied, then please disregard this letter.
If you have net yet answered, I would really appreciate your 
taking a few minutes to complete the questionnaire, and 
returning it immediately in the stamped addressed envelope.
If I am to complete the dissertation in time for summer 
graduation, all the responses must be in by July 13 for 
analysis and interpretation. I am convinced that the results 
of this study will prove extremely beneficial to you and 
other broker - dealers in the industry. Your reply is eagerly 
awaited.
Sincerely,
George M. Charles.
APPENDIX IV
RELEASES OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 
TO MEMBERS AND ALLIED MEMBERS
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New York Stock Ex c h a n g e
E l e v e n  W a l l  S t r e e t  
N e w  YORK. N Y. 1 0 0 0 5
W . H A A C K
PACtiOCNT
January 2, 1968
TO: Members and Allied Members
SUBJECT: Commission Rate Structure Proposal
A principal unsolved problem facing the securities industry is that 
involving the New York Stock Exchange commission rate structure. The com­
plexities and ramifications are such that they are not generally understood 
even though they directly or indirectly affect the New York Stock Exchange 
and its members, regional exchanges and their members, the third market, non- 
member broker-dealers, institutional investors and, of course, the public.
The problem has become more acute by reason of certain pressures which 
are building up in Congress, government agencies and departments, a segment 
of the press and the SEC which has oversight responsibilities in the area.
The issue is further complicated by the fact that the Exchange, enjoying the 
privilege of self-regulation and operating under a government approved 
commission rate structure and certain anti-trust immunities, has an obligation 
to review its fees and industry developments and practices in the light of 
public interest. This is a problem which cannot be solved by the Exchange 
alone. However, inaction on our part is apt to result in the problem being 
solved by those outside the industry who may be less familiar with the 
ramifications and as a result might direct changes less satisfactory than 
those we initiate.
The minimum commission rate is ceasing to be a "minimum" because of 
practices which have developed and which are proliferating. This is the case 
in large measure because certain institutional investors are naturally 
desirous of achieving a lower commission rate on large transactions, and 
brokers who are non-members of this Exchange are understandably interested in 
achieving access to the commission dollar. To accomplish these objectives, 
among others, a wide range of devices is being employed. Membership on 
regional stock exchanges, used in both simple and complex reciprocal arrange­
ments related to NYSE transactions, has resulted in a practical access to the 
New York Stock Exchange. Other practices have in effect given certain instit­
utions commission discounts. One exchange, by permitting rebates to SECO 
members, in effect is giving a public and institutional discount. Through 
complicated arrangements there are now certain sophisticated individuals who 
manage to receive 40% rebates on their listed transactions. The net result,
OWN YOUR SHARE or AMERICAN OUSiNCSS
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in brief, is an intricate maze involving give-ups, give-aways, reciprocal 
practices, manufactured participations in trades, transported trades moved 
from one Exchange to another, all of which result in a leakage of the 
commission dollar.
The situation also reflects a commission structure which was most 
recently revised in 1959 and which doss not properly recognize significant 
changes which have since taken place in the mix of our business. We are all 
aware of the increased institutional activity which is one of the significant 
phenomena of our time and which in all likelihood will continue to grow. It 
seems reasonable that institutional business with its unique characteristics 
and demands must be recognized in our commission charges. Moreover, failure 
to recognize and speak to the problem will inevitably result in a diversion of 
activity to competing marketplaces.
Because of all of the foregoing, the Board of Governors has unanimously 
adopted a resolution which had earlier been recommended by the Cost and Revenue 
Committee and which has the further approval of the Regional Firms Advisory 
Committee and the Liaison Committee of the Association of Stock Exchange Firms 
to the effect that the New York Stock Exchange proposes to
(1) incorporate a volume discount in the minimum commission schedule, 
the amount and nature of such discount to be subsequently determined.
(2) support continuation of the practice of customer directed give-ups 
on their own transactions with a limitation on the percentage amount 
which may be so given-up.
(3) take steps to prohibit reciprocal practices which result in de facto 
rebates of NYSE commissions even where those arrangements involve 
other markets than the NYSE floor, provided that the SEC will aid
in prohibiting such practices in other markets.
(4) allow a discount in the minimum commission schedule for non-member 
brokers, both domestic and foreign, with qualifications to be 
specifically defined subsequently.
(5) at the order of the SEC to this and other registered exchanges, adopt 
rules limiting membership and broker-dealer allowances to bona fide 
broker-dealers.
Because of the interrelationship of these proposals these courses of 
action are offered as a package. . Further, the specific details of each of the 
five elements of the package will have to be developed subsequently.
The first proposal described would give directly to large investors, 
principally institutions, and to the public which has entrusted its funds to 
institutions, a commission reduction to which they are entitled by size of 
transaction and which some are presently receiving circuitously.
12
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Continuance of customer directed give-ups on a reduced and controlled 
b a s i s  would tend to eliminate abuse in granting of reciprocals, and would give 
recognition to the fact that there is more to an order than its execution.
The third proposal, involving an enforcement of rebate rules, would help 
to eliminate undesirable reciprocal practices and arrangements engaged in by 
some which through certain other exchanges and the over-the-counter market, 
result in NYSE commission "leakage".
Because we recognize and respect the desire of non-NYSE brokers to 
merchandise securities listed on our Exchange profitably, and preferring not 
to have them compensated by artifice, we propose that certain qualified 
brokers be given an opportunity to share the commission dollar directly instead 
of indirectly. The public will be better served and depth and liquidity of 
markets on our Floor will be improved.
Our last proposal restricting future membership in any exchange to bona 
fide broker-dealers is necessary to insure the health and vitality of our 
securities distribution and auction market mechanisms as we know them.
Chairman Gustave Levy and I presented these proposals for consideration 
by the SEC this morning. I cannot emphasize too strongly the important role 
that the SEC must play in considering and evaluating the action which has 
been taken by the Board of Governors.
Subject to Commission reaction, the Cost and Revenue Committee intends 
to proceed immediately with drafting rules and commission structure to 
accomplish these ends.
Robert W. Haack, 
President
13
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N e w  Yo r k  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e
ELEVEN WALL STREET 
NEW YORK, N Y. 10005
R O R C R T  W. H A A C K
June 27, 1968
TO: Members and A llied Members
SUBJECT: Board Decisions on Volume Discount, Customer*Directed Cive-Ups and
Nonmember Broker Discount
Ac i t s  policy meeting today, the Board o f Governors decided on three basic e le ­
ments for a new commission s tru c tu re . These princip les follow — with one s ig ­
n ific an t exception — the proposals we put forward la s t  January 2. Today's 
Board ac tion  was takan on the basis of a report from the Costs and Revenues Com­
m ittee and a f te r  consultation  with the advisory groups representing the view­
points o f  regional firms and of the A ssociation of Stock Exchange Firms.
The p rinc ip les are being discussed with the Securities and Qcchange Commission 
as the framework for a new commission schedule. A deta iled  schedule, as wall as 
several a lte rn a te s , are already being tested  for th e ir  p o ten tia l e ffe c t on the 
current mix of the secu ritie s  business and on member firm revenues. I t  is  hoped 
th a t, sub jec t to the discussions with the SEC, the new schedule can be proposed 
during the summer.
Since the three proposals complement one another, tne board believe» Liiat f in a l  
ac tion  w ith respect to  each should be taken simultaneously. The three points 
are as follows:
(1) The Board o f Governors reaffirm s i t s  approval of incorporating a vol­
ume discount in a new commission schedule. Such a discount would re ­
cognize the lower handling costs of block orders as compared to smal­
le r  transactions. I t  would a lso  give d irec tly  to  large investo rs , 
mainly in s ti tu tio n s , and to the public that has entrusted  i t s  savings 
to  the in s t i tu t io n s , a reduction in  commissions.
At the same time, the schedule we are working on would m itigate  d is ­
p a r i t ie s  th a t now e x is t between commission costs for low-priced and 
high-priced issues.
(2) Nonmember brokers, both domestic and foreign, who can meet prescribed 
q u a lif ica tio n s  would be e n title d  to a discount o i up to one-th ird  
from the minimum commission schedule. We favor amendments to A rtic le  
XV of the Exchange C onstitution to allow qualified  non-NYSE brokers 
to  have access to our markets and be compensated d ire c tly  for th e ir  
e f fo r ts .  The additional p a rtic ip a tio n  in our market should enhance 
i t s  depth and liq u id ity .
Before such a change in our C onstitu tion and Rules can be made, the 
problem posed by Section 3(a)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 would have to be resolved. That provision defines a "member" 
as a person who Is permitted to make use of the f a c i l i t ie s  o f the 
Exchange for transactions thereon "with the payment of a commission 
o r fee which is  less than that charged the general pub lic ."  Be­
cause of the obligations the Act places on the Exchange to police
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And d isc ip lin e  members. I t  would have to be made c lea r th a t non- 
member firms qu a lif ied  to  receive such a discount would not be 
regarded as "members." This could be accomplished e ith e r  by an 
amendment to the 1934 Act, or by an appropriate ru le  promulgated 
by the SEC under the Act.
(3) The Exchange considers th a t continuation of customer-directed
give-ups weakens the economic basis o i  the minimum commission
s tru c tu re  i t s e l f . Therefore. Che Board has voted in favor o i
________________.    For obvious reasons, customer-
d irec ted  give-ups cannot be e ffe c tiv e ly  abolished by the u n ila t-  
ac tion  o f one national se c u r itie s  exchange. To be e ffe c tiv e , 
the ac tion  must apply uniformly to a l l  markets. I f  no t, such 
give-ups would lik e ly  continue on any exchange whose ru les per­
m itted  them, to  the detrim ent o f exchanges where they were not 
allowed.
At a time when the princip le  o f minimum commissions Is being ques­
tioned , I t  may be more d i f f ic u l t  to defend the economic basis of 
the minimum commission law i f  members arc able to  give up, or give 
away, a su b stan tia l part o f the minimum commission. In any case, 
a commission schedule th a t includes a volume discount would reduce 
the wherewithal fo r give-ups.
Wa are  asking the SEC to take appropriate action to  in i t ia te  s tep - 
by-step  p roh ib ition  of a l l  custom er-directed give-ups. Step-by- 
s tep  Implementation, over a period o f a t  lea s t one year, would 
give firms an opportunity to ad just to  the economic impact o f 
such a change. We would, o f course, expect continuation of bona 
fide  agency-principal re la tionsh ips between members for such se r­
vices as c lea rin g , floor ucukexogc and introducing o f eccmmrs on 
a disclosed b a s is .
The Costs and Revenues Committee is  s t i l l  continuing i t s  work with respect to  
such m atters as in tra -in d u stry  ra te s  and policy regarding in s t i tu t io n a l  member­
ship^ and expects to report on these subjects a t  a la te r  date .
I f  approved by vote o f the membership, the new commission schedule and rela ted
amendments and rules would be the f i r s t  rev ision  o f New York Stock Exchange
ra te s  in  nine years.
Basic s h if t s  a re  taking place in the nature of the se cu ritie s  business. I t  i s  
imperative th a t our connisslon s tru c tu re  be responsive to  the fac ts  o f l i f e  in  
today 's marketplace.
In  the l e t t e r  of January 2 to the membership, i t  was noted th a t a major fac to r
in  the Board's endorsement of important s tru c tu ra l changes a t  chat time was chat
•  network o f  p rac tices  In the industry are eroding the present minimum commis­
sion  s tru c tu re .
An in tr ic a te  maze o f give-ups, give-aways, rec ip rocal p rac tice s , manufactured 
p a rtic ip a tio n s  in trad es , transported trades moved from one exchange to  another, 
and the l ik e , have resu lted  in considerable leakage of the commission d o lla r .
Regulatory developments since January have underscored the need for taking ac­
tio n  along the lines then recommended.
Shortly  a f te r  we presented our January proposal, the SEC advanced an incompat­
ib le  suggestion, i t s  proposed Rule 10(b)-10, requiring that any give-up d irected  
by an investment company must, in e f fe c t ,  be rebated to the in s ti tu tio n . In a 
comment on th a t proposal, the Department of Ju s tic e  questioned the necessity  fo r
224
and propriety  of any minimum commissions. Then the SEC in advancing i ts  proposed 
"interim " commission proposal in May, and requesting that the NYSE place i t  in 
e ffe c t by September 15, 1968, offered as an a lte rn a tiv e , the abo lition  of mini­
mum commissions on a l l  orders above $50,000. The SEC's "interim " proposal quite 
apart from i ts  serious e ffe c t on member firm revenues, would present severe op­
e ra tio n a l problems.
As you know, SEC investiga tive  hearings on the commission s tructu re  and rela ted  
m atters begin in  Washington next week. Give-ups and reciprocal p ractices are 
among the topics the SEC intends to examine. Fortunately, the Exchange's for­
mulation o f policy on these matters began long before the scheduling of the pre­
sent hearings. With the p rinc ip les defined for restructu ring  comnissions, and a 
new schedule near completion, the Exchange is in a so lid  posture.
The three policy decisions reached by the Board today, coupled with the commis­
sion schedule to follow, speak d irec tly  to the changing nature of the secu ritie s  
market and the questions ra ised  by the SEC and the Justice  Department. They em« 
body a to ta lly  modernized approach to the way the membership charges fo r i t s  se r­
v ices , p a ra lle l  in s p i r i t  to the automation and other up-to-date techniques that 
have been introduced recen tly  in to  such aspects of our business as market data 
communications, odd-lot handling, and clearance and delivery of s e c u r itie s .
A new comnission struc tu re  along the lines of the three policy decisions report­
ed, above is  bound to involve an overall decrease in  member firm income on a 
given volume of business.
The Exchange is  making d e ta iled  calcu lations of the economic e ffec ts  of the pos­
s ib le  commission changes on member firm s, based on carefu l sampling studies and 
examination of Income and Expense reports. When the fin a l commission schedule 
is  developed, we w ill be in  position  to estimate i t s  to ta l  costs and the effec ts  
on a ifte ren c  types of firm s, varying, of cumâc, with the nsturc of each firm'# 
commission business.
I t  should be noted that the "interim " commission schedule proposed May 28 by the 
SEC, which was figured on the 1966 Public Transaction Study, involved a reduc­
tio n  of approximately $110 m illion in  gross member firm revenues. The reduction 
could be much greater on the basis of the membership's current volume and mix of 
business, and i f  allowance is  made for revenue losses resu ltin g  from a discount 
to  qua lified  nonmember brokers.
The need to  restruc tu re  commissions comes a t a time when the se cu ritie s  industry, 
which is  c h a ra c te r is tic a lly  cy c lica l in i t s  level of a c tiv ity , is  a t  an a ll-tim e  
peak in  volume of business. The industry is incurring heavy costs to gear i t ­
s e l f  fo r handling th is  volume. The best prospect for our membership to recover 
the immediate costs of a res truc tu ring  of commissions l ie s  in fostering  long­
term growth in  demand for the membership's services to Che investing public .
The p rincip les approved by the Board, and the connission schedule being prepar­
ed to  carry  them out, w ill  encourage such long-term growth. In the long run, 
these changes may well present member firms an opportunity to a t t r a c t  additional 
business to the Exchange from nonmember brokers in th is  country and abroad, 
improving the position  of the Exchange and i t s  members. Such add itional business 
would add to the depth and liq u id ity  of Exchange markets, thus enabling the Ex­
change marketplace to do a b e tte r  job for a l l  investors who use i t .
We will, of course, keep you informed of developments and hope before long Co be 
able CO submit, for a voce of the membership, a full commission schedule and re­
lated Constitutional amendments.
APPENDIX V
INCOME OF MUTUAL FUND RETAILERS— TABLES AND 
FIGURES OF DISTRIBUTION FOR I968 AND I969
226
TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME FROM MUTUAL FUND OPERATIONS 
AS A PER GENT OF GROSS INCOME
Number of Firms 
(Frequency)
Income from Mutual Fund Operations
as a Per Cent of Gross Income 1968 1969
0 - 1 0 43 48
10 - 30 30 33
30 - 50 20 21
50 - 70 20 27
70 - 90 50 4o
90 - 100 123 115
Total 286 286
Source: Data from questionnaires received from mutual fund
retailers.
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TABLE 2
CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME FROM MUTUAL FUND 
OPERATIONS AS A PER CENT OF GROSS INCOME
Income from Mutual Fund Operations 
as a Per Cent of Gross Income
Number of Firms 
(Cumulative Frequency)
1968 1969
Less than or equal to 0 0 0
Less than or equal to 10 43 48
Less than or equal to 30 73 83
Less than or equal to 50 93 104
Less than or equal to 70 113 131
Less than or equal to 90 163 171
Less than or equal to 100 286 286
Source; Data from questionnaires received from mutual fund 
retailers.
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TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS INCOME 
FROM MUTUAL FUND OPERATIONS
Gross Income 
(Thousands of Dollars)
Number of Firms
1968 1969
0 - 30 127 131
30 - 100 30 53
100 - 200 38 30
200 - 300 11 15
300 - 300 l4 11
300 - 1000 16 20
1000 - 1300 10 7
1300 - 2000 3 2
2000 - 2500 1 2
Over 2300 16 15
Total 286 286
Source: Data from questionnaires received from mutual fund
retailers.
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TABLE 4
CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS INCOME 
FROM MUTUAL FUND OPERATIONS
Gross Income 
(Thousands of Dollars)
Number of Firms 
(Cumulative Frequency)
1968 1969
Less than or equal to 0 0 0
Less than or equal to 50 127 131
Less than or equal to 100 177 l84
Less than or equal to 200 215 214
Less than or equal to 300 226 229
Less than or equal to 500 240 240
Less than or equal to 1000 256 260
Less than or equal to 1500 266 267
Less than or equal to 2000 269 269
Less than or equal to 2500 270 271
Less than or equal to 00 286 286
Source : Data from.questionnaires received from mutual fund
retailers.
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APPENDIX VI
SECURITIES INDUSTRY QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE INDEPENDENT 
BROKER-DEALERS» TRADE ASSOCIATION
3
X
Raymond W. Cocchi
President
Independent Broker Dealers' Trade Association
4 7 2  Bridge S tree t  
Springfie ld , M assachuse tts  0 1 1 0 3  
T e le p h o n e  (413 )  7 8 1 -3 8 0 0
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Janws C. Butterfield
Treasurer
December 1, 1969
Dear Member:
He are pleased to enclose the results of 
a recent survey, in which your firm participated*
As you know, this survey was prompted by 
members of Congress who have expressed deep concern 
over the continued profitability of independent 
brokers and dealers, particularly in the face of loss 
of "give-ups", pending Mutual Fund Legislation, and 
rising costs in maintaining small businesses*
Thanks again for your cooperation, and we 
will keep you advised»
Sincerely,
Q lM
Raymond W. 
President
tc
Cocchi
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Raymond W. CoceW
President
Independent Broker Dealers* Trade Association
4 7 2  Bridge S treet 
Springlield , M assachusetts 01 1 0 3  
T eleph one  (413) 781-3800
TOTAL REPLIES - 189c=8s:=s=ssss===sssa=ssa
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
James C. Butterfield
Treasurer
SECURITIES INDUSTRY QNESTIONNAIRg
FOR NON-NYSE MEMBERS
INSTRUCTIONS; Answer all questions you can in your best judgment* 
Questions have been double spaced to allow room for 
additional remarks, if any.
Answer
gpaco
Average IS yrs.
Yes 142 - No 42
Order Takers 130 
8m.Investors 27
1.
а.
3.
4.
5.
б.
Yes 115 No 69 
Yes 94 No 93 
Yes 100 ftp 84 
Yea 156 No 20 
Yea 114 No 47 10. 
Yea 20 No 173 11. 
Yea 11 No 9
9.
12.
GENERAL
Now long have you been in the securities business?
Your business is in Rural Area 56 . Metropolitan Area 126 . 
Eastern Part of USA 72 Midwest 49 . West 43 ? Non U.S. 4
Your business volume is roughly OTC Stocks 13 %. Third 
MfU-'keL C 7i, «iuLuoil Fuiiûs 70 Life Insurance 0 ».
Give Away NYSE 4 %, Misc. ÏÏ.
Do you compete against a NYSE branch office?
Would the NYSE branch in your area be classified as erder- 
takers, or do they spend their time with small investors?
Do you have contacts with small companies that need 
financing?
7. Have you participated in new issues in the past? 
e. Are you interested in new issues for your clients? 
Do you feel the S.E.C. is anti-small business?
Do you feel the N.A.S.D. is anti-small business? 
Did you join a regional exchange in the last year? 
Has your arrangement been satisfactory?
Yes 155 JSto-23 D  
Average 76%
Inc.sup. 129 
Prom.costs 43
• Have you had a dramatic increase in overhead since 1966? 
Roughly what percentage?
14. Is much of this due to increased supervision, bookkeeping
and regulation snowballing, or is it due to promotion costs?
Yes 183
IS. Do you feel Congress is uninformed regarding the "grass roots' 
of the securities industry?
3
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Answer
Spsce
Yes 74 Ho 106
Average 61%
Yes 0 Ho 187
-2-
16* Do you feel like part of the industry? That is, are you
posted on the effects of new regulations and new legislation 
prior to their enactment?
Yes 106 Yes 98
17. Do you give fringes to back office personnel?No 61 Salesmen? No 68
18. Nhat percentage of commissions are paid to your salesmen?
19. After the sale, when a client has a time-consuming problem, 
do you charge for your time?
Yes 175 No 10 1. 
Yes 140 , 41 2.
Average 15% I.
4.
Yea ISÔLJiu. 25
i.
Yes SBUtoullS 
Yes 126__Nn 42 
Yes 96 pa 80 7.
8.
Yes 141.„.Hn 28
9.
Yes 166 No n
10.
Average f,4f%
Yea 23 No 160
MUTUAL FUNDS
Do you have problems with Mutual Fund custodian banks?
Do your clients blame you for custodian bank foul-ups?
Nhat percentage of your time do you spend correcting 
custodian bank foul-ups?
Should this problem be sent to Congress as one of the reasons 
that banks should not be permitted to enter the Mutual Fund 
business?
Mould you survive if Mutual Fund commissions are reduced to 
a maximum of 5%?
Mould you reduce salesmen's commissions?
Mould you reduce client services?
Mould you survive if the "front-end-load" on contractuels 
is abolished?
Mhat part of the Mutual Fund Bill now pending in Congress 
would effect your business most? Sales charge 171. 
"Front-end-load" 41 . Banks entering Mutual Fund field 109 . 
Management fees is .
11.
12.
Yes 8 No 152
13.
Did your firm receive "give-ups" or "reciprocal" from Mutual 
Funds prior to December 5, 1968?
ly^ roximately what percentage of "givs-ups" or "reciprocal" 
did you receive in relation to your Mutual Fund sales?
Have you received "give-ups" or "reciprocal" since 
December 5, 1968?
Has the elimination of "backward pricing" of Mutual Fund 
purchases helped your clients?
DX
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Answer 
Space 
Do 126 
Do Not 61 1.
Yes SA No 7 2.
3.
Yes 36 Ho 137 
Average 52% 4.
S.
Yea 72 No 20
Encouraged 7 6.
■ Discouraged 51
Yes 24 -No 154 7. 
Average 21 6.
Local 22 9.
Katiwnal 10
-3-
INDIVIDUAL SECURITIES
X do/do not handle individual securities transactions.
I£ you do not, would you provide this service for your clients 
if you did not have to become involved in execution, con­
firming, transfers, dividends, etc., and were paid a portion 
of the commission?
Do you feel that the proposed 33 1/3% commission "access" to 
the New York Stock Exchange for non-members is adequate?
If you answered no, what percentage would be adequate?
Do you agree with the pending Senate- bill that would raise 
Regulation A offerings from $300,000 to $500,000?
Have "wholesale quotes" encouraged or discouraged your 
merchandising efforts in OTC stocks?
Do you make markets in securities?
If so, in how «any stocks do you make markets?
Are your markets made in local issues or national issues?
ADDITIONAL REMARKS
D
X
APPENDIX VII
LETTERS FROM STOCK EXCHANGES
240
N e w  Y o r k  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e
E L E V EN  WALL S T R E E T  
NEW YORK, N. V. 1 0 0 0 5
ALLEN O. FEUX
MANAOEN, K M O O L  AND COLLEGE NELATIONE
February 4, 1970
Mr. George M. Charles 
College o£ Business Administration 
The University o£ Oklahoma 
Norman, Oklahoma
Dear Hr. Charles:
Your letter to the President of the Exchange, Mr. Robert 
W. Haack, was referred to me. I am enclosing materials which will 
give answers to many of your questions. Some of the data for 1969 
have not been tabulated yet. If you will contact me later for 
specific data, of a type as included in our FACT BOOK, I  will try 
to get them for you for the year 1969.
One source you might check is the New York Times and 
several financial magazines which feature year-end facts and fig­
ures. Also, of course, there are several services which compile 
data of all sorts —  for example. Standard & Poors, Moodys, Forbes, 
etc. If your library does not have these, you may want to check 
with some of our member firms who will probably let you refer to 
their copies.
The answer to your question #3 is no; however, as 
carried in press releases recently, the whole concept is under 
detailed study at this time. Changes may be forthcoming within 
a few weeks or months.
The Exchange does not allow foreign members, question Û5, 
Anything is possible but this change is not among the ones being 
carefully considered at this time. Incidentally, may I  suggest 
that you get a copy of our Constitution. This can be ordered from 
Commerce Clearing House, 4023 W. Peterson Avenue, Chicago, 111.
3
X
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The S.B.C. is involved in several studies relating to 
questions you asked. Check with them to see what data or informa* 
Cion they will release. Regional exchanges are the best source 
for some of your questions.
Cordially yours,
0 U M ,
I
Allen 0. Felix
3
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O W N  Y O U R  S H A R E  O F  A M E R I C A N  B U S I N E S S
American Stock Exchange
86 Trinity Place 
New York N V 10006 
212 964-3200
Information Service* Division
M arch 18, 1970
M r. George M , Charles 
College of Business Administration 
Department of Finance 
The U niversity of Oklahoma 
Norman, Oklahoma 73069
Dear M r. C harles:
It is  w ith some em barrassm ent that I reply to your le tte r  to  
W insor H. W atson, Jr. of March 11, 1970. M r. W atson, a t 
the time that you firs t corresponded with the Exchange, had 
asked me to  research  the data tha t you had requested  and to 
forward the m aterials on to  you.
We have not forgotten your request. Rather, I had sen t 
copies of your original le tte r  to a number of d iv isions within 
the Exchange, since many of your questions d ea lt with areas 
unfam iliar to me.
I am attaching  the  rep lies to most of these  questions; and 
additional source m aterials from which you can gather more 
complete d a ta .
If I can be of further se rv ic e , p lease  do not h e s ita te  to  ca ll 
on me d irec tly .
American Stock Exchange
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M r. George M . C harles 
M arch 18, 1970 
Page 2
In the  m eantim e, thank you for your in te res t in the  American 
Stock Exchange.
C ordial
John C . Ford 
M anager, 
Education Services
jCF:ahc
Enc.
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No. 1 
Question:
Answer:
Dollar and share volumes on the Exchange for the 
period 1960-1969.
This information is  ava ilab le  in  the  a ttached  l is t ,  
"Stock Trading S ta tis tic s"  (2 /5 /70) and a lso  in the 
Amex D atabook, likew ise  enc lo sed .
No. 2 
Q uestion: Number of block trades per year for the period 1960- 
1969. Is it po ssib le  to  break down the block trades 
tran sac ted  for mutual funds and those  for other 
custom ers ?
Answer: A block transac tion  breakdown is  available only from
1966; and memorandums with th is  information are 
likew ise  a ttached  (H. Vernon L ee). Other relevant 
m aterial on th is  sub ject w ill be found in the Amex 
Databook.
No. 3 
Q uestion:
Answer:
Do you accep t subsid ia ries of mutual funds and other 
in stitu tio n a l investo rs a s  members of the exchange? 
If you do , when did the p ractice  begin? If you do 
not, do you propose to  in  the future?
No, we do not accep t subsid ia ries of mutual funds 
and other in stitu tiona l investors of the Exchange; 
although same is  being considered under general 
question  of in stitu tiona l membership.
No. 4
Q uestion: Could you send me a booklet or brochure giving the 
history  of your exchange which would include the 
various types of members and the  functions of each?
Answer: I am enclosing a number.
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N o. 5 
Question:
Answer:
Does your exchange accep t foreign members?
If you d o , when did the p rac tice  f irs t begin?
If you do no t, is  th is p o ssib le  in the future?
The Exchange has had C anadian members for years . 
Although we have had foreign a sso c ia te  members 
over the y e a rs , we have none now. It is  possib le  
again in  the fu ture, depending on the outcome of 
public ownership and other questions of a c c e ss  
to the market now under s tu d y .. .though th is  p resen ts 
problems of surveillance a t such a great d is tan c e .
N o. 6 
Q uestion:
Answer:
W hat s tep s have you taken to  make sure th a t the 
ban on custom er-d irected  g ive-ups is  enforced ?
W hat is  to  stop a member from sp litting  com m issions 
with non-members if d irected  to do so by a mutual 
fund?
Article 6 of the Amex C onstitu tion specifica lly  forbids 
th is  p rac tice  (copy on request); and it  is  enforced 
through periodic checks by exam iners who v is i t  members 
firms and survey reco rds. As for part 2 of your 
question , the rule alone and observance of same is 
the guideline which would stop a member from 
sp litting  com m issions; and periodic checks by auditors 
would bring same to ligh t.
N o. 7 
Q uestion:
Answer:
The number of stocks on your exchange th a t are 
dually  lis ted  for the period 1960-1969.
See a ttached  additions (memo: Joseph Kenrick) to 
information availab le  in enclosed  Amex Databook.
No. 8 
Question: Have you alw ays prohibited your members from splitting  
com m issions with non-m em bers? When w as th is  rule 
f irs t put into effect?
Answer: Y es, So long ago, the date  is  not av a ilab le .
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No. 9 
Q uestion: Have you any information on when the practice of 
custom er-directed g ive-ups f irs t  began? Is it 
p o ss ib le  to  determ ine the number of shares and 
dollar volume d irected  to  regional exchanges 
originating from mutual fund orders during the 
period 1960-1968? If th is  is  p o ss ib le , I would 
imagine the amount of com m ission generated by 
these  orders could be determ ined.
Answer: No, but the p ractice  f irs t began during the la s t
fiv e -ten  years . Would suggest th a t a check of 
regional exchanges would provide more accurate  
answ ers since information is  not availab le  here.
No. 10
Q uestion: Where is  i t  po ssib le  to obtain  an u p -to -d a te  study
of the Third M arket?
Answer: Suggest Weeden & C o . , or F irst Boston Corporation.
A lso, SEC in W ashington.
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Pacific Coast Stock Exchange
« • S a l m n t m n  s o i  P i * *  S t* * * *
lo*a«oiu(*ooi4 Log Angeles s»»p**»cikoo4io»
AprU 14. 1970
M r. Georg* M. C harles 
*^he U niversity  of Oklahoma 
N orm an. Oklahoma 73069
D ear M r. C harles:
P lease  accept our apologies fo r  the delay in  responding to your se t of 
questions. Enclosed is  a 1969 annual rep o rt which w ill cover a  m ajo r 
portion  of the questions you have detailed.
Unfortunately, we a re  unable to  answ er ce rta in  questions you have asked  
as  our records a re  e ith er m aintained in a  d ifferent m anner o r do not go 
back fa r  enough to  prove conclusive for your apparen t needs.
I shall go through your 13 questions and indicate e ith er the answ er o r  w here
it  m ay be found;
1. See booklet "Pacific  C oast Stock Exchange Story. "
2. See attached volume figu res.
3. See attached breakdown.
4. See attached.
5. See annual report.
6. See annual repo rt.
7. Yes.
8. Yes. 1965.
9. Annual rep o rt. Any company in the United States which m eets 
our basic  specifications. See annual re p o rt fo r requ irem en ts.
10. 173 PCSE m em ber f irm s , 89 of which a re  m em bers of the NYSE, 
and 84 m em bers of the AMEX, M idwest o r local m em bers. 17 
a re  institu tional m em bers (see attachm ent).
11. In the 1930's. We do not have volume figures available.
12. Our ru les  a re  enforced by our com pliance and surveillance 
function, and hopefully there  a re  no loopholes.
13. As evidenced by our volume fig u res , the give -up ban has not 
caused a  decline in  volume on the PCSE.
I hope the attached inform ation is  useful and would very  much appreciate  
receiving a  copy of your conclusions. If we can be of any fu rth e r a ss is tan ce , 
p lease  do not hesitate  to contact us d irec tly .
S incerely  yours,
'
P h il ip p .  Thom as 
Vice P res id en t
PA C inC  COAST STOCK EXCBANOX
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Volume by Y ear Value
1 9 6 9  1 7 1 , 8 8 4 , 0 8 5  $ 5 , 5 1 3 , 6 6 9 , 2 6 2 . 0 1
1 9 6 8  1 4 3 , 2 7 6 , 8 7 5  5 , 2 4 2 , 1 4 9 , 8 4 9 . 3 0
1 9 6 7  1 1 4 , 3 2 3 , 0 8 9  4 , 5 3 8 , 5 5 1 , 4 4 1 . 3 2
1 9 6 6  8 8 , 9 3 1 , 6 8 8  3 , 5 2 4 , 0 1 7 , 9 8 9 . 5 1
1 9 6 5  6 2 , 4 4 0 , 9 0 6  2 , 1 7 9 , 9 2 3 , 5 7 7 . 8 9
1 9 6 4  5 6 , 2 1 6 , 6 7 2  1 , 8 0 0 , 0 4 1 , 7 6 0 . 0 0
1 9 6 3  5 3 , 1 3 6 , 2 4 3  1 , 5 4 2 , 4 4 2 , 8 1 1 . 0 0
1 9 6 2  5 0 , 5 6 5 , 9 1 1  1 , 0 9 7 , 2 0 8 , 4 4 6 . 0 0
1961  7 3 . 1 9 8 , 4 6 1  1 , 2 7 9 , 8 1 5 , 9 6 8 . 0 0
I 9 6 0  4 4 , 8 5 3 , 0 8 5  8 8 3 , 3 5 5 , 6 7 1 . 0 0
N um ber of New L istings
1 9 6 0  32
1961  36
1 9 6 2  25
1 9 6 3  36
1 9 6 4  38
19 6 5  4 0
1 9 6 6  6 4
19 6 7  7 8
1 9 6 8  83
1 9 6 9  121
P A C inC  COAST STO'CK IXCHAMOl
Block T ran sa c tio n s  
1 9 6 9  1 5 . 2 8 9
1 9 6 8  1 2 . 5 8 0
1 9 6 7  9 , 2 2 6
1 9 6 6  6 . 0 7 9
1 9 6 5  3 . 5 6 2
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% of T otal S hares 
36
32
33  
33  
20
1969
1 0 0 0  -  5 0 0 0  5 . 0 0 0 - 1 0 . 0 0 0
1 2 , 3 6 3
12%
1 . 5 2 9
5%
10. OOP fc up
1 . 3 9 7
19%
250
B o s t o n  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e
e S T A B k lS H C D  1 0 3 4
5 3  S T A T E  S T R E E T
JAMES E. DOWD BOSTON, MASS. 0S109
PRCSIOCNT Ar c *  C o d c  6 1 7  9 3 3 - S 3 B O
February 5, 1970
Mr. Georg# M. Chari##
College of Buainee# Admlnlatration 
Department of Finance 
University of Oklahoma 
Norman, Oklahoma
Dear Hr. Charles:
I have your letter of January 24, in which you request certain
date in connection with the preparation of your doctoral thesis.
I succeeded Frederick Moss as President of the Exchange on July 1, 
1969 and 1 will attempt to answer most, if not all, of your inquiries, 
following the order in which you presented them.
1. Enclosed is a reprint of the Boston Globe which appeared 
some time in early 1967. There is also enclosed a Xerox 
copy of an article that appeared in "Boston Magazine" in 
September 1965, which provides a fairly detailed history 
of the Exchange.
2. Exhibit 1 is the volume by year from 1960 through 1969.
3. Exhibit 2 is a schedule of the number of securities fully
listed on this Exchange during the period 1960 to 1969.
Bear in mind, however, that in addition to those fully 
listed, we also maintain trading markets in approximately 
550 dually traded issues.
4. I am unable to supply figures on the block trading or the 
percentage of blocks versus total volume for these years. 
Exhibit 3 is an excerpt from an in-house study conducted
for the period February 1 through October 23, 1969 on
trades of more than 10,000 shares.
B o s t o n St o c k  B xciianob
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Mr. George M. Charlee -2- February 5, 1970
5. The number of authorized seats in 1960 vas 102; on November 9, 
1967, the authorized number was increased to 112 and on 
October 9, 1968 the 112 seats were split 2-for-l, giving us a 
present authorized 224 seats. Of this figure, ten are held in 
the treasury. There are 181 seatholders, some of whom hold 
two seats and for tax or other reasons have not sold their 
split or second seats as yet.
6. The present cost of a seat is $14,000 (post split). By way of 
explanation, the auction market for a seat on Boston in 1960 
was about $2,000 and remained in this range until late 1965. 
Between early 1966 and October 1968, the auction market price 
was increased to a high of $28,000. At that time, when the 
Governors voted a split of seats, they fixed the price of 
"second seats" at $14,000 where it will remain until all of
the 214 available seats are outstanding. I would assume that at 
that time the price will then go on a supply and demand auction 
market.
7. The Boston Stock Exchange does accept foreign seatholders. In 
December, 1968, the Exchange received into membership a rep­
resentative of German-American Securities, a wholly-owned sub­
sidiary of the Dresdner Bank, Frankfurt, Germany. Since that 
time, we have received into membership alien seatholders rep­
resenting Swiss and French interests and in November and 
December, 1969, we accepted four Japanese, representing domestic 
subsidiaries of Japanese firms. The reason for accepting the 
foreign applicants was the desire to broaden our possible sources 
of business. As you may know, in Germany it is customary for 
investors to purchase securities through their local bank and
it made sense for the bank to join the Boston Stock Exchange 
through a domestic subsidiary, thereby saving its depositors 
additional expense and at the same time creating a profit 
center for the bank. I might add that the foreign memberships 
have been extremely successful.
8. The Rules of the Boston Stock Exchange at present do not permit 
subsidiaries of mutual funds or banks and insurance companies 
to become members. I do not foresee any change in this policy 
except perhaps to the limited extent proposed by the Midwest 
Stock Exchange in its recently circulated proposal to amend 
the Rules regarding membership and public ownership.
252
IloHTo.v S t o c k  E x c h .vncjk
Mr. George M. Charles -3 - February 5, 1970
9. Four new so le  llac lngs 'w ere  added during 1969, and t>e a re  
hopeful th a t during 1970 we can a t t r a c t  ten add itiona l so le  
l i s t in g s .
10. Our membership covers a broad spectrum of the s e c u r itie s  
business from the Floor Broker, Dealer S p e c ia lis t ,  small 
to  medium reg ional firm  to the larg e  New York wire houses.
In  ad d itio n , our membership numbers (p a r tic u la r ly  among the 
newer members) a group of e s se n tia l ly  mutual fund dea le rs  who 
Joined the Exchange a f te r  the a b o litio n  o f the customer d irec ted  
give-up in  December, 1968.
11. I  would be unable to  determine when the p rac tice  of the  customer 
d irec ted  give-up f i r s t  began. There i s  no doubt th a t i t  became 
extremely prominent and much used (and abused) in  the mid and 
la te  '6 0 ’s . There i s  no question th a t  the tremendous increase 
in  volume on the Boston Exchange during 1967 and 1968 was 
accounted fo r by the customer d irec ted  give-up. Since i t s  
a b o litio n , we have been stud iously  attem pting to  find ways
and means o f a t t r a c t in g  new business and l is t in g s .  The 
s p l i t t in g  o f the sea ts  and the acceptance of foreign members 
a re  two steps in  th is  plan.
12. I t  i s  not possib le fo r commissions generated on th is  Exchange 
to  be s p l i t  w ith non-members. We po lice  th is  proh ib ition  by 
our s ta f f  of f ie ld  aud ito rs  and I  am unaware of any loopholes 
in  th is  absolute p roh ib ition .
For your add itio n a l inform ation, I  am enclosing a re p r in t o f a r t i c l e s  
which appeared in  the December, 1969 issu e  of ISM, the magazine fo r investment 
p ro fess io n a ls , as well as the January 3, 1970 issu e  o f Business Week. Both 
o f these a r t i c le s  deal with the regional exchanges and the problems th a t they 
have experienced w ith the end o f the customer d irec ted  give-up.
X t ru s t  th a t the  foregoing inform ation and enclosures w il l  be h e lp fu l 
to  you, and I  most c e rta in ly  would app rec ia te  reading a copy o f your th es is  
upon i t s  completion.
Very tru ly  yours,
James E. Dowd 
President
JED/cr
Enclosures
VOLUME & DOLLAR VALUE OF STOCKS TRADED
ON THE B. S. E . FOR THE YEARS 1060-1968
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EXHIBIT 1
Volume $ Value
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
/9&1
5 .606 ,360  
6 ,268 ,720  
5, 332,051 
5, 595,436 
5, 925, 854 
7, 143,002 
13, 271, 928 
20 ,084 ,162  
42 ,406 ,072
o “2^~ Y i^ i"
' ..'/f
272, 155, 515 
318, 519, 633 
252, 352, 847 
274,085, 531 
310 ,107,457 
382,403, 133 
700 ,623 , 645 
1 ,091 ,604 ,173  
2 ,0 5 5 .2 2 3 , 378
4 / Â .
FULLY LISTED SECURITIES ON THE
BOSTON STOCK EXCHANGE
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EXHIBIT 2
YEAR
1955
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1968
1969
STOCK
81
69
68
62
57 
54
58 
57
BONDS
16
14
11
10
10
10
11
11
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É  B o s t o n  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e
C S T u a L IS H C O  l » 3 *
53 STATE STREET 
BOSTON, MASS. 0810Q 
Anc* C ooc 617 6 2 3 -5 3 8 0
June 20, 1970
Mr. George H. Charles
College of Business Administration
Department of Finance
The University of Oklahoma
Norman, Oklahoma
Dear Mr. Charles:
Your June 16, 1970 letter directed to Mr. Dowd has been referred 
to me for reply.
We have indicated on your enclosed sheet the volume and dollar 
value of stock traded for 1969.
We enclose a summary of block transactions of 2,000 shares or 
more for the years 1967, 1968 and 1969. No separate records were 
maintained for the years prior to 1967 so we are unable to even 
estimate what percent of the volume done on this Exchange was in 
the form of blocks.
We do not have any form of a yearly data book or written explanation
on the functions of members of the Exchange. However, if we can answer 
any specific questions, we would be happy to do so.
Very truly yours.
WEC/c
En els. Secretary
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N a t i o n a l . A s s o c i a t i o n  o p  S e c u r i t i e s  D e a l e r s , I n c .
S e V E N T t l N T H  S T R E E T  N . W .  W A S H I N G T O N ,  0 .  C .
Ja n u a ry  30, 1970
M r. G eorge M. C h a rle s  
C ollege of B usiness A d m in is tra tio n  
D epartm en t of F inance  
The U n ivers ity  of Oklahom a 
N orm an , O klahom a, 73069
D ear M r. C h a rle s :
i 'm  a fra id  that we do not have any of the s ta tis t ic a l  in fo rm a tio n  on cu sto m er 
d ire c te d  g ive-ups th a t you need fo r  your d o c to ra l d is s e r ta tio n . I would suggest 
tha t you contact the reg io n a l exchanges d ire c tly  fo r th is  type of in fo rm ation .
I am  enclosing your le t te r  in  case  you would like  to u se  i t  a s  a  b a s is  fo r 
in q u ir ie s  to o th er o rgan iza tions.
S in cere ly ,
K aren  Ray
In fo rm ation  D epartm en t
E n c lo su re s
APPENDIX VIII
PEGULATORY ACTS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
258
REGULATORY ACTS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
In the course of this study, certain legislation and 
organizations are repeatedly mentioned. Some knowledge of the 
basic objectives of these acts and organizations is desirable 
since they are all related, in varying degrees, to the problem of 
customer-directed give-ups.
The Securities Act of 1933 
This was the first of the securities acts and resulted 
from congressional investigations following the collapse of the 
stock market during 1929-1932. The basic objective of the 1933 
Act is to provide full disclosure of relevant information to the 
public regarding the issue of new securities. The act makes no 
attempt to control the quality of any issue or the method of its 
distribution. Some of the main features of the Securities Act of 
1933 follow:
1, The act applies to all interstate offerings of new 
securities in excess of $300,000. Those under $300,000 may be 
exempt from most of the provisions of the act with the consent of 
the SEC. Also exempt are government bonds, bank stocks, securi­
ties offered privately to a limited number of people, short-term 
commercial paper and securities issued by nonprofit organizations.
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2. Securities must be registered with the SEC before they 
are offered to the public. The registration statement provides 
legal, technical and financial information about the issuer.
There is also a prospectus which summarizes this information for
public use. If any of the information is misleading or inade­
quate the SEC is required to delay or stop the public offering.
3. After the registration has become fully effective the 
securities may be offered if a prospectus accompanies the offer­
ing. A preliminary prospectus, however, may be offered during 
the waiting period.
4. If the registration statement or prospectus contains mis­
leading information, any purchaser who suffers a loss may sue for 
damages. Sejypr'e penalties are imposed for violation of the act
The Securities Exchange Act of 1954
The act extended Federal regulation of the securities
industry to include trading in securities already issued. The 
principal features of the act tire :
1. It established the Securities and Exchange Commission to 
administer both the 1934 Act and the 1933 Act which had been 
administered by the Federal Trade Commission.
2. It provided for registration and regulation of all stock 
exchanges of substantial size. The SEC was given authority over
^John C. Clendenin and George A. Christy, Introduction to 
Investments (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), pp. 293-
295.
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listing and delisting of securities, short selling, floor 
trading techniques and general rules and practices of the 
exchange,
3, Listed companies of the exchanges must file registration 
statements and financial data with the SEC; periodic reports 
must also be supplied.
4, All officers, directors and major stockholders of a cor­
poration are required to file monthly reports of any changes in 
their holdings of the corporation's stock. Short term profits on 
company stock transactions must be surrendered to the corporation 
if stockholders take legal action. This feature of the act pro­
vides control over corporate insiders,
5, Proxy requests and practices are subject to the SEC 
control,
6, All securities brokers and dealers must register with the
SEC whether or not they are affiliated with stock exchanges,
7, The 1934 Act prohibits manipulation or any fraudulent
practices in securities transactions.
8, The Board of Governors of the. Federal Reserve System was
2
given the power to control margin requirements.
^Ibid., pp, 295-297.
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The Investment Company Act of 1940 
In addition to the Securities Act of 1933» and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 193^» investment companies are subject 
to the Investment Company Act of 1940. The act was passed by 
Congress after an investigation revealed, among other facts, that 
many investment companies had been run more for the benefit of 
the promoters than for the owners. Many investment companies had 
been organized with weak capital structures and unsound invest­
ment policies. Excessive debt had left these companies vulner­
able to business depressions. There was rampant investment in 
speculative securities which led to severe losses. Excessive 
salaries and fees had been paid to investment company managers. 
The important provisions of this act are:
1. A registration statement must be filed with the SEC by 
each investment company with more than 100 security holders.
These must be annual reports to the SEC and quarterly reports to 
the stockholders.
2. The registration statement must give information on con­
tracts for investment advisory service, which are subject to the 
annual approval of the shareholders. At least 40 per cent of the 
directors must be persons who are iiot employees or officers of 
the investment company or its investment adviser.
3. Each registered company must file a statement of its 
investment policy with the SEC. The investment in any company 
cannot exceed 10 per cent of its voting securities or 5 per cent
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of the investment company's assets.
4. Open-end companies can issue only common stock with 
voting rights, A limited amount of bank loans may be contracted.
5. Sales of new securities must be in accord with the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the regulations of the National 
Association of Securities Dealers,
6. Securities and cash of registered investment companies 
must be deposited in the care of a bank or stock exchange firm.
In addition, all individuals who have access to securities or 
funds must be bonded.^
The Securities and Exchange Commission 
The SEC was created by the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. The major reason for establishing the SEC was to protect 
the investment public from losses owing to fraud, unethical acts 
or unfair competition. The major objectives of the SEC are as 
follows :
1, To adequately inform the public about securities traded 
in various securities markets. All securities sold to the public 
must be registered with the SEC except for specific exempt 
securities.
2. To provide for the registration of exchanges, in order to 
regulate their activities.
Ralph E. Badger, Harold W. Torgerson, and Harry G. 
Guthmann, Investment Principles and Practices (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), pp. 374-573.
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3. To prevent manipulation in the securities markets by 
requiring information relative to inside trading.
4. To regulate the activities of investment companies and 
investment advisers by requiring their registration with the SEC.
5. To regulate the activities of brokers and dealers 
operating in the securities market.
6. To supervise the activities of the National Association
4
of Securities Dealers.
The National Association of Securities Dealers 
The National Association of Securities Dealers is the 
only self-regulatory association of brokers and dealers. The 
major objectives of the NASD are as follows;
1. To promote through cooperative effort the investment 
banking and securities business, to standardize its principles 
and practices, and to encourage and promote among members observ­
ance of Federal and state securities laws.
2. To provide a medium through which its membership may be 
enabled to confer, consult, and cooperate with governmental and 
other agencies in the solution of problems affecting investors, 
the public, and the investment banking and securities business.
3. To adopt, administer, and enforce rules of fair practice 
and rules to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and
4
Frederick Amling, Investments: An Introduction to
Analysis and Management (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1970), pp. 232-233.
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practices, and in general to promote just and equitable principles 
of trade for the protection of investors.
4. To promote self-discipline among members, and to adjust 
grievances between the public and members, and between members.
The NASD maintains its authority by means of a rule which 
forbids any member to allow a dealer's concession to, or receive 
one from, any nonmember firm on any new issue or secondary offer­
ing or over-the-counter transaction. Since these transactions 
are important to most firms' existence, memberships must be kept 
in good standing.^
The Investment Company Institute 
The Investment Company Institute was founded in 1941. It 
was formerly the National Association of Investment Companies.
The ICI represents mutual funds, their underwriters, managers, 
and shareholders in matters of legislation, regulation, taxation 
and various other areas. The Institution provides a source for 
information about the mutual fund industry, and serves as spokes­
man and fact-finder in many areas affecting its members, their 
shareholders and the investing public.
^Wilford J. Eiteman, Charles A. Dice, and David K. 
Eiteman, The Stock Market (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1966), pp. 55-57.
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The Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Association 
This association was formed in 1966 to protect and assert 
the rights and interests of independent brokers and dealers who 
are not members of the New York Stock Exchange. Approximately 
3000 of the kOOO or more registered brokers and dealers in the 
U.S.A. are eligible for membership. The efforts of the associa­
tion have been directed to issues relating to mutual fund legis­
lation, the abolition of customer-directed give-ups, proposed 
access to the NYSE for non-members, and changes in the commission 
rate structure.
